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DARWINISM AND RELIGION[1]

RUDOLF OTTO

Translated by STEWART G. COLE and EUGENE MUNGER AUSTIN

How may one define Darwinism? Those must be termed "Darwinists" who acknowledge in science the principles and methods of Darwin and who, using them in research, venture to extend his findings. In this sense, Darwinism is at first the name for a *biological* school. But its scope has been widely extended; an attempt has been made to carry over Darwin's principles and methods from the field of biology into other fields, and thus to establish, not only such natural sciences as zoology and botany, but also the social sciences of psychology, history, sociology, ethics, and epistemology with "Darwinistic" principles and methods. In this manner "Darwinism" became a general and at the same time universal direction of thought, and even a coherent understanding and interpretation of the world and of things in general.

In its original and narrowest meaning the term, Darwinism, is employed as a principle for biological research to infer that the structures and species of living things represent the outcome of an ascending scale of progress through transformation from the lowest and simplest forms of life. These struc-

[1] *Darwinismus und Religion,* von Rudolf Otto, Göttingen. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1909, pp. 14–41.

tures and species, together with the fitness of their biological adjustment, have come to be through blind natural causality, according to natural law. They are fully subordinate to the operations of the natural factors of variation and hereditary transmission, and are under the guidance of natural selection of the fittest through the struggle for existence. This theory also includes and evolves the view that life in general may be explained by means of intranatural factors, and rests on the basis of a natural causality which excludes the supranatural. But what remains *essentially* Darwinistic in this view-point is the belief that the struggle for existence (or better expressed, the "gain" or "biological profit") is the motive of life and of life's evolution.

A Darwinistic physics or chemistry has not yet been attempted, but there is indeed a Darwinistic astronomy. Charles du Prel transferred the idea of struggle for existence or biological profit to the heavens and the universe. He attempted to prove that the "species" (the structures of stars and orbits and their relationship of complete consistency) have emerged from the continuous struggle of mutual self-destruction, and that those which by accident were best qualified (that is, those which corresponded most closely to universal conditions) preserved their forms.

By means of the same principle "Darwinistic" interpretations of history and sociology have been conceived, and that quite naturally, since the doctrine of the struggle for existence originated in these fields (Malthus). With this same principle Darwinistic theories of the nature of the soul, of psychology, of ethics, of history of religions, and even of epistemology have been derived. In truth, this theory, which originally was an hypothesis of a zoological school, has expanded to represent a comprehensive school of thought, and has claimed to be the key to universal knowledge.

According to the theory of biological advantage, the individual organism is the sum of very many constructive individ-

ual variations which have been retained through hereditary transmission. And during the development of the mind, since in the formation of the instincts and psychic potentialities selection from possible variations is the regulative principle, soul, reason, and spirit are considered the simple aggregate of variations, accidentally combined and retained, whose bond is not an inner and organic unity, but rather the principle of utility (*nützlichkeit*) in the sense of self-preservation. The whole tendency in this manner of explanation, to derive and to explain the higher from the lower and to concede the former only as a quantitative gradation of the latter, produces a " Darwinistic " psychology in so far as one attempts to account for the higher psychic powers by those beneath, and for the whole psychic life by a play of simplest factors of sensation; so it includes necessarily a return to the old sensualism in a strengthened form. Darwinistic sensualism is distinguished sometimes from the early sensualism in that it recognizes to an extent ideas *a priori*. It purposes to explain an *a-priori* knowledge. It is the heritage of the mind (*erb-mnēmē*), a treasure of knowledge which earlier generations have acquired, retained, and brought down to posterity through hereditary transmission in accordance with the principle of utilitarian selection.

Thus, there has been created a Darwinian theory of *ethical* ideas and ideals. In so far as the struggle for existence refers not to the maintenance of the individual but of the species, it nurtures the *altruistic* forces of the species, the feelings of readiness to make sacrifices, to be regulated, to pay allegiance; all of which forces gradually become segregated and in time independent ideals, while their original utilitarian value for the struggle of the race for existence either is not known or gradually becomes unknown.

Similarly, the *æsthetic* feelings and values may be explained. Originally they served as utilitarian evaluations, and later became independent.

And finally there was developed also a Darwinian *theory of knowledge,* which attempted by means of the principle of biological research to solve Pilate's question, "What is truth?" This is the epistemology of "pragmatism" and of the so-called "economy of thought" (*Denkökonomie*). Truth also comes to be defined and understood finally by means of what is useful. The struggle for existence has no interest in what the ordinary man up until the present understood by "truth." It develops the faculty to have the most "useful" thought, and if truth is anything, it is the useful thought.

Why religion should be most strongly interested in such a "Darwinism" and from a hostile view-point, stands apparent. The interest of religion is here closely related to that of all higher and spiritual knowledge and to every ideal conviction, if the latter will not suffer themselves to be dissolved into illusion. The ethics here proposed is not an ethics as religion would presuppose them and as they presuppose themselves. As to reason and the human soul, it destroys completely all of the higher conceptions thereof, and breaks up the foundation also upon which religion has built itself. Regarding the Darwinistic definition of truth, scientific knowledge, perhaps, may content itself with this pragmatic definition and still go on with its work. But never religion. Religion actually *lives* by the conviction that truth is really truth, and not just useful ideas. Take from it the possibility of truth, and it must die. God must be truth and not a useful idea, else we would not serve him.

To this *expanded* Darwinism not an inch of ground can be yielded from the side of religion, nor from the side of any idealistic conviction, nor from the side of spiritual knowledge in general. The battle against it is not to be conducted in such a way that mere Authority and Oracle enter the field against the opponent. On the contrary, the adversary is to be shown simply and calmly that he is wrong. The methodological principles that he uses themselves are wrong. He tries to make psy-

chology out of physiology, but the spiritual explains itself neither through the physical, nor through analogy between the physical and spiritual, nor *vice versa.* The view is false that the soul is an accidental aggregate of motley " useful variations." It is a mistake to attempt to explain its close organic unity through " the dice-game " of natural selection. False is sensualism and the derivation of higher rational power from sensation; false is empiricism and the deduction of fundamental æsthetic and ethical principles, judgments and convictions through the theory of biological profit. Emphatically false is this impugnment of the idea of truth itself. *This* Darwinism is false, not because it contradicts our dreams and desires, but rather because it contradicts facts and sober observations. It is false, even if Darwinism, in its original sense as a purely biological hypothesis of evolution and continuity of life forms, would be correct.

This latter hypothesis of Darwinism, *purus et simplex,* taken by itself and confined to the domain of biology would, if true, help to solve the problem, *under what conditions* and in what physical continuity of evolution did the soul and spirituality appear upon our earth and develop? However, what *these things themselves* are, what and whence their substance —of these matters Darwinism knows nothing, nor are they explained through its observation and methods. The appearance of life and soul is perhaps constrained by such factors as conditions. But both are not to be positively explained through them. Only through the soul itself may the soul be understood. And all true understanding of it will be only hindered and made more difficult by the transfer of material and physiological considerations into its domain. The highest calling given to true science is the searching quest for the spirit itself, its powers, its perceptual efficiency, and its sources of evaluations.

This great task cannot be accomplished here. But two principles in Darwinism, and even in the " narrower " concep-

tion of that term, can be taken separately and may be dealt with here in their relation to religion. They are the principles usually referred to when questions are raised regarding " Darwinism and Religion " or regarding " Darwinism and Theology." These are (a) the fundamental presupposition of Darwinism of complete, connected evolution of all living things under natural law, and (b) that which du Bois-Reymond has termed " the removement of teleology."—Life, so enormously manifold, spreads itself out before us, in astonishing fulness of forms, gradations, and contrasts. But all that is has developed, and has developed according to natural law and through natural factors. This is the first principle. As for the second, each species and separate form of living beings is indeed—as the Darwinist yields—an inimitable wonder of practical construction, and the whole series is a stairway of forms ever higher and more developed in physical and spiritual organization and complication. Indeed, both of these principles produce the impression of an ultimate purpose, and lead to infer some sort of purpose in natural continuity. Natural science, however, repudiates this, and admits only the nexus of *causæ effectivæ*. Now Darwin's theory is the attempt to explain the " teleology " in nature, the seemingly purposeful structure and outfitting of organisms by mere causes, without a purpose, interrupting or completing the nexus of natural causality.

If so, is it not clear then that even in its narrowest domain Darwinism must be antagonistic to theology? If religion, and particularly the religion represented by theology, the religion of belief in God, owns any truth, then the *foundation* of all things and of all world-phenomena must be in God. But according to (a) the existence of life and even of mankind is reduced to natural evolution, which took place according to natural law and should be confined strictly within itself. And if religion is to remain itself, and is not to evaporate into a misty surrogate of itself, it must furnish a *purpose* which decides things and their existence. It cannot and does not

presume " to have sat in the counsel of God himself," and to know the final purpose of the world in general; but if there is to be religion it must and does claim as a divinely ordained *purpose* at least the existence of spiritual-personal realities, who are capable of a communion with God; and at least in this sense it must claim a purposefulness of life, and of its organization in the biological sense as the necessary presupposition of spiritual life.—How then does the matter stand? Which shall yield, Religion or Darwinism? How can this problem be solved?

The problem solves itself, in that it does not exist. And this is true in a double sense, since (a) the problem is only a part of a greater problem, which theology had already solved *before* Darwinism established itself, and since (b) the problem in general constitutes only an imaginary one.

Our first problem is a part of the general problem of the relation of the natural to the supernatural. This is the fundamental question in all theology. Without the supernatural there is no religion. That which is perceived and given to us in first-hand certainty is the natural. How may the natural be considered along with, and in its relation to the supernatural?—The explanations of this relation are exceedingly manifold. To understand them, we must go back to Martin Luther.

In every primitive religion the supernatural and the natural are considered really as two spheres of existence, occurrence and activity which touch and cross each other promiscuously. Long before a clear doctrine of " natural law " and the control of phenomena according to natural law had been formed, there was already a distinction between the usual every-day occurrence, " of itself " and " natural," and the unusual, the irregular, the exceptional and the extraordinary. And in the latter was declared the rule of distinct higher powers, gods, demons, angels, devils, or heroes, sacred beings; in short, supermundane powers. In this way that which may be termed a " vulgar supranaturalism " was developed; that

is, that the miraculous affects the ordinary course of things by *single, extraordinary* acts, whether these acts be friendly, inimical, or merely strange and incomprehensible. In this view of things a world of miracles, myth, and legend takes root. But there has also developed from single and deep religious intuition another view which stands in contrast to the former one, and which bears within itself the seed of an overcoming of the vulgar supranaturalism. This more deeply devout view does not content itself with searching out the divine order in exceptional actions alone, but it also subordinates to divine rule the commonplace, the daily restraints and advancements of life's ordinary course. All, even the smallest and most unpretentious, is under divine ordinance, is the object of divine providence and hence of divine causation. " Cannot two sparrows be bought for a penny? And yet, no sparrow falls to earth without your Father." This view does not allow itself to be disturbed a little by the fact that the same events have at the same time their manifest natural causes and connections.

Such an attitude of mind was decidedly in the way of Luther's thinking. Even as he binds the supernatural efficience of " the Spirit " with " the Word," so does he bind the universal working of God with the " means." God works by means. This type of mind turned away most distinctly from the miracle-devotion of the mediæval time. The simple, sober piety of the *Aufklärung* period, turning away from miracle-seeking, continued only in this form, which Luther provided.

God works through means. This signifies simply that one should not search for him in extraordinary *portenta et prodigia,* but that one should evaluate the usual and natural continuity of occurrences of normal life as guidance of God. This is expressed most simply and sincerely in Luther's explanation of the first Article: I believe that God has created *me* along with all creatures. That *I* have come to be through father and mother and in the continuity of natural occurrences, does not prevent me in the least from saying that God has created *me.*

That does not mean that, because God created Adam, he created me only in a figurative sense. On the contrary, I myself and " all creatures " and the entire circuit of existence are quite as directly related to divine causality. If one considers this logically, Darwinism is thus made acceptable to pious thought by Luther's explanation of his first Article, before the theory had appeared.

The problem, however, which such a statement of pious judgment will call forth is this: Manifestly, to allow for a definite event in the natural continuity of things is in itself an explanation thereof from natural causes, and such an explanation seems *complete* and *sufficient* in itself. Is there then any occasion to refer the same event also to the infinite, explaining and conceiving it as abiding with the rule of God, that is, within divine causality? Can one truly include one and the same happening in nature and refer it at the same time to " Creation, Government, Maintenance," or what symbol else may be introduced instead for divine causality?

Not only can one make such an inclusion; one *must*. Usually one does so by bisecting the event, explaining it *partly* by the operation of natural causality (*causæ secundariæ*) and *partly* by the divine *concursus*. But that is manifestly the same mistake of the old supernaturalism, only in a somewhat hidden form: One would give to Nature what belongs to nature, and to God that which is God's, and by doing so ruin it for both. One destroys the strict continuity which the law of causality demands, and one puts divine causality into an order of time, and sets it up as a cause opposed to other natural causes, both of which contradict the real opinion of Luther decidedly. Moreover, by doing this one creates a great island of events, which is freed from divine causality: that portion, namely, which is due merely to secondary causes and therefore *not* due to the primary source, God. Thus an extra- or infra-God domain would be established, with which God himself only " concurs."

The solution to the problem is accomplished otherwise. It can be reduced completely only by a deeper understanding which Jacob Friedrich Fries, a pupil of Kant, already has given, in which is made clear the relation of the natural to the supernatural, and how the supernatural lies *at the heart of the natural.*[2] In the theology of Leibniz the solution was already intimated. His thought is approximately this: Assuming that I could trace back a single event of the world to its natural causes and perceive through them its necessity of appearance at this moment of time, and trace these back to earlier causes, even then I would not comprehend that there is a world at all; and that there is a world such as ours. I would not comprehend that there are natural laws and that there are things and such things which are subordinate to them and which obey them. However far backward I may draw the line of intramundane causality according to natural law, still *the world itself* remains " the accidental " and requires grounding. Take, for example, the Iliad: If I conceive of each of the single copies of the Iliad as having been transcribed from an earlier copy, and that from one still earlier, then I may understand the existence of this one Iliad which I have in hand. But that never explains the existence of the Iliad itself. The Iliad can exist only if there is a Homer, in whom the possibility of the existence of an Iliad is centered. Now, let the present conditions of the world itself be an Iliad and the natural laws be the transcribers of this definite Iliad from an earlier one. But even with an endless extension of the time-order there is necessary a Homer of this World-Iliad, that is a sufficient principle for the existence of the world and for such a nature of its existence, be it limited or unlimited in time and space. This Homer, this principle itself, is by no means a part of the time-order, or a link in the causal chain, or a mere concursus of secondary causes, but rather it exists above the whole order

[2] Compare R. Otto, *Philosophy of Religion,* which contains the speculation of Fries. An English translation of the book is in preparation.

as a timeless and eternal *underlying* cause of everything in every moment, and each moment is dependent upon it as much as any other.

This view-point, overcoming and eliminating naïve supranaturalism, establishes a supernaturalism of a higher order and implies a new relation concerning God and the world, and means for faith and devout thought a vast enrichment and amplification. Not only in exceptional phenomena or in supplementary assistant forces, not only in the domain of the spirit (and perhaps of life) but also in the mechanistic phenomena of inanimate substance, and even in the stedfast, stern calculability underlying the rotation of the very stars in their orbits, the Eternal is directly and ever at work. The world and existence are rooted in God in every part and every moment.

Such a new idea took form in Goethe in his "all-in-God-doctrine." "It became Him to move the world from within, to abide in Nature and to make Nature abide in Himself." From this view-point there have developed various so-called "immanence" doctrines. If these mean nothing more than to express the *intimacy* of the relation of the finite to God, quietly they may be accepted. The greater or lesser strength of the symbolic expression of the relation which in itself always remains a mysterious one does not matter so much. And we can refer to the very words of St. Paul, "In him we live, move, and have our being," words which may give us information but certainly not a definite rational explanation. For *in* and *im*manence would mean if taken strictly a connection and relation in extent of space, which, of course, can mean a mere symbol.

This understanding of the relation of the supernatural to the natural, already intimated by Leibniz, went over to the modern theology of our time. Its introductory book, Schleiermacher's *Addresses on Religion*, makes it an essential of religious feeling, to relate every finite thing to the infinite; but that

at the same time each individual event has also its relation to other finite occurrences, is for him a matter of course. This belief lies at the very foundation of his dogmatic theology, which is the important early theological work of the nineteenth century. ("From the interest of religion in perfect dependence upon God there can never arise a desire to exclude any fact from its dependence upon the natural connection.") Next to Schleiermacher, De Wette (a pupil of Fries) gave direction to the theology of the nineteenth century. Their foundations of theology are quite similar. In his notable book, *Uber Religion und Theologie,* he developed on the foundation of Fries the relation of the natural and the supernatural. Nor was an exception made by him as to the genesis of man. Thus says De Wette: "Considering the world from the standpoint of time and of *natural development,* we never arrive at a starting point; that is, if we avoid confused thinking. Behind any moment of time there lies a whole era, even as ahead of it. That from which something developed according to natural law must have developed itself and have been derived from something else. If there were once a time when there was no earth or sun, there must have been another world sphere; if the human race originated, *it is the product of certain powers of nature.*"

If the problem of the relation of the natural to the supernatural is solvable in this manner, then the problem of Darwinism proper, in so far as it maintains only the genetic continuity of all life and the development of all forms of life according to definite natural causality, cannot concern us much. We are not in need of a theological zoology. That humanity developed according to natural forces would not only not exclude, but would rather expedite and even affirm and clinch the fact of man's creation through God.

Whether man sprang from a celestial planet or from a higher vertebrate, whether in gradual transition or suddenly, he *developed* and that according to natural law. Whether the

particular hypothesis which Darwin and his associates propounded has been verified, is more than doubtful according to the latest turn of things in biological circles. For instance, our relationship with the apes seems quite problematical, and the particular theory of the struggle for existence is of value to many specialists only as a partial or generally untenable postulation. Probably another and better theory is superseding it. But undoubtedly that also is to be a *naturalistic* one. And just so regarding the theory of life, and the appearance of life as we know it on this planet. One hesitates now to affirm the supposition that it was blown here from another planet; whether man can produce it with our present knowledge of chemistry is more than doubtful. There is no doubt but that in the production of life factors and laws came into play which we do not know and probably never shall know. But we have no reason to doubt that they were *natural* factors and *natural* laws, from and according to which life has taken its beginning in its own time on our planet, and from which life would arise quite similarly if they were known and set in action. Granting all this, however, does not tear nature away from the dependence upon her eternal foundation, but rather, only binds her more closely thereto.

The first problem of the relation of the supernatural and the natural, and how man may have the right, even the constraint, to relate the same event to both " the finite " and " the infinite," was a real problem. Yet it solved itself. And in so far as Darwinism emphasized natural causation it could be met by theology, seeing that this problem newly raised was only a part of an older problem already solved. As for the second problem (that of teleology), it will be seen that it is only an apparent issue.

The struggle against *causæ finales* is as old as modern natural science. It rose from the first beginnings of the new science of the *Aufklärung* and its analysis of the Middle Ages. But what does it mean here? It means the struggle of the new

physics against the old physics of Aristotle, against the doctrine of entelechy, the *formæ substantiales,* and the *causæ finales* as working entities.

In contradistinction the new science declared that natural science knows nothing of purposive causes nor asks concerning it, but rather considers it imperative to seek out the causal connection of events, through which each one comes to its position in its own time. Further, the new science has claimed that in this causal connection only the *causæ effectivæ* (but not the so-called *causæ finales*) are conceded. Man was first able to arrive at a real natural science through such a "removement of teleology"—that is, of the intermixture of aims in the *causæ effectivæ.* In point of fact, Darwin's experiment is nothing more. It is the simple, strict consequence of the scientific principle of the *Aufklärung,* an attempt to acquire a causal understanding of things as complete as possible. Its special end is to gain a causal understanding of the fittedness of organisms for the conditions of their existence, and of the scale and diversity of the "species" of life. Its purpose is also to solve the question as to what laws all of these must yield and have yielded, without the necessity of referring to inwardly conceived *causæ finales,* entelechies, or the like.

But of what avail is such a search for *that* "teleology" which religion is concerned with? What value for religion lies in Aristotelian or Galileonic physics and metaphysics? Assuming that Darwin's experiment has been successful and that sooner or later it would be possible by means of his method to provide a strictly causal explanation of the complete course of evolution of the life-world, would thereby *that* teleology be discarded which theology is concerned with? The question is nearly laughable. Natural science explains itself expressly; it knows nothing of "ends" in view; it claims only that, in the constant pressure of causal continuity, each individual event, as well as the whole evolving order of events, is to be explained from sufficient and controllable principles.

But whether the developing whole or the individual has an end in view or not, how does natural science know? Have we to learn the aims and ends of life and existence from natural science? To affirm them lies quite beyond its power, but just so and even more so to deny them. The estimation of ourselves and of our existence in the light of value and purpose has its reasons quite elsewhere than in natural science.

On the other hand, if I cherish the belief that an eternal Wisdom purposed the existence of life and spirit and the human soul in this world, then I presuppose a strictly connected and unbroken chain of causal links for the realization of that purpose. All of the events of evolution realizing themselves according to strict law, all the multiplicities of improvement from form to form, the restless advancing and hastening selections, are nothing more than so many means by which this purpose may be accomplished and the strict and unbroken concatenation of the means only the surety of its realization. As here, so in general, the view-point of purpose does not exclude that of cause, but rather is it the simple and necessary converse thereof. Would natural science claim to have "freed" itself from *this* teleology, then liken it to the man who disputed the existence of tones because he could not see them in his microscope. There is certainly no way to gather divine purpose from mere natural science. For our faith in it we have other sources. But if it is known from other sources, then we can accept the picture which natural science gives us of a development of the world with strictly causal explanations.

THE GERMAN HIGH CHURCH MOVEMENT AND ITS OUTSTANDING LEADER FRIEDERICH HEILER

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[The paper following was in reality two papers, and was so prepared by the author. Because of their dealing with the same general subject the Editor requested the author to permit them to be run consecutively. This will explain any possible repetition or duplication. The paper is of exceptional interest.—THE EDITOR.]

WHEN Germany was celebrating the decisive moment which introduced Protestantism to the world, there appeared from the hand of one, Pastor Hansen, ninety-five new theses,[1] a new, incisive protest against the Christian church. Protestantism, read the second thesis, has no reason to be celebrating jubilees, but ought to repent in sackcloth and ashes. It has driven out one devil but has let in seven others far worse, concluded the third. Protestantism should now return, not to the Roman Church, but to Catholicity, read Thesis 7. Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Protestants all belong to the true Church because they are all catholic. And so they ran, with little restraint and no elaboration. There was exaggeration, but also much adequate reflection. For the most part, Hansen's protests fell on dull ears. Yet they marked the beginning of the present High-Church movement in Germany—not a very flourishing movement, perhaps, but one that has its official organ, its leaders, and its adherents in many parts of the country. Opponents fear that it may have dangerous and disintegrating effects within the national church.

The faults of the German Church are in many ways peculiar to Germany. While there is dignity and solemnity in its church worship, there is certainly frigidity and excessive for-

[1] *Stimuli et clavi* (*theses adversus huius temporis errores et abusus quas publice sive disputando sive scribendo defendet*), 1917.

malism. The sermons are frequently dogmatic and seldom inspiring or heart-warming. German churchmen themselves are not unaware of this, for the last ten years have seen the rise of a number of liturgical movements all of which seek to infuse life into German church life. The High-Church leaders make much of this lifelessness of current German Protestantism, and they see their efforts as another Reformation. Whether or no their proposed Reformation is at all possible or desirable, the fact remains that they have exposed glaring weaknesses and ills, weaknesses and ills partly inherent in the Reformation itself, but also due to the subjectivity of much theological thought and to the chaos in which the German Protestant Church found itself after the war.

There is a certain flexibility in the movement. Perhaps no one of the leaders could quite agree with another as to the degree to which the church should return to Roman Catholic forms. And all leaders insist that their chief interest is catholicity in its true sense, a universality which will include all shades of Protestantism as well as Roman Catholicism. They desire only to find a place in the manifold variety of German church life. They do not even deem it desirable that the German Church should become High Church. On the other hand, there is intensity, and the intensity concerns matters of ecclesiastical forms and attendant matters of dogma. The result has been division, so that at present we have the High-Church ecumenical group side by side with the High Church Union, each with its official organ, *Una Sancta* and *Die Hochkirche*. There is promise of union, but diversity and disagreement there is bound to be.

The leader of the more radical group is Prof. Friedrich Heiler, of Marburg. He counts himself a Lutheran, but he has never left the Catholic Church in which he was born and reared. Not only because of this unusual background but also because of his scholarship, his knowledge of church history and the Fathers, his mystic insight into the significance of ecclesiastical

form and organization, his feeling for Catholicism and his regard for Luther, his position as editor of the *Hochkirche* and leader of the High Church Union, he is the outstanding spokesman of the movement and its most prominent representative. Liberal influences early left their trace on Heiler. He has frequently lectured on Luther to Catholic audiences. Archbishop Söderblom of Sweden and Baron von Hügel are closest to him of moderns. To him Luther is the greatest evangelist since New Testament times and his mission is to the whole of Christendom. But Luther was not an organizer and builder, and his successors were not able to construct an ecclesiastical structure in accord with the Lutheran Church ideal.[2]

In 1919 Heiler described the genius of Catholicism and evangelical Christianity in the following words:[3]

> Catholicism is a grandiose, infinitely complicated, scarcely comprehensible syncretism, in which all religious forms find themselves together, the highest and the lowest, in which paganism, Judaism, and Christianity have been bound into a strange mixture. Its basis is absolute obedience, complete subjection to ecclesiastical authority, which takes the place of God; its culmination a supra-ecclesiastical, supra-Christian mysticism which, in its ecstatic bliss, exceeds time and space. Evangelical Christianity, on the contrary, is a completely simple and transparent form of personal religion. Its ground is faith in the revelation of the eternal God in Christ, its goal the blessedness of forgiveness of sins and the realization of God's reign on earth. There a bright interweaving of primitive cult and sublime mysticism, of external service to the law and inner experience of God, of worldly politics and spiritual asceticism, of ancient religion and Biblical Christianity—here, Biblical Christianity in strait-laced chastity and sharp exclusiveness; there *complexio oppositorum*—here, "the pure gospel."

To be truly Catholic is to assent to the WHOLE of Christianity: a *whole* God; a *whole* Christ,[4] in whom dwelt the fulness of the Godhead; a *whole* Church; a *whole* Scripture; a *whole*

[2] Cf. Hansen's seventy-fifth thesis on Luther.

[3] Lecture delivered at Upsala in Upland's Priestergesellschaft and printed in 1920 under the title *Das Wesen des Katholizismus*. See also *Evangelische Katholizität*, 150 ff.

[4] By the *whole* Christ is meant the eternal preexistent Christ, not only in his historical manifestation but throughout the whole course of Christian history. But more than this, the full belief in Christ (*der volle Christusglaube*) includes all history before Christianity as well as other religions besides Christianity.

tradition, which the undivided Church of the East and West has handed down. Catholicism's great sin is that it has allowed peripheral matters, not native to the Christian gospel, to occupy a central position.

To be truly evangelical means

> to believe and proclaim the wonder of the God-given forgiveness of sins; to live in a firm assurance of mercy and trust in salvation; . . to be a child of joy, and as such to bring the joy of salvation to every creature; . . to be free of paralyzing legalism and slavish adherence to the letter; . . to recognize the individual conscience as the highest and holiest norm, and in belief in the power of God's spirit to detest every external compulsion from the depths of one's soul; to realize the kingly priesthood of all believers; to give the Spirit free range and to affirm the right of charismatic, prophetic enthusiasm.[5]

One can hardly accuse Heiler of not discerning what the central affirmations of historic Protestantism are. But his criticisms of Protestantism are exceedingly severe. Protestantism of today, he says, has no occasion at all to criticize either Eastern or Western Catholicism as a decline from the gospel. It is neither called nor fitted to cleanse the temple of either branch; her temple-cleaning needs to begin at home. The Protestant Church needs a reformation more seriously today than did the Church of the sixteenth century.[6]

This call *Reformamini!* sounds again and again in the High-Church literature from Hansen's ninety-five theses to the latest issue of the *Hochkirche*. But it is more than a cry in the dark, for the High-Church group see very clearly what needs reforming. It is more than a craving for more form and beauty in church worship. Matters of dogma are implied in their desire for liturgic and ecclesiastical changes. Nor is Protestantism always at fault. Luther and the creedal confessions of the Reformation supply just the corrective and purga-

[5] *Die Hochkirche*, November, 1929, p. 328.

[6] *Die Hochkirche*, December, 1929, p. 364. Cf. Hansen's *Thesis* 52: "In the course of centuries there have crept into the Lutheran Church abuses which are worse than those which Luther combatted."

tive force that is needed. Indeed, more often than not, they simply ask for a restoration of such formulations as the *Confessio Augustana* and the Augsburg Confession.

The most notable feature of the High-Church movement is, of course, its pronounced ecclesiasticism. The Church is the *corpus Christi mysticum.* The exalted and risen Lord dwells in it. To be without the Church is essentially to be without Christ. To be a member of the Church is to stand in the company of the Old and New Testament heroes and the saints of Christian history. " The visible Church is nothing less than the permanent incarnation of God." Not only on the right hand of God the Father but also in the Church the risen Lord continues to live and work, and in the Church his suffering is continued. . . All this sounds like Roman Catholicism. Yet we are told that no ecclesiastical system shall be created, but a living fellowship which will feel its oneness with Christ, and will work for the coming Kingdom. Still the words of Cyprian, " There is no salvation without the Church," and of Thomas Aquinas, " The universal church cannot err," are quoted with great approval.

But the Church cannot exist without authority. So the High Church will create bishops and an official priesthood. Occasion may even arise when the primacy of one bishop should be recognized, but " this is not absolutely necessary." " Indeed, we recognize the primacy of the Roman Pope in the sense of . . . *primatus honoris, excellentiae et auctoritatis*, but not as *primatus iurisdictionis.*" The function of Church leaders is pastoral. In order that the Church may realize its unbroken continuity with Christ and the apostles and may perceive its unity in function (teaching, priestly, and pastoral) as well as an historic divine entity, in order that the Church of Germany may sense the fullest fellowship with the Church of other lands—especially the Eastern and the Anglican Church—the High Church will restore apostolic succession, the " reflection and completion of all our catholic efforts."

Few ties bind the Catholic so close to his church as confession and the absolution of sins. Through confession the Catholic clergy exercises a powerful control over the individual conscience. They enter into the most immediate intimacy with the depths of a man's soul. The individual, on the other hand, receives restoration, refreshment, and a sense of inner cleansing. Luther himself spoke of confession as an "excellent, precious, and comforting thing," and the *Confessio Augustana* solemnly proclaims that it is to be retained. Nevertheless, confession has almost completely disappeared from the Lutheran Church. In Catholicism confession has frequently exerted an evil influence because of the "talmudic casuistrics" through which the priests must go. This process is liable to destroy sensibility and insight, and the result is serious harm to the person who bares his soul. Catholic confession needs the corrective which the evangelical emphasis provides, "for personal Christianity knows no compulsion, no church law, no rulership of priests over souls, but only the sovereignty of the conscience united with God."

Again, the High-Church group stresses the importance of sacraments, and they aim to restore them to a central place in worship. "In the broken bread and the cup of the Eucharist God's love is revealed more plainly than in the most eloquent sermon." By virtue of its miraculous and divine creative power baptism gives new life. The holy Eucharist is "the hearth of the Church." Nowhere is the idea of the Church as the Body of Christ more vividly concretized than here. Nowhere are the incarnation, the crucifixion, and the resurrection made so visual to the believer. The incarnation becomes a fact of the living present. "The Son of God tarries among us in the homely forms of bread and wine." The Eucharist unveils the mystery of the crucifixion as an ever-recurring fact. He who partakes of the Eucharist is transformed into a new being; he is literally fed with food and drink of a new life. The Lord's Supper is, however, a strongly evangelical sacrament. Jesus' words in the

Upper Room were for Luther "a short summary of the gospel." The Lord's Supper is a *communion* not only of the individual soul with Christ (as in Catholicism) but also of believers with each other.

The High Church calls for reform in church worship. Its discontent with existing forms is great. Due to Luther's emphasis, the preaching service has been greatly overstressed. This service must now be expanded to include a sacramental worship. It must make room for the mystery-character of divine worship. It must attempt to express the Holy by numerous æsthetic devices—whether by painting, sculpture, or music. Evangelical services lack the *mysterium tremendum.* They have no religious drama which arouses the religious emotions. The Church is not a lecture hall nor an office, but a house of prayer. The tributes of adoration and praise should be symbolized by the presence of flowers, statues, paintings, and lighted candles about the altar. Like the Catholic Church the High Church will have its church doors open at all times for prayer and meditation. They will create liturgies embodying the great liturgies of the early Church. The altar will be the symbol of God's presence, and evangelical Christianity will have its places for quiet worship.

But sacramental and liturgical living demands the creation of centers of power and vitality for the church. So the High Church will support a monastic movement. It will create brotherhoods where men will go of their own will to live a life of meditation, prayer, and asceticism. From them will go out missionaries to the great industrial centers as helpers of the poor, rescuers of the fallen, and heralds of the gospel; in short, they will continue the work of Francis and Benedict. Wilfred Monod, the French Huguenot, has established a "tertiary order," a modernization of the Franciscan lay order, and in 1927 Friedrich Heiler established the first of such "tertiary orders" in Germany. Here the ideals of the High-Church movement are realized. To sense what is Heiler's ideal of such

an order, one should read his glowing description in his outline of the Evangelical High-Church program.

It cannot be denied that the movement of Heiler and his confreres represents a strong return not only to catholicity but also to Roman Catholicism. They would be the first to admit this, for their fundamental axiom is that the Reformation was in many respects a deformation. In some ways it exaggerated grievances, and in its protest went too far. In other ways, the successors to Luther, wanting his genius, pressed the development of Protestantism along unfortunate lines. And in still other ways, Luther himself was not without error, especially in his later works. That there is much to admire in the High-Church movement, no one who has studied it or felt the throb of its pulse will deny. That there are difficulties in the way no one realizes more keenly than the High-Church leader himself. One is sometimes caught, perhaps, dreaming wistfully for the halcyon days of romantic religious life when men ventured forth to leave the world for God and then return into it again for him. But dogmatic presuppositions underlie every reform of the High-Church group, and to these most men will find it difficult to assent.

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In 1919, under the influence of Archbishop Söderblom, Friedrich Heiler was received into the fellowship of the evangelical Lutheran Church without, however, formally renouncing his allegiance to the Catholic Church. Under the spell of the Bishop's personality, the close kinship of the latter's theological views with his own, and the beauty of the ecclesiastical forms of the Swedish Church, Heiler expressed his longing to remain in Stockholm in the presence of the Cathedral, and in the company of the Archbishop to live his life in an atmosphere that was preeminently congenial to him. The Bishop advised against such a move and told the young man that his task lay in his own native Germany. Once the Bishop wrote Heiler in significant and prophetic words: "You were born to be a

pilgrim on earth. If ever you find yourself quite happy in any Christian organization and feel at home there, that will signify that you have fallen from your spiritual calling." Perhaps no words better express Heiler's place in contemporary German religious thought and movement than these. Once he wrote, almost pathetically, " My own plans for the future are broken because God wished it otherwise." At another time, contemplating the condition of the German Protestant Church, he wrote, "And I myself have never been able, despite my high appreciation of evangelical Christianity and my enthusiasm for Luther's personality, to feel myself quite at home in evangelical churches." From his own country he is really expatriate, and his kinship is more intimate with the religious movements of England and France and Sweden than with those of his own land. In his reports of the Stockholm conference, in which he joined with abounding zeal and enthusiasm, his condemnation of his own countrymen is almost vitriolic. And his admiration for the Frenchman, Monod, and for many Anglicans recurs again and again in all his writings. On the other hand, both laymen and theologians will have none of him. The lay are outspokenly suspicious of his Catholicism, and theologians attack him with vigor and rigor. Yet, Heiler has made his impress upon German religious thought, for many individuals have found in him and his numerous writings and his High-Church movement freedom and contentment and warmth. Moreover, Heiler's theological position is bitterly contested, and thus he has added considerably to the production of controversial literature in a land that is not averse to controversy. By some he has been dubbed " crypto-Catholic," by others *phantastisch.*

Friedrich Heiler is still a young man. He was born in 1892. He studied Catholic theology in the University of Munich. At an early age he came under the influence of Reform Catholicism and liberal Protestantism. He was an omnivorous reader, as his writings show, both of modern and

ancient theologians. As a theological student he read a pastoral letter of Archbishop Söderblom, and the words made a profound impression upon him. "They were a beam of light," he says, "because they revealed to me what evangelical Catholicity really was."[1] He saturated himself in the Church Fathers, and this influence is always marked in him. For Heiler such reading was more than a scholastic pursuit. He breathed the very atmosphere of the Fathers, he felt himself on common ground with them, his spirit seemed to gain sustenance and refreshment from them. In all that Heiler has to say—whether it be in such colossal works as his great book on prayer, *Das Gebet,* or his learned volume on Catholicism, or in his lesser writings, in his classroom lectures or in his sermons—the language of the Fathers has left its indelible trace. And Heiler is an excellent eclectic: he knows what is germane, what will sum up a whole philosophy or point of view, what will give the spirit of the man and incarnate his genius in words. It is this familiarity with the Fathers that gives such warmth and color and power to his writings. One feels himself, after reading Heiler for an hour, transported to another realm. And it is a romantic realm which fascinates and captivates and kindles ardor and passion.

But it is not only the ancients that Heiler knows so well. He is familiar with modern philosophy and the history of religion, and he can usually read a writer, whether Oriental or Occidental, in his own tongue. It can be said of him what cannot be said of all German scholars, that he keeps himself in touch with contemporary English scholarship and theological thought. Perhaps this is due to the fact that they are more congenial to his way of thinking, for among his modern heroes he counts Dean Inge and Evelyn Underhill, to the German translation of whose large book on Mysticism he has written the preface. Perhaps there is no other modern outside of the Archbishop of Sweden to whom he feels more closely bound

[1] *Evangelische Katholizität,* 164.

than the late Baron von Hügel. The one great pattern that he ever holds before him in his strenuous efforts for an evangelical Catholicity is the Anglo-Catholic movement, and his writings refer again and again to the work of Pusey, Keble, Froude, and Newman. So powerful has been this influence that not only Heiler but many others characterize the present High-Church movement in Germany as the German Oxford movement. It is this example that spurs Heiler on, and the present status of Anglo-Catholicism fills him with almost ecstatic admiration and hope. "In Anglicanism," he writes,[8] "we can learn how a Protestant Church, which had come to ruin through Rationalism and state-ecclesiasticism, can be renewed and transformed by a sublime Catholic awakening. In it we can see how it is possible to plant Catholic belief, Catholic worship, Catholic mysticism and asceticism, and Catholic orders on Protestant ground. In it we see what immeasurable blessing a Catholic renaissance of Protestantism is able to bring." Only second to his enthusiasm for Anglicanism is his regard for the East Orthodox Church. From it, too, Protestantism has much to learn for the structure of an ecclesiastical ideal and for the preservation of a catholic unity of belief and ritual in a multiplicity of national churches.

At the age of twenty-six, Heiler became instructor (*Privatdozent*) in theology at the Catholic university of Munich. The next year he made a lecture tour through Sweden, and it was at this time that he made the momentous step which changed the entire course of his life. In 1920 he was made Associate Professor, and in 1922, at the age of thirty, full Professor of Comparative Religion at the University of Marburg. When he first came, he drew a large following of enthusiastic students and townsmen. While his classes are still well attended and especially the so-called "open" lectures fill the auditorium to overflowing, there has been a clearly marked wane in his influence. Yet, even if the early enthusiasm of his

[8] *Die Hochkirche*, November, 1929, p. 322f.

followers has decreased in strength, Heiler still exerts an influence broad in scope. He is leader of the High-Church movement in Germany, the chief editor and most frequent contributor to its organ, *Die Hochkirche,* and its most vigorous and learned theological support. While to many he may seem more of a disintegrating factor because of his pronounced Catholicism, the future of the movement seems safe in his hands, for Heiler is a man of the utmost charity, liberality, and tolerance. And in Marburg itself, Heiler shows both practical and theoretical interests. His work at Michelchen Kapelle is undoubtedly a most fruitful one despite the comparatively small number of those who attend. And if a personal witness be permitted, I was more deeply impressed by his services in the little chapel of Michelchen than by his passionate and learned lectures on the deity of Christ.

The place that Heiler occupies in German religious thought and activity today becomes clearer when one attempts to define his efforts or to formulate a statement of his theology. The chief contention that Heiler makes is that the Reformation went too far, that the successors to Luther did not follow in his paths, that they forsook him at crucial points, that the great consistently Reformation statements such as the *Confessio Augustana* have been shamefully deserted or distorted by modern church theologians, and that the German Protestant Church is lacking in vitality and power because of its failure to stress those points in dogma which Luther himself regarded as cardinal. His cry, therefore, is " Back to Catholicism." But not in the generally and popularly accepted sense of the word. For Catholicism, too, has made its great errors, and Luther's reformation exerted a purging effect in making the *gospel* the true center of the faith and not a large number of peripheral elements derived from Judaism and paganism. Heiler yields to none in his admiration for Luther, but he contends that many have a misguided admiration for the priest of Wittenberg. For

Luther himself is guilty of a onesidedness, which must be taken account of. For example, Heiler says that Luther's conception of monasticism and the monastic life is unfair, for he never really apprehended what the classical conception of monasticism was. And Luther's failure, a failure of which he was himself conscious, to erect an ecclesiastical structure corresponding with the Church ideal of Protestantism, has robbed the evangelical faith of infinite force and attractiveness. It accounts for the lack of unity and coherence in Protestantism, its inability to hold its members with the irresistible force of Catholicism in times of upheaval and storm, and the barrenness of its churches. Many other trenchant criticisms of Protestantism are advanced. If one reads his writings in chronological order from 1919 until today, one cannot rid himself of the feeling that Heiler feels himself increasingly uneasy in the Protestant fold, and that Catholicism becomes constantly more lovely and satisfying. Yet, it must be remembered that Heiler has never left the Catholic Church. He still attends its services and is inspired by them. He has never cried, "A plague on both your houses," for both evangelical Lutheranism in its original emphasis and pure Catholicism (whatever that may mean) are essential to " evangelical Catholicity." It has been questioned whether Heiler has ever discerned the pulse-beat of Protestantism as he certainly has discerned it of Catholicism. But Heiler speaks within the Protestant fold, not the Catholic, and he is trying to incorporate into Protestantism, at least in Hochkirchentum, those elements which he conceives to be essential to true catholicity. Many of these elements were to be found in the Protestantism of Luther and the *Confessio Augustana*, and nearly all of them are still represented in Roman Catholicism, though not always in their purest and best form. But here again it is just the function of evangelical Protestantism to act as a corrective force (e. g., confession, mysticism, and apostolic succession). Heiler's call is for a reformation of the Reformation. The Protestant Reformation, he quotes from

Hurrell Froude, "is an ill-set limb; it must be broken once more to be well-set again."

Heiler would not greatly resent it, perhaps, if one were to call him a Roman Catholic. He would say it meant no offense, but that it was a mistake, for he was an evangelical Catholic. He defines in terms of dogma what this means, but it means even more than all that dogma can say, for catholicity to him carries with it a very definite, practical implication. Therefore, he has allied himself with all the forces that make for church unity. He has written on behalf of Faith and Order, has attended the great conferences, has attempted to formulate a basis on which Protestantism may become truly universal, and has made luminous in many telling sentences the historical background which will pave the way to church union. Everywhere he finds signs of a miracle taking place, the greatest miracle for four hundred years, the revelation of the glory and richness of the Church, the *una sancta et apostolica ecclesia.* To be sure, many of his efforts for church union are couched in strongly High-Church language, yet he avers that in his scheme there is room not only for the elaborate ritualist but also for the sober Puritan. On the other hand, Heiler would have difficulty in seeing any possibility for union on any other basis than certain grounds of dogma.

But in spite of all his ardent efforts in behalf of an evangelical Catholicity, perhaps Heiler is better known in America for his great books. His work on prayer has few books in the whole literature of that subject to match it. It is an excellent exhibition of the mind and temper of the man. And it appeared when he was but twenty-six years old! His work on Catholicism, too, is masterly. There are few in the world today who understand the Catholic mind and heart better than Heiler, and perhaps none who can portray its essence and its appeal in more glowing and living language. His writings on Sadhu Sundar Singh have aroused violent opposition, but they, too, portray the same insight and sympathy. For Heiler is a historian of

religion, and he does not remain callous to the appeal of deeply religious personalities and ideas. He does not departmentalize his various interests, but synthesizes them in a way that gives a unity to all his work. Thus he finds a harmony between the provisional and preparatory divine revelation in all other religions and an exclusive and absolute revelation which is found in Christ and his Church. His theory of missions is the necessity of a synthesis of the Christian faith with the elements of truth in Eastern religions. Similarly, he champions the necessity of Catholic institutionalism and the prophetic character of the Reformation. Finally, we have seen what form his efforts for church unity take in his espousal of evangelical Catholicity.

The importance of Heiler in contemporary German theology and church life is greater than the present state of the movement he champions. He has the respect of the academic world for his scholarship. Whatever his theological theory may be, his work in the history of religion can scarcely be said to be vitiated or colored by it. His familiarity with the history of the Christian Church is intimate. He is a writer of unusual skill. The beginner in theological German would do well to start reading Heiler. He writes with the ardor of a true mystic, but his sentences never lack clarity. He is a man of deep religious sentiment. He admires Augustine, Francis, and Thomas Aquinas. There is a kindling romance in religion for Heiler, and he has the faculty of transmitting it.

THE RELIGION OF THE SPIRIT

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I. Authority in Religion

I DEFINE religion as the relation between two intelligences: man at the lower end, and God at the higher. The nature of man I do not discuss, but merely accept the theory that he is a spiritual being functioning through a physical organism. When he acts, thinks, feels, the "he" who does things is the man, the person. Without defining personality we say man is a personality. This personality is not his body, nor his brain, nor his instincts, for they are the medium of the personality's expression, nor is it his disposition. The personality is not physical, cannot be touched, handled, or seen. It is spiritual and without parts, therefore indestructible. This thing called personality is also in God although in the highest degree of perfection. These I take to be the *sine qua non* of religion. There are phases of thought which do not deal with God as a personality. I consider them philosophies, not religions. Certainly they are not to be identified with Unitarianism which is a religion of the unmediated relation between the soul of man and the spirit of God. If I were convinced that these ground beliefs of religion were false, I should cease to set up as a teacher of religion.

For those then who believe in religion, I wish to deal in what is really the most important of all questions. If we have an authority for what we believe, an authority that we can trust, we need not fear that we are on the wrong track in devising our way of life. This may strike some as being mediæval—that we no longer have authority—but of course that is wrong. We change authorities, but we always have authority. Indeed as the field of knowledge widens, we become more and more dependent upon authority. Which of us today is an authority

in relativity? One man alone seems to be the high pontiff in this realm. The rest of us rather take it for granted that Einstein and those who claim he is right have sufficient equipment for knowing what they are talking about. We do not know for certain they are right; if we did we should know as much about their subject as they do. In history we weigh the merits of various authorities. The tremendous amount of material which we accept on the word of people we trust is enough to stagger one. None points this out more facetiously and strikingly than Mr. Bernard Shaw, who tells us that mediæval faith in a multitude of angels dancing on the point of a needle was skepticism compared with the trust of the modern in the theory of the dancing electrons. Indeed we who accept the evolutionary hypothesis ought not be too contemptuous of those who believe in the literalness of Genesis—for we take a vast amount of it on faith.

But there is a difference in the way we accept our authorities today. Once an authority was considered infallible. Thus a mediævalist was said to reject a scientific experiment on the ground that there was nothing about it in Aristotle. We all know how the Copernican theory was rejected by the mediæval church because it conflicted with the Bible, and how evolution is rejected today in Tennessee for the same reason. But it is a mistake to identify authority and infallibility. Much as we trust the work of Einstein and Eddington, we do not endow them with infallibility. We have to trust their findings because we have not the means for disproving them. We trust that there will be those who will test their opinions by putting them into practise and in other ways showing that they will or will not work. We are quite prepared to have Einstein disproved or modified or accepted. If he proves to have been right in every respect we shall indeed be surprised.

There are some who are frightened at the hypothetical nature of scientific knowledge. But really it is not so bad as all that. Einstein has modified Newton. We are told that Euclid-

ian geometry is gone, and yet men who were raised on the older mathematics and physics bridged chasms and built mighty sky-scrapers. Hypothetical knowledge may not be the absolute knowledge we once thought it, but it has been enough to enable man to perform "miracles." And it will enable him to perform more "miracles" in the future—not only in constructing bridges, but in building up his spiritual life.

That last remark means that we no longer look for infallibility in religion. It is not reasonable to expect a species of proof in theology that is lacking everywhere else. I know people who have been shocked to hear it said that the existence of God and spirituality of the soul and the validity of the moral life were hypothetical. But they should stop to think that all knowledge is hypothetical. Is it a small thing to say that the truth of religion is as patent as the truth of astronomy?

The old argument had it that religion must be guaranteed by an infallible authority. It is a postulate of this paper that religion has authority without infallibility. We shall expect to find in religion enough truth wherewith to save our souls and yet enough flexibility for the truth to expand, to be added to, to be seen in new lights. In other words we shall expect religious truth like that of science—and both are God's truth—to be living truth.

To go back to our *a-priori* assumption that God *must* give an infallible guide to religion. It is the starting-point of the greatest of all modern churches—the Church of Rome. Man cannot find out much religious truth by himself, says Rome; therefore such a necessary thing as the way of salvation must be placed by God within easy reach of the simplest intellects. Is it an attractive and plausible theory? Plausible enough indeed to have caused hundreds of thousands since the Protestant Reformation to scour the world for signs of the infallible Church, the infallible Book, or whatever else it was that once found they might trust implicitly and never again have to be troubled. Mankind loves something on which to rest—why

not here in the supreme field? Plausible as it may seem, however, we find that infallibility is not given. We need to know how to make a living, how to fight the elements; yet God does not give us miraculous knowledge. By slow degrees man has had to hammer his way. How many a poor wretch has starved in the desert, or drowned in the deep of the ocean! For centuries we went without the radio which has saved many a life at sea. There are probably untold forces like that of the radio still undiscovered which would save millions of lives if we could only utilize them—but God does not reveal them to us. The conquest of nature is a conquest, and the only authority we have is the authority of truth discovered and the authority of the experts who are discovering it. God does not by fiat save us from sin, which would be still more important than salvation from errors of judgment. What evils might have been spared mankind had God seen fit to interfere! What robberies, adulteries avoided; what homes might never have been broken; what hopes might never have been shattered; what lives never wrecked by drink, drugs, and vice! One would think that a good God *must* prevent such evils, and there have not been lacking men who said because they were not prevented there was no God.

The truth is, there are no short cuts. In science, in ethics, nothing is easy. It is Whitehead who tells us we have no right to think religion—which is more important than anything else in the world—should be easy. Religion is a steep ascent. It is no play for laggards or for cowards. By slow steps we mount upward. To stand still is to fail. To look in advance for the infallible oracle is to look in religion for what is given nowhere else.

II. The Authority of Christ

The crucial problem of Protestantism today is that of the authority of Christ. Indeed it is always the main problem of all Christianity. The Catholic needs to believe that Jesus is

God before he can build up his system of the authority of the Church. Indeed the entire problem of authority is wrapped up in the question of the nature of Christ. If he was God come upon the earth to make an unmistakable revelation of himself to mankind there must be an infallible mouthpiece somewhere to perpetuate that revelation. Either the Bible or the Church or both are the organs of that revelation today. Protestant Fundamentalism and Catholicism are alike consistent in this matter because they claim an infallible authority—the one in the Bible and the other in the Bible as interpreted by the infallible Church.

But Protestantism is no longer so sure of the authority of Christ. Protestantism is fighting a theological battle today. Will Protestantism become a pure religion of the authority of the spirit in man, or will it cling to an external infallible authority? Protestantism must eventually go back either to Catholicism or to Fundamentalism if she chooses the way of external authority. Hence it is that this problem is no mere exercise of wits by rival schools of theologians. The very nature of Protestantism is at stake. She must go on to a frank admission that Christianity's authority is internal to the soul of the individual believer, or she must go back. She cannot remain where she is now—betwixt and between.

That the progress will be forward and not backward—inward and not external—is most likely. The infallible authority of Christ—upon which, of course, rests the infallibility of Catholicism and Protestantism alike—has been shaken by the critical studies of the last century. To point to a few of the reasons for doubting Christ's infallibility, it is sufficient to mention that he apparently believed in the existence of angels and devils, archangels and the archdevil, Satan. He also believed, or at least allowed his church to teach the belief, in his immediate second coming. "There are some standing here who shall not taste death till these things come to pass," he is reported to have said. Not that generation, but many since,

have tasted death, and still he has not returned on the clouds of heaven. He must have been mistaken, and therefore he was not infallible God.

There is another element of uncertainty destroying the absolute confidence with which we once turned to the pages of the Gospel. There are such discrepancies in the words of Christ and the pictures given us of his character by the evangelists that we are no longer absolutely sure that a given saying is authentic. For instance, what did Jesus say, " Blessed are ye poor," as Saint Luke has it, or " Blessed are the poor in spirit," as Saint Matthew has it? Were the Beatitudes delivered on the mount as in Matthew, or on the plain as in Luke? That we can arrive at a good idea of his ideas is possible through scholarly criticism, but we no longer are certain enough of his *ipsissima verba* to be able to say, Thus and thus said he, without an iota of doubt.

With the infallible Jesus gone from the picture, all infallibility is gone. " They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him," I can hear some people say of this ruthless work of criticism. But have we taken him away, or have we really restored him? This is the vital question. Biblical criticism is founded on fact, and it is here to stay. If Biblical science destroys the Lord Jesus, then he is destroyed with people who love the truth above all else. Believing as we must in a God of truth, how dare we say that the truth will hurt, that it will take away anything of real religious value?

What the truth takes away from us is not Jesus of Nazareth, but the Christ of a later theology. The Jesus whom Peter and John could not but follow, the Jesus of whom it was said that he spake not as the Scribes, but as one having authority—this is the Jesus of history, of truth. Truth restores him to us by taking away what was mistaken about him. When he met the fishermen on the shore of the lake he did not say, " Follow me because I am God, the Second Person of the Trinity "; all he said was, " Follow me," and they obeyed. Why? Because

he was God? Absurd! Because he was the Messiah? They did not dream of it at the time. From his lips there fell such gracious words, from his eye there shone such power, from his personality there emanated such a compelling influence, they could not but follow him. Destroy this reputed godhead, show that he was mistaken about devils and hell and the second coming, prove his fallibility, his humanity as much as you like, and yet we are charmed and conquered by the gracious words which have been recorded of him. No man can reflect upon his personality, learn it, become acquainted with it, and not fall captive. Were he to meet us today and speak to us as once he spake to Peter and say: "Follow me"—is there one who would not drop what he was doing to follow him?

What then is the authority of this Man? Not the authority of organization. "The rulers of the Gentiles love to lord it over them, and their great ones exercise authority over them. Not so shall it be among you; but whosoever shall become great among you shall become your servant." "Be ye not called Rabbi; for one is your teacher, and all ye are brethren." These sayings, as Sabatier pointed out, mean that Christ appointed no hierarchies of authority to which men must submit their minds and consciences. What then was his authority? The authority of truth. He spake not as the scribes who spake by authority—that is, by citing chapter and verse of Moses. Jesus hid behind no authority, but dared assert truth for himself. Let us read over the parallels in the Sermon on the Mount which he drew between his own teachings and those of Moses. In each case he said, "It was said to you of old . . . but I say to you."

The authority of Christ was the authority of the prophets. Those who assert his defiance of Moses as a proof of his deity have not read the prophets carefully enough. When surrounded by vile idolatry and immoral worship, those preachers of old dared to say: "Who hath required this at your hand to trample my courts, to burn incense, to sacrifice animals, to keep feasts and fasts? God wants only that you should live justly and

love mercy." This was a terrific rebellion on the part of the prophets, for all around them the people were wedded to their immoralities and their superstitions. By what authority dare they cry out, "Thus saith Jehovah"? Heard they an audible voice from heaven? Not at all. The only voices the prophets ever heard are the same voices that you and I hear—the voice of mind and heart.

When you and I read the prophets, do we ask by what authority did they these things? We do not. We need no authority. Their position stands by itself without aid from without. Asked whether God prefers a clean heart to the blood of a goat, what would you answer instantly? The clean heart, of course. By what authority make you this answer? By the same authority that the prophet made it—the authority of the truth appealing to your own heart.

And so of Christ. Gracious words proceeded from his mouth that two thousand years after his death are still resistless. When he speaks of the clouds of heaven, of the second coming, of the flames of hell, of the devil and his angels, we listen not. Those ideas strike no responsive chord within us. Instead of making us religious, they only alienate us from religion. But when he says, "Blessed are the peacemakers, blessed are the meek, blessed are the merciful," our hearts throb in unison with him. His truth has found a resting-place in us. It remains for us but to receive it and give it a chance to grow and bring forth good fruit.

Look out at our world today. We see lazy, self-indulgent people living off the labors of others. We see some wasting their time in frivolity. Still others are constantly fretting under the obligations of life, resenting such misfortune and illness as must come in a measure to all. Selfishness, self-seeking, lying, stealing. Little children being abused, neglected, taught vicious habits and thoughts. Brutality and tyranny hold sway. Family ties melt, fidelity to ideals dissolves. Then think of Jesus of Nazareth. Measured by his spirit, this is all

wrong. Apply to such a world his spirit, and it would have to yield for the better. Is he right, or is the selfish world right? He is right. By what authority? By the authority of an inner voice in us that answers the voice of the shepherd of the sheep.

Can you do a dark deed if you imagine Jesus standing beside you? Can you remain in a constant grouch or depression or state of hatred? Can you bicker and quarrel and whine and complain at your lot, at the way people treat you? Why does his spirit dissipate such pettiness? Simply because true greatness banishes smallness.

Christ is not a tyrannous teacher before whom we must bow in lowly submission. He is a true teacher—a liberator of our souls. It is the function of the true teacher to put his pupils on their own feet. Not because he said it would he have us accept the truth, but because it is true.

"Why judge ye not of yourselves what is right?" said Jesus in the record of Luke. "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven." These are words of eternal life. They are the words of God's truth written in our hearts. We need no infallibility. We know they are true. We know that when they reach our hearts they compel moral action on our part. We know that in resisting them we are resisting not men but God. By what authority know we his truth?—by his own spirit in our hearts "whereby we cry, Abba, Father." "No man can say Jesus is Lord but by the Holy Spirit."

III. The Inner Light

It seems simple enough after this discussion to agree that the ultimate source of authority in religion is the Inner Light. But granted that, is there anything left? This is the criticism I have felt obliged to direct against the books I have read on the subject. After all, man is not only a worshiping animal, he is also a believing one. It is well enough to talk of the religion of the spirit, but what is it? We have a glib way of saying

religion is not a creed. But can religion get along without definite beliefs? When I read Sabatier's splendid book, *The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit,* I wondered when I had finished just what Sabatier himself believed. A religion must have ideas. It must have forms. Nothing exists—so far as we are concerned—in pure spirit. We have to clothe the spiritual in the visible and material. Jesus called God his Father. We know he is not our father in the literal sense. The word father, when applied to any one but our own flesh and blood parent, is a metaphor. Jesus was using a metaphor when he called God Father. Some modern people show small discernment in protesting against the use of the metaphor by insisting that God is not our Father. He is not in a literal sense, and if the critics would pause for a moment to hear us out, they would not need to criticise. All our religion needs metaphorical, material clothing. In other words, religion, like all life, is necessarily sacramental.

The religion of the spirit, then, is not yet arrived at when we have said that the Inner Light is the ultimate source of authority. The Inner Light is not, as some Quakers once thought, a fact-finding organ, although we may not be far wrong in calling it a fact-testing organ. We gather religious facts just as we gather any other facts; through experience. In the realm of science we have ways of testing for validity. And so it is in religion. We test religious thought by all the tests known to science. The Bible is viewed in the light of every kind of scholarship; so is Jesus Christ; so also the church; so the lives of the saints; so the sacraments and ceremonies of the church. *But when finally all scientific tests have been applied, there remains still the test of the Inner Light.* Unless the truth affirmed passes the scrutiny of the conscience of man, it is not to be accepted. But the facts are not presented by the conscience nor by disembodied intellect; they come from our contacts with others, from our contacts with life in all its visible forms. *Non est in intellectu.*

We learn first about God from nature. We see, from observing the process of evolution, that this striving and straining and struggling process has been toward the production of a creature who can think and will, a creature of personality. Through long ages this thinking creature has reflected on the meaning of his own nature and destiny and has at last come to believe in the existence, not of a myriad of personalities controlling the universe, but of one supreme Person. Were he content to judge the universe by its lowest constituent, he would conceive of mere matter and energy, or perhaps mere energy, moving but blind. If he moved a step higher and thought of reality in the terms of the plants, he might think of God as not only moving, but as living, though still blind. Some philosophers do stop there, difficult as it may be for some of us to comprehend them. A step higher, and man looks at God through the medium of the beasts of the field, and decides that God has feeling as well as life. But when he insists on studying the universe—not just a part of it—he realizes that he must include man. Then it is he sees God must be not only energy and life and feeling, but still farther, a living intelligence.

Man knows that all these predicates of God are metaphors. We know that the Eternal is not a limited intelligence, but an infinite one; but just because the term " person " is inadequate to express God, it does not follow that it is not just so far as it goes. God is *like* us so far as we carry the principle of personality—but how far he transcends us, the finite mind cannot begin to comprehend. When we speak of the infinite, it is like speaking of the millions of light years that separate us from the far-off stars—it is only a word, a concept passing imagination. Before the awful mystery of the nature of God, man can but bow and say: " My God, thou art too wonderful for human eyes to behold, for human thought to encompass. We worship thee as the sum of all goodness, the sum of all beauty, the sum of all truth; great source of light and life, in whom we live and move and have our being. We thank thee for the truth and

goodness and beauty in our own lives. We realize our own unworthiness of the great boon of existence. Not of our merits, but of thy bounty has life come to us with its marvels of thought and will and feeling. For our misuse of thy gifts, we abase ourselves before thee in great sorrow of heart. For lost opportunities, for mistakes, for avoidable blunders, for idleness and vanity and selfishness, we express our deep contrition. O God, in future, we resolve to amend our lives, to become new men, to be born again as little children. From henceforth, O God, thy will be done in our thinking lives as it must be blindly accomplished by the lower creation."

This is the first step in the religion of the spirit. All else depends on it. We must recognize that God *is;* that we depend upon him for all we have, and we must express that dependence in acts of worship. The church worship on Sunday is our way of publicly worshiping him, of supporting the institution which exists to keep alive and teach belief in him, and to set the example to others of the duty of worship. The more emancipated we consider ourselves, the more necessary is it that we set the example so that those without our education and opportunities may see that the more man learns, the more humble and worshipful he becomes. Worship of God is followed by thanksgiving for benefits conferred, and by sorrow for sin. And out of it all grows a sense of gratitude that we are alive, and with that the serious and deep resolution to avoid in future the mistakes of the past.

I have said that all life is sacramental. Man is a sacrament. You will all remember the definition of a sacrament—that outward and visible sign of an inward spiritual grace. Man outwardly is an animal; that which distinguishes him from the ape is not visible but invisible—spiritual; his mind, conscience, soul, and spirit. The spiritual is always imparted to us through the outward and visible. When I speak of worship, I am speaking of a sacrament. For while it is true that man must worship in spirit and in truth, as a matter of fact he

forms his acts of worship into words and deeds, and words and deeds are outward signs of inner spiritual realities. Dr. John B. Watson tells us that even our unspoken thoughts are really not unspoken at all, but only inward talking. So the most spiritual act of worship of the believer in his chamber is, after all, a material transaction—man talking to God. You and I learned our first lessons about God from others through their symbols. Doctor Grenfell tells us that his idea of Christ came from his mother—not what she taught him as a boy, but *what she was* made her practically God to him. Such is the power of a beautiful life. We see these sacraments of God's spirit all about us. With some of us, it was a mother. I talked one day with a young man who said he had no religious beliefs except that he knew he wanted to be the kind of man his grandfather was. That grandfather was the symbol of God to that boy. Now this, I take it, is the function of Christ Jesus. He was the image of the invisible God. Those who walked with him saw the Father. As I spoke about our judging God through the universe, and said that we must include not only blind force and the amœba and the horse, but also man, so I maintain that if we wish to reach our highest knowledge of God we must take for our comparison not the lowest of mankind, but the very highest. There is no rival for this place of honor among men to the figure of Christ. The minds and consciences of millions will be satisfied with nothing less than to say the Jesus *is* God; other millions are saying he is *like* God, and that when we see him we see the highest manifestation God has ever made of Himself. When the miracles are swept away, when criticism has done its worst, he still stands as the supreme moral achievement of our race. *To me, he is the image of the invisible God.* That is what he was once to all Unitarians. Today he is neglected. *From studying too closely what was temporal in him, we have come to miss the eternal; as the church in the past neglected his humanity in its eagerness to vindicate his divinity, so today the Unitarians have lost his divinity in their*

desire to assert his humanity. And the nemesis that has fallen upon us is that in losing Christ, we have lost God.

I think he was no accident. I think God was using him; and I think *one reason why atheism stalks close upon the heels of disbelief in Jesus is that disbelief in Jesus is really an act of infidelity to God. For better or for worse Christ and God stand and fall together.* Make what you will of it; we, the Unitarians as a denomination, are a standing proof that I speak the truth. Jesus is the outward visible sign of God. There are other such sacraments, but he is supreme. *No true follower of Christ will ever lose God.* I did not believe all this when I became a Unitarian; but I believe it now; and if I had not become a Unitarian, I might have gone on thinking of the divinity of Christ as a church-made dogma, rather than as a fact proved by the experience of the race. He is God made flesh—that is, God manifesting himself under the weakness and limitation of the flesh; but the proof that while God never leaves himself without a witness in these latter days, he spoke to us through his Son.

I do not know what Christ means to my readers. Whatever belief they hold of him will rest ultimately with their inner light. Some of them may have some day bowed before him as God of God and Light of Light: this is putting the symbol in place of the reality; but if their consciences will let them be satisfied with nothing less, then they must make their act of faith. To me he is not the Father; but the image of the Father in our human flesh.

FUNDAMENTALISM VS. LIBERALISM

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FUNDAMENTALISM is a symptom. It is a characteristic expression of American life. It is a fever and its diagnosis should reveal something of importance about the state of our culture and the "American soul." One must first get the facts about it and then with the picture before him as complete and detailed as possible, he must try to discover what it signifies concerning American civilization, American religion, the nature of religion in general, and the human nature which underlies all of these.

Prof. Stewart G. Cole, in his *History of Fundamentalism,*[1] does this. He gives most of his strength to description, however, rather than to interpretation. This is as it should be in a first attempt to gather together in a comprehensive manner all facts pertaining to this movement. Mr. Cole has gathered and organized in a masterful way a mass of material pertaining to the brief but fervid career of fundamentalism. He first sketches swiftly the beginnings of American life, showing how it was dominated by the church. Generally speaking, all the social activities of each community centered in the church. Institutional religion was imperialistic. It controlled the life of man as lived on the Atlantic seaboard in those days. And it continued to do so as people began to spread out into the Mississippi Valley. This period Mr. Cole traces only in very broad outline, for it is merely incidental to his main theme. A more detailed account might show exceptions to this domination of the church.

But after the Civil War this control exercised by institutional religion began to break down, and from that day to this secularism has grown stronger and stronger while the domination of the church has receded farther and farther. Many

[1] *The History of Fundamentalism.* Richard R. Smith, Inc., New York, 1931. Pp. xiv, 360.

factors have contributed to this end and Mr. Cole traces their influence: the industrialization of society, the rise of science, State education as distinguished from education in Church schools, the increasingly impersonal control exercised by society over the individual as distinguished from the personal judgment of neighbors in a small community, the multiplication of interests and means for their satisfaction beyond anything the church could provide. Then came the World War with its disintegrating influences.

But church leaders and church-members generally had inherited the tradition of power exercised by the church over the life of the community in early days. In many regions it had been an undisputed sovereignty, for in America at that time there was no powerful centralized government to check or subordinate the church, such as held it in leash in many other parts of the world. Now they who have tasted power do not readily relinquish it. Mr. Cole suggests that this is one of the chief roots of Fundamentalism, for Fundamentalism was, among other things, an attempt to regain for the church and the church leaders that power over society and human life which prevailed in previous generations.

Fundamentalism became a distinct, clearly defined and self-conscious movement about 1909 when the twelve volumes on *The Fundamentals* began to appear. The publication and spread of these books was financed by the Stewarts of Southern California. Some three million of the books were distributed. These, together with the W. E. B.'s *Jesus Is Coming,* provided the impetus and ideas which brought Fundamentalism into existence as an organized, aggressive, and self-conscious movement. For seventeen years it was tremendously active and influential. Innumerable Bible conferences carried it forward. Pamphlets, books, squadrons of speakers, conventions, evangelistic services, associations, and institutions of various sorts spread the movement far and wide.

A mere list of the names of some of the Fundamentalist

organizations reveals the enthusiasm and power with which the movement was carried on: The Anti-Evolution League of America, The Bryan Bible League, The Research Science Bureau (!), The Defenders of the Christian Faith, The Bible Crusaders of America, The Supreme Kingdom, The American Science Foundation, The American Conference of Undenominational Churches. Greatest of all of them was the World's Christian Fundamental Association.

For seventeen years Fundamentalism went up and down the land in power—power so great that the religious life of United States will bear the scars of the conflict for a generation. But after 1926 its vitality swiftly ebbed away. It still exists, but its strength is spent. It is completed, and it is time to write the history of it. But it was stirring and glorious while it lasted for those who were swept along in the current of it.

But how did it happen? Whence came the might and the fervor of it? What does it signify concerning the life of man on the American continent north of the Rio Grande?

There was first of all that tradition of imperial power wielded by the church in early days which many church people could not see slip away without a fight. But why did the Fundamentalists fight for it as they did while other church leaders did not? Because, says Mr. Cole, Fundamentalists were unable or unwilling to make the "adventurous quest for a higher synthesis of old and new Protestant values." Three desires in particular sought satisfaction in Fundamentalism: "the desire for an unshakable religious security, the desire for a like-minded Christian fellowship, and the desire for the administrative direction of the Church of Christ." The last desire he emphasizes especially. They who would not, or could not, make the "higher synthesis" found themselves losing prestige and power in the councils of the church. Fundamentalism was their way of seeking to regain positions of administrative control and honor.

We believe that Mr. Cole's diagnosis is true as far as it

goes. Any one who knows human nature must recognize that such motives must have been operative. Such motives are as potent among Liberals as among Fundamentalists, but in the nature of the case such desires would not produce Fundamentalism among those who made the "higher synthesis," while among those who had not, it did. All that is doubtless true, but we do not believe Mr. Cole has gone to the bottom of the matter. This is no criticism of his excellent work. It is only an attempt to supplement it.

Mr. Cole like Mr. John Dewey makes desire for security the chief motive that leads to fixation and glorified certification of doctrines. While this desire is doubtless present, we do not believe it is the most important one. Indeed we think it is relatively unimportant as compared to the major religious impulse which leads to such insistence on certainty and fixation as we find among the Fundamentalists. The second desire, that to attain like-minded fellowship, certainly must have been very strong, as it always is everywhere. But when it comes to the desire for prestige and power in administration of churchly affairs, we have something which we believe could apply only to the outstanding leaders and not even to all of them. But it could not apply to those thousands and thousands who made up the mass of this movement. And it is the fervor and devotion of these thousands that we must explain, not the eccentricities of a few leaders who, perhaps, in many cases did not do so much leading after all as rather to ride on the crest of a wave.

Why were these thousands of common people so deeply stirred and uplifted by Fundamentalism? Crowd psychology does not explain it except in small part, for it was not a crowd movement. It caught only deeply religious people together with the camp followers that are always swept along in such a drive. It did not catch the crowd. The cherished emotion aroused by old words and formulas had something to do with it, but could not, we believe, have engendered the power which Fundamentalism displayed.

There was a good and justifiable reason for the rise of Fundamentalism. It arose because of the weakness of religious Liberalism.

A deeply religious soul must have something to which he can give his passionate devotion, and not only that, but something to which he can dedicate all human living and for which he can cast himself and all his fellow men beneath the juggernaut in an ecstasy of service and reverence. Such an object is what the deeply religious person finds somehow, somewhere, in the universe or beyond it, or thinks he finds, however unable he may be to put it into words or even into articulated thoughts. Therefore, when to such a one the representatives of religion come palavering about something which does not command his passionate and ecstatic service and reverence, he knows something is wrong. He knows it is not the kind of religion that will satisfy his yearning and his aspiration, and he will have none of it.

But what were the Liberals offering to these passionately religious personalities? They were offering some kind of a patched-up "higher synthesis." Mr. Cole would not say "patched up," but he does make plain that this is what distinguished the Liberal. The Liberal spent himself "redefining Christianity to meet a shifting culture." That is what made him a Liberal. That is the essence of Liberalism. But it certainly is not the essence of the most passionate and powerful religion.

It is interesting to note how the several denominations settled the Fundamentalist controversy in their own ranks. The liberal Baptists did it by compromise and tactical maneuvers. The Presbyterians did it by legal devices. "The Fundamentalist cause lost in the courts of the church (Presbyterian) for the reason that its sponsors depended upon an appeal to loyalty to historic traditions at the expense of pursuing the proper legal methods." The Methodists weathered the storm by means of their efficient organization and methods of control. But tact

and compromise, legal maneuvers, and efficient organization do not feed the flame of religious passion. They are devices of respectability, not the wings of aspiration. How to keep the apple-cart right side up and how to keep abreast of the times and improve the estate of man, these are the important ends of religious endeavor for the Liberal. But there is a kind of religion—and it is always the deepest and mightiest—which does not seek primarily to improve the estate of man but rather seeks a cause to serve of such transcendent value that man can find his glory in being consumed in it and for it. Not to serve men, but to sacrifice men for a cause greater than men, is what they seek.

Now this surging, uncontrollable drive for cosmic ends was something the Liberals could not understand. " Tut, tut, behave and be good," said they. But the simple souls who turned Fundamentalist would not be good. The deeps of their passionate religious loyalty were simply flabbergasting to the good Liberal who was trying to harness religion to the works of sanitation and medicine and the sale of antituberculosis stamps. Pegasus would not work in harness and so the Liberal hedged him in with maneuvers and bribes of office and legal devices until the wild light died out of his eyes and after 1926 his wings began to moult.

Where and how can I find something to which I can devote all my life and the lives of all my fellow men in reverent and passionate service? That is what the deeply religious people asked of the administrators of religion. The Liberals did not give it to them but sent them away with adaptations to the culture of the day. Fundamentalists did give it to them. To be sure what the Fundamentalists offered could not be accepted by many people. But for them who could accept it, it met this religious hunger. In general the Liberals were not then and are not now giving anything to meet this hunger for a cause which is so much greater than the welfare of man that man's welfare can be sacrificed for it and the earth burnt to a cinder for it and

the majority sent to hell for it. The Fundamentalists did meet it for all who could stomach the sort of thing they offered.

A potent and vital religion is man's reaction to something which he is *sure* is more important than anything else that is or ever can be. Man has this soaring outreach by which he seeks the greatest in value that can ever be brought forth in all time or, perchance, is too great for time and so is trans-temporal. The utmost culmination of all being is that before which he would bow down and to nothing less. This culmination of all value, precisely because it is the highest possible, must be eternally and changelessly the highest and best. This and nothing less than this will he accept as the object of his deepest religious passion. No good work, no social reform, no manifestation of a transitory human culture, no system of thought, nothing which is anything less than the highest and best that ever can be, will this kind of religious person accept as the final object of his religious allegiance. Such is the audacity of the deeply religious man, and we honor him for it.

Since this is the persistent and passionate demand of him in whom religion surges most mightily, there is in such religion something barbaric, uncivilized, at times almost a contempt and indifference for the loyalties and good works and high endeavors of that trivial and transitory thing called the culture of an age or the civilization of a race which is so quickly to perish with the procession of the millenniums. To be sure this religious man will often do good works and serve his fellows with a demonic energy if he can do it for the sake of the All-Highest. But if any system of thought or achievement of culture or service of his fellows is set up as a substitute for this supreme object, at once he turns cold and looks upon your little enterprise as though it were a heap of dust compared to the glory which it presumes to supplant.

Here is where the Liberals failed, and here is where they are still failing. They set up as supreme concern for religious consciousness some form of good works, some piece of social

reform, sanitation, health, the ideals and intellectual systems of the passing age, some high product of our little civilization. When these little matters come strutting forward as the highest reach of religious aspiration this religious man says, " Please excuse me. I have something more important."

Disgusting of him. Of course it is. But remember he is a savage. He is a savage if by savage you mean some one who cannot be cribbed and cabined within the narrow confines of a culture which lasts for a few thousand years and then flickers out while the æons roll. This religious man is concerned with the rolling æons which are the little building stones of that structure of existence and possibility which constitutes the greatest value.

Liberalism generally speaking was weak and wholly inadequate to give expression to the gigantic propulsion of religious passion. Fundamentalism was inadequate, too. It was almost as bad in its way as Liberalism, but at least it did not make the mistake of trying to glorify to the empyrean the puny achievements and ideals of the culture that happened to prevail at the time and place. It lifted the vision to something more grand and vast. It was lamentably uncouth, bigoted, guilty of all the evils you wish to name. But perhaps religion at its best will always be uncouth because it refuses to submit to the habiliments of any transitory culture.

Liberalism is doomed. Religious passion will spurn it. With Liberalism cast off there are just two ways open for religious passion to follow. One is the way marked out by Fundamentalism. That means to take some traditional cosmology and set it up as though it were the final truth, eternal and changeless, enshrining the highest possible values. Such a move is always hopeless, for such a cosmology cannot stand. But simple and genuine religious souls will fling themselves into such a movement again and again, hopeless though it be, if Liberals keep on blocking the way with their glorification of the prevalent culture.

The other way might be called Radicalism. It does not set up any cosmology or any system of thought. It freely and frankly confesses its ignorance of the specific nature of that structure of existence and possibility which sustains, promotes, and constitutes the highest values. They who go this way confess they do not know *what* the All-Highest is, but they do know *that* it is. But how can they serve in any practical or theoretical way a structure of highest value when they do not know what its requirements may be? They can do this by operating tentatively and experimentally with the functions of the culture of their day, to the end of promoting or trying to promote this structure of greatest value, or at least to the end of expressing their devotion to it by doing the utmost they can in their ignorance and weakness. They will use the best beliefs they can and do the best works they know, but will never forget that these beliefs and these works are only the little ventures and groping sallies of men in their ignorance and weakness. This third way might be called the way of Radicalism as over against the way of Liberalism and Fundamentalism.

But whether we spasmodically fling ourselves into Fundamentalism or find the way of Radicalism, in either case Liberalism is spewed out. My applause goes out to the Fundamentalists. But let us hope it will not be necessary for Fundamentalism ever again to return to feed the hungry souls of passionately religious persons.

THE HUMAN GOAL

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I SUPPOSE no mind really directed to the immensities and unending changes of our mysterious universe, fails to ask himself many times over the essentially unanswerable questions: "What is it all about? Whither is it tending? What does it mean? Who and what am I?"

> We raise the questions old and dark
> Of Uzdom's tempted patriarch,
> And speech-confounded, rear again
> The baffled tower of Shinar's plain.
> I am—How little more I know!
> Whence came I, whither do I go?
> A centered self that thinks and is;
> A cry between the silences,
> A shaft from nature's quiver cast
> Into the future from the past,
> Between the cradle and the shroud,
> A meteor flight from cloud to cloud.

Though in some sense unanswerable we cannot but strive for answers, and I do not believe that our efforts are wholly in vain, however inadequate. Certainly as we follow the almost infinite course from nebula to star, to planet, to life, to mind, to man, to society, one discerns an orderly series which looks like a plan, and finds even at our stage of understanding the emergence of values that seem secure. An honest mind must, of course, face the inescapable possibility that he may be mistaken—that what he takes for order may be meaningless, and that all his little life is an accidental moment in a blind cosmic happening. Here is the place of "the evidence of things not seen," for "the will to believe" by which we elect into life-interest, enthusiasm, values, and creative energy, as against

blindness and blackness, stupidity and indifference—a death-in-life, a will to destruction, a poor mean world. Confronted by such a choice of a rich and glorious world against a poor and mean one, I think only a fool would select the latter.

Wherefore we note as reality the noble order entering into a primeval chaos of electrons, atoms, and molecules, creating circling systems and ages later pronouncing the fiat, "Let there be light!" and heat! and electric pulsations! and mysterious chemical affinities—and so our world circling in its orbit with its attendant moon, with growing arrangement of mountain, sea, and plain. Clouds and darkness round about it, but sunshine breaking through.

Then life! we know not whence, and we know not whither. But we know somewhat its course for the few millions of years that make up its period to now, and those astronomers who think they know promise it yet many millions of years before the changes of light and heat and pressures make its present forms impossible. So even though we do not know the ultimate whence and the ultimate whither, we know some proximate whences and can vision some possible whithers. And not so very proximate either; for nature has very considerately kept samples of her handiwork all along the way, and they may still be seen by those who have eyes to see. Still chaotic nebulæ sprawl in space, while others show beginnings of order in great spirals or in great slow-turning starry wheels. The heavens yet declare their glory in fiery primitives and in glowing clusters foreshadowing systems like our own. Nebulous stars, meteoric rings, and miniature solar systems point the way earthward so that we can fairly guess the cosmic path of our sun and world. So also do rivers, continents, and seas with light and heat, frost and snow, flowing waters, driving winds, rising mountain ridges and deepening valleys, in our own day tell us of the stages our earthly habitation has passed through in reaching a condition which made life possible.

So also life itself is all with us yet. Our primordial

protoplasmic ancestor or his prototype is in a drop of water ready to be put under our microscope. The whole varied brood of life is round about us today to tell us how it has floated and swum, has crawled and rolled, and flown and walked and run all the way from the zoophyte to man.

We can learn from them the long journey life has made and in some measure how it has made it. And to study the stages of a journey is to get at least its direction if not its terminus. Yet we find by no means a straight line leading to a definite end. Having found in complex hydrocarbons its material basis, the life process seems to have experimented in confused and uncertain fashion, in apparent trial and error, in fumbling and success. Starting as single cells, these cling together in masses, and presently learning to cooperate, they develop into organs and systems of organs. The vague touch sense of our lowliest relatives slowly subdivides; there come to be spots that see, spots that hear, spots that taste and touch and smell—and the seeing spots from merely distinguishing light and darkness come to vision the marvels and miracles of color; while the hearing spots pass from merely knowing noises to song and symphony.

Nature seizes on sun-energy and stores it in great fern forests and later in all our varied vegetation; but her storage system is so heavy that it roots down. Her animal world uses the storage system as a reservoir and so has mobility. But what to do with the mobility? The world-maker groups her life material in irregular masses, packs it in hard shells, and spreads it through the ancient seas; only to lose interest in her mollusks and leave them in the oceans and rivers while she tries other ways. Living stars with few and many rays appear but never take much part. Any one can see a mathematical trend—with even a decimal system perhaps—in the five-rayed stars and the five-petaled flowers; and now it shows again in the appearance and expansion of the series system: the monotonous sections of worms and wormlike creatures; the break-

ing up of the monotony in decapods, and myriapods, and centipedes, and millipedes, in arachnids and in arthropods—and then in vertebrates!

Who knows where mind turns up in all this multiplicity and variety? or what mind is anyway? But one thing does appear—that either the provincial, localized nature of our petty planet values life highly, or life values itself highly and has some efficient means for maintaining it for a few cosmic minutes in our corner of infinite space-time. One of these means was that of lavish multiplication. I once spent part of a sleepless night in estimating the unchecked reproduction of the microscopic paramecium, and as I remember it, if none of them died or were devoured they would fill the solar system out to Neptune in a score or so of years. A cod is said to lay fifty thousand eggs. As the total number doesn't seem to vary greatly, that means that forty-nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight die for the two that replace the parent pair. Tennyson seeing

> That of fifty seeds
> She often brings but one to bear

exaggerates tremendously. I should say that of the tens of thousands of seeds our campus maples drop for the breezes, probably not ten grow up in ten years. Any species unchecked would use up all the carbohydrates in the world in a few years and have nothing to make more bodies out of. But this other way of self-protection—the mind way? No one can tell us where it starts or just what it includes in the long list of reactions to stimuli—reflexes, impulses, tendencies, instincts, conations, secondary impulses, volitions, and all the rest of them. But we select from the lot those standardized acts called instincts, and those intelligent choices out of possible futures which mark what we modestly call the highest vertebrates. The former of these is especially present in certain members of the great group of arthropods, those known as the social

insects. As nearly as we can tell these respond to stimuli by conduct adapted to standard environment. Apparently without what we call foresight of ends they live average lives and so succeed under average conditions. If the conditions are not standard the conduct does not fit, and they may very probably pay for this with their lives. But conditions are mostly standard, and this automatic adjustment of lives to the probable world has been one of nature's outstanding successes; so that along with the microbe which persists by extraordinary fecundity, the insects are probably our chief rivals in possessing and using the earth. It is to be noted that insects are the most variable and adjustable of creatures, so that nature has hardly an empty space which they do not fit into. There are flat insects under stones, and round ones in holes—they walk and run and crawl and fly. They live in the water and earth and air. If nature sought merely persistent life and variety she has it here.

But life passes on from impulse and instinct to intelligence and conscious choice; here the living creature meets and conquers not merely average and standard situations but novelty and the unknown. It does not merely adjust itself to surroundings but adapts surroundings to itself and develops that deep and mysterious will to ends—to purposes—which involves a knowledge of ultimate values and a power of creation. For the most distinctive feature perhaps of the highest animals is the capacity to live forward into new futures—to select a future from possible futures and make it real by living it. It is this element of life, the intelligent, creative will, that makes religion possible, for it is this element which men in all ages have called God. To great spirits of the past in many races and in many times this creative impulse has come with such power and authority that they have recognized in it a spirit akin to their own. So they have personified and deified it; and as tradition developed the world-mythologies have been handed down from age to age, growing and becoming more

and more mysterious and miraculous as they faded into the past, and investing the prophets and leaders whose names are associated with the ancient stories with halos of myth and tradition. The foundation has always been some vision of a better and a nobler humanity, with the creative urge to make it real. Too often the superstructure has been a blind acceptance of authority, often in entire indifference or blank ignorance as to the meaning of it. Lloyd George, in discussing a point of difference between two Welsh sects, once said: "This is a matter of vital importance. I would willingly die for my faith, if I could only recall which side I am on." Any dependence on authority as final is a dangerous denial of the universality of that guiding element which is as genuinely a part of human life as sensation, or emotion, or reason. The conclusions of the fathers, whoever they may be, should provide stimulus and illumination—but not decisions.

This applies to the great teachers as well as to the minor ones. There is a sentimental attitude toward Jesus and his teachings that is fundamentally misleading. At one of our recent general meetings a valued and important minister announced that he "took Jesus as authority." Now as a matter of fact he differs in most of what official Christianity calls essentials, from an overwhelming majority of those who call themselves Christians. Which means that he reads his own opinions into the teachings of the Master, not agreeing with the most noted authorities. So exactly do Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, Protestants, and unassorted Christians generally. No one knows what Jesus meant or even what he said. We see through a glass darkly a great life. A few phrases in a language we do not know, float down to us in various forms. We select what we feel to be true and attribute it to him not because he said it but because he should have said it.

Now if we do this knowingly and with courage, we are on the right track. Jesus and other great teachers are leaders, not dictators. Their function is to stimulate the more abun-

dant life, not to show a pattern to be followed or to make statements which shall be used as creeds. It is easy to see how Jesus himself tried to avoid the place which has been forced upon him, since he rarely answered questions otherwise than by asking others or by telling stories. We should get from him the courage to trust our noblest and clearest-thinking selves, and to make the adventures of that trust. There is no third alternative to blind authority on the one hand and the taking of responsibility for decision and conduct on the other. But the latter may be done in half-hearted and cowardly fashion or with courage and enthusiasm. Of course it is vital that we shall be clear-headed and not substitute a mere fog of mysticism for the word of authority. Certainly there is an important element in life which is not rational but superrational; indeed without it as foundation there would be no place for the reason. This element is universal and so deep-seated in our natures that it is not only easily overlooked, but even when noticed it is so commonplace that it may seem unimportant. This which is so vital, is—is it not?—the domain of *values*—the answer to the question "What is worth while?" I am suggesting to you that, the world over, men agree in the fundamental answer to this and differ only on methods of attaining it; presently, however, coming to lay all emphasis on their own method, even to forgetting the end striven for. What we all want in life is something beyond merely being alive, and it cannot be stated in a single word or phrase; it includes such things as happiness, beauty, knowledge, love, friendship, and pleasure—a group of life experiences which bring us content or satisfaction.

The religions of the world have always centered on this problem: How shall we get an abundant life? According to the conditions of the people involved they have given varying and seemingly inconsistent answers. The religions of India, where misery and starvation have been the rule rather than the exception, reach a wholly negative answer. Life cannot give

satisfaction—it is essentially evil, misery outweighing happiness. Their religion therefore consistently centers on the way out of life rather than on a way of life. With this as a foundation they built up a philosophy and a religion of negation, which, however, never actually took hold of the life-processes of the people, for most men still strove for more abundant life. Reality is deeper than any formulation, and in spite of suffering and misery men found in this deeper life love, light, beauty and truth. Only a few fanatics ever attempted to really live the life of entire negation.

Another of the great world fathers undertook to build on custom. What was already attained was the right and the true. Propriety—the way of the fathers—precedent—was the basis of a religion which has dictated the lives of billions. It made a static civilization; it had much of the value of life but presently it grew no more, standing still for a thousand years. Another great religion centered upon the curious pluralism of life and believed its values to be attained only in a great conflict between good and evil, each contesting army led by a great deity and all men taking sides for one or the other.

Europe took all these ideas and fused them with great concepts taken from that people of greatest religious genius, the Hebrews. Thus Christianity adopted the idea that this present life is evil and that the way of greatest good is withdrawal from it so that monasteries and convents took the noblest and best of medieval Christian times. But this was not to get rid of life and its miseries as with the Orient, but to attain to them in the highest form beyond death. So the center of life was placed beyond the grave, and the affairs of this world were made to seem unimportant. Also early Christianity adopted the world conflict of God and the devil and went beyond Persia in regarding this world as the devil's own. The early Christians also glorified precedent; the future must be cut to pattern. The way of life is certainly known, and so only can we attain to its values. Added to this and mingled

inconsistently with it were the great ideas from the Hebrew prophets and from Jesus, the greatest of them. These were essentially that of divine fatherhood, or a friendly world element in human life, the kingdom of God, or a human society based on good-will, and the idea of man as the " servant of God " by whose aid " the kingdom " should be attained. These great ideas had never been very clearly formulated nor fully accepted as a basis for actual living by the Jews, and the Christian fathers ultimately took most of the value out of them by adjusting them to the other elements of their world theory. Thus the fatherliness of God was confined to a small group arbitrarily selected, by methods wholly irrational and unmeaning, while to the rest of mankind no demon could be more unsympathetic and brutal. The kingdom of God was banished from this world to that of a future life, so that men had no active part in " salvation " except that of getting themselves and others into the small chosen group. Man as " the servant " was a *mere* servant blindly obeying arbitrary orders. This was, and to a considerable extent is, the Christian Church. It will be seen that it sought the same values as all men have sought, but lost itself in a ponderous and inhuman machine of salvation. In all these thousands of years life has overflowed this machine—vaguely accepting and going through the required motions, men have sought love and beauty and truth and have found them through the church that has frowned on all of them.

Today we have a curious spectacle in the life of men. There is a great crude medieval section in all parts of the world; a backward, bigoted, dictatorial element which tries to force upon men the creeds and formulas of a thousand years ago. Over against these are the men and women of the scientific spirit of the age including a great part of our population, especially its younger element, who know, as we all know, what the life values are but do not know the way to get them in largest measure; and are likely to miss them by grabbing right

and left for the goods, since they have no clear vision of a general plan for the making of them. Apart from the church the genuine search for the good, the true, and the beautiful has gone on. The scientist has devoted himself to the search for truth, the artist to the search for beauty, the statesman for such organization of society as would make possible the greatest possible good; and all of us to appropriating what we can get into our actual lives. So much has been accomplished that we ought now to be able to sort out those elements of life which are "right" and plan an orderly way of life based on a clear vision of what we want to accomplish, worked out in ways appropriate to the kind of a world the scientist has discovered us to live in, and to the kind of people we are and ought to be.

Let us sum up the content of a reasonable religion. It aims at a way of life which will give the most abundant experience to the largest possible number of people. It recognizes that by a revelatory intuition which may be due to the inspeaking voice of a long heredity or in more direct fashion, we know the great values of life for mankind. It welcomes with enthusiasm membership in the race, so that no man is himself alone nor serves himself alone, but is by his higher nature dedicated to the creation of a nobler and better civilization. To this end he turns to that curious double nature which is in all of us—that other self which checks the impulsive, immediate self for a higher good; and this check gives time for that reasonable survey of the probable consequences of our acts, which is the life of reason. It is probably a fact that nine-tenths of our acts are guided aright by the immediate impulse—so well instructed is that mysterious inner life which has grown up so slowly in man. But the other tenth is our world of adventure into the unknown, illuminated but by no means dictated by the past. That element of our mysterious inner life which constantly tends toward the good is what we mean by God—known in part and through a glass darkly, but known in fact, in spirit,

and in truth. Our worship is our mediation and formulation of the truth as God gives us to see the truth.

My friends, the static life is the life of materialism. Rocks and rills, and woods and hills approach it. Men and women who hold to the merely accustomed life are the real materialists; however, they gild their materialism with luxurious sensations and emotions which they call "spiritual." To be "spiritual" in any vital fashion is to live vividly and vigorously in the task of bringing good order into our often irrational and chaotic world. The comfortable idler revives from time to time the world-old evasion of life, by claiming that all is good and evil is illusion, thus emancipating himself from all responsibility for unnecessary misery and disorder. I know no more discreditable item of the last generation than the reappearance and growth of this fungoid element of religion coupled with an unwholesome deification and worship of an ignorant, vulgar, and neurotic woman; a cult not Christian and certainly not scientific, however persistent may be the use of these terms by its adherents.

The enormous change in spirit of a single generation even, is evidenced by two definitions of religion, one from a liberal and reliable history of religions of a quarter of a century ago, and the other from a recent scientific philosophy. The former says, "Religion is the worship of a higher power from a sense of need"; the other, "Religion is enthusiasm for the good." The former still implies an imperial deity desiring flattery and servility; the latter a creative vision of that which shall be. To seek the divine vision, and then to project it into the world as reality is our substitute for the medieval dictatorship of a tyrant God. The atheists among us are those who refuse to enter this active partnership with God—those who not only "take things as they are" but are willing to leave them so. Naturally such are likely to be those whose lives are easy and comfortable and there are many of them among us. Let me in all affection remind them that the only outburst of anger

recorded in the brief notes we have of the life of Jesus was aimed at the Pharisees—the respectable, comfortable people who lived by precedent, accepted as of divine ordering a system much to their advantage and thanked God they were not as other men. If we are respectable and comfortable in a war-ridden, exploited, unbrotherly world there is something serious the matter with us. One of the foundation laws of physics is, "Action and reaction are equal and opposite." If we are meeting no resistance, we are exerting no pressure: "Woe unto you when all men speak well of you!" How many of our thousands are experiencing reaction which shows them to be genuinely active? We want a friendly, brotherly world based on good-will. How many of us are lined up with parties that buy elections, refuse ordinary human rights to Negroes, deny fair play in the courts to laborers? parties that have laid an ugly sewer of corruption from the Atlantic to the Pacific? that are in unholy alliance with vice and crime in our cities? And we sing:

> Faith of our fathers—glorious faith,
> We will be true to thee till death!

Who among us are "true" even to slight public disapproval?

We need again the old note of heroism that sounded in the days of beginnings, and—if but faintly—during the great war. It comes from far back in the love of struggle characteristic of our Teuton forefathers—the Angles and Saxons and Danes of the Norse Sagas. I will close in a few great phrases, extravagant with the glorious extravagance of those to whom life and death alike are the great adventures of human endeavor and achievement.

> Write on your doors the saying wise and old:
> "Be bold! Be bold!"—and evermore, "Be bold."
> Be not *too* bold—but better the excess
> Than the defect, better the more than less.
> Better like Hector on the field to die
> Than like a perfumed Paris, turn and fly.

The Roman officer said to his troops who complained that the enemy had longer swords, "If your sword is too short *take a step forward!*"

Two verses of an old saga:

> With a short-shafted hammer smites conquering Thor,
> Frey's sword but an ell-long hath he.
> 'Tis enough, art thou brave? Then go close to thy foe
> And too short shall thy blade never be!
>
> When the storm is abroad, hoist the sail to the top!
> Never flinch though the wind blows a gale!
> Let her go! let her go! They are cowards who furl.
> Rather founder than take in thy sail!

We may have fair weather if we conform to this world; we shall have storms if we begin to be citizens of the world that should be.

THE PLACE OF BELIEF IN RELIGION

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THERE has perhaps never been a time since Christianity became the religion of the Western world when unbelief was so general as now. Of course, skepticism in some form or degree has been present always. Occasionally it has so permeated the class of educated people as to set them off as unbelievers against the mass of common men, as in Rome in the second century and France in the eighteenth. But the skepticism of the present day is a different kind of thing. It is not a skepticism of the intelligentsia only; it is diffused through all orders of society. If our radical philosophers or scientists or men of letters reach novel or skeptical conclusions on religious matters, these conclusions do not remain their special property; they are diffused into every nook and corner of the country through popular books, popular magazines, popular schools and universities. The result is that modern society presents a picture, if not of skepticism, at least of indifference and uncertainty which is probably without any parallel in uniformity and extent.

Regarding this skepticism or indifference, I wish to propose two questions: First, what are its causes? Second, what is to be the attitude toward it of persons who, like ourselves, prize the Christian tradition in which we have been brought up, and yet wish to remain abreast of the thought and discovery of our day?

First, then, what is the cause of the present skepticism? I do not think there is any one cause, and it is even difficult to name a cause which will stand as the principal one. There is no event, like the war, nor any one time like its beginning or end that marks the abrupt commencement of the new way of thinking and feeling. Society changes its beliefs very much as

individuals do. A young man, let us say, goes to college carrying along with him his quota of baggage in the way of unquestioned beliefs. These beliefs may be about anything, about the creation of the world in the manner described in Genesis, about the obvious superiority of Republican principles, about the wrongness of Sunday golf. They are held unreflectively but none the less firmly. In the course of the next four years he may seldom think about them specifically, and yet when at the end he turns his mind to them again, he finds that his feeling and belief about them have altered radically. What seemed essential now seems unimportant. What seemed self-evident seems now infected with mythology. The new values and beliefs are probably far sounder than the old; as Emerson says, "When half-gods go, the gods arrive." At any rate, the beliefs he brought to college with him have largely disappeared. And the point of interest is that he can recall no definite argument which disproved any one of them, nor can he point to any person who offered the refutation. What has happened is that beliefs which were unreasoned, which were sown and fertilized by mere suggestion in his mental soil, have withered and died of inanition in the clearer air of a better knowledge. So it is with popular changes in belief. The beliefs in eternal punishment, in total depravity, in witches, in demon possession, have never been demonstratively disproved, but they are dead or dying because they find so uncongenial the atmosphere of scientific conviction and humanitarian feeling in which men are nowadays living.

But if it is the new atmosphere which has produced the new state of belief, what is it that has produced the new atmosphere? There seem to be three main causes.

First, there is the tremendous increase in the prestige of science. The world of a few generations ago was fixed in its larger framework by the Bible; the framework of our present-day world is throughout a scientific one. And even where old and new have not come into definite conflict, the old has been

superseded. There is nothing in biology or physics that is irreconcilable with the old scheme of salvation or with the doctrine of heaven, purgatory, and hell, but we find ourselves no longer taking these things with any great seriousness. The scientific feeling and attitude have become an integral part of our minds; and since such beliefs do not consort with that attitude, we find men coming to regard them more and more like the beliefs in fairies and Santa Claus. The modern man does not accept them even though he would be helpless to refute them; he takes their objects simply as unreal.

But what is it that brought to dominance this scientific way of thinking? There are, of course, very many factors, of which I would mention three as among the most significant. These consist in the personality and work of three remarkable pioneers, Copernicus, Descartes, and Darwin. The service of Copernicus was to fix the earth's place in the universe. The service of Descartes was to fix the place of reason in belief. The service of Darwin was to fix man's place in nature.

About Copernicus little need be said. The importance of what he did stands recorded in the significant phrase—the "Copernican revolution." It is common knowledge that the world of thought in which men lived before his time was extremely different from ours today—that the earth was flat, that it was rimmed by a great sea, that around it there circled the sun, moon, and stars, fixed in transparent spheres, that down below was a physical hell, that up above was at least a quasi-physical heaven. The universe was a finite whole; the history of mankind was a finite and well-known drama turning upon the salvation of man. With the coming of Copernicus, man and the stage on which he walked began a process of recession from the center of the universe. We are now accustomed to the suggestion that ours is a third-rate planet of a third-rate sun, and that, far from being the center of the known universe, it wanders obscurely in the outskirts. Doctor Shapley has recently put it more exactly when he said that a

light ray, leaving the center of the universe at present known, would take some forty-seven million years to reach us.

The work of Descartes was hardly less important. It was he who popularized the mechanical view of nature, a view which was strongly resisted because of its implied exclusion of miracles, but which, whether right or wrong, has won the majority of scientists to its side. It was he again who led the way to a new conception of the place of reason in belief. Before the time of Descartes, if one wanted examples of certainty, one went to the Scriptures and the church; but he raised the question of what constituted certainty, and answered by saying that it lay in self-evidence. The ideal of certainty then became, not conviction in theology, but demonstration in mathematics; and it was only, he said, when philosophers and theologians could exhibit in their thought the same clearness, agreement, and necessity that their thought would be worthy of equal credence. He was too loyal a son of the church to press these conclusions home regarding theology, but there were others to draw them for him, with the result that his works soon found their place on the Index.

Third, there was Darwin. The revolution that he initiated is still in progress. His contention that man is in body a child of nature has been all but universally accepted; even the Catholic Church is willing to admit that this *may* be so. But Darwin himself, of course, went further. He maintained that man's mind and spirit are also products of nature, and from this a considerable body of philosophical and religious opinion would still dissent. More and more persons would agree, however, that this issue also may be rightly approached in the scientific spirit and settled by reflection on the kind of evidence science affords.

The second factor in producing the new atmosphere of belief is the application of scientific thinking specifically to religious problems. Of this the most conspicuous example is the higher criticism. Before 1835 it had been commonly sup-

posed that the text, or at least the substance, of the Scriptures both old and new had been communicated directly to those whom John Donne described as "secretaries of the Holy Ghost." But in that year appeared a book by a twenty-seven-year-old professor at Tübingen, which was destined to have the profoundest influence upon the scholarly study of the Bible. This was Strauss' *Das Leben Jesu*. Following Strauss came a long series of energetic scholars, Baur, Renan, Weiss, Weizsäcker, Wernle, Harnack, who pressed this kind of question regarding the New Testament and its origin: Who were the true authors of the Synoptic Gospels? Were they witnesses of the events they described? When did they write? Did they have any motives for writing apart from the desire to record fact? Did they share the prepossessions of their age regarding myth and magic? If the Gospel of John was written to present its cause to the Greeks, how did its use of Greek terminology affect the minds of writer and readers? When was the present canon formed? What part had the Council of Nicæa in establishing the Christian creed? These and hundreds of similar questions were not only asked, but received answers that were novel and in some cases startling. These answers were read by theological professors; they began appearing in theological lectures; communicated to theological students, they began to reappear in the pulpit, and have now become common property. And even when they have not become common property, the plain man is dimly aware of them, and feels vaguely disturbed in his older and simpler faith.

Then, in the third place, there is the increasing secularization of men's interest. By this I mean that the time of the modern man is so largely claimed by the press of interests and duties which, though not irreligious are non-religious, that he has far less time than formerly to devote to things of the spirit. "The glare of the lamplight," James Martineau said, "has put out the stars." One can hardly be casually religious, or religious in five minutes a day. There are so many news-

papers to read, so many engagements to meet, so many societies in which membership must be maintained, so many new developments of thought with which one must have some acquaintance, that our attention is exhausted by the immediate, and there is no time left for that cultivation of the meditative mood which John Woolman and Cotton Mather thought so essential. Here again it is not that men have deliberately turned their back upon the faith of their fathers; it is merely that the strenuous secularity of our modern life leaves small time or place for it.

Now it is inevitable that the official guardians of our faith should take earnest cognizance of the change. The gradual dwindling of belief raises the question in poignant form: Is belief really necessary for the survival of the religious attitude? To this question two very different answers are given by different sections of the church. To the fundamentalist the acceptance of a permanent creed is as essential as it was to Newman or Calvin. "Dogma," said Newman, "has been the fundamental principle of my religion; I know no other religion." And dogma in the sense of belief resting on revelation is at the heart of fundamentalism. This the modernist declines to accept, finding the essence of religion elsewhere. In order to get the issue before us, let us look briefly at the views of the place of creeds in religion that are held by two outstanding exponents of these contrasting positions.

In the opinion of Doctor Fosdick, an evolution in religious belief is as natural and as necessary as an evolution in science. Indeed, the two should keep pace with each other. In fashioning our religious view of the world we should accept gratefully whatever insight and knowledge an advancing science may offer. If this entails a modification or even an abandonment of earlier beliefs we need not suppose that religion itself is threatened, for religion is not in essence a matter of belief; it is a life. A man's religion is not to be measured by how many of the thirty-nine Articles he is able to subscribe to. He may

accept them all and yet be essentially irreligious because his heart is cold and his ends selfish. He may reject them all and be profoundly religious notwithstanding, because his heart beats in sympathy with that of mankind and because his ends are noble. The best test whether a man believes in God is whether he believes in man. Only if he does will his religion be the religion of Jesus. The three most familiar parables—those of the Lost Sheep, the Lost Coin, and the Lost Son—all have this for their burden. The religious man does, it is true, usually assent to certain intellectual formulations, but it is not on the amount of his assent that the reality of his religion depends. For religion, says Doctor Fosdick, is a life. "Christianity is a stirring and costly adventure in personal character and social relationship. Theological theories can help, but they do not come first; they come last." Doctor Fosdick quotes with approval the dictum of Tolstoi, "Where love is, God is."

It seems clear, then, that for Doctor Fosdick belief is far from the thing of first importance. What exactly is its importance? To see that we must study it in its historical origin and growth. Such study will reveal two things: (1) That men's beliefs in religious matters are less attempts to state fact about the world they live in than to register and report the importance of their spiritual experience; and (2) that such beliefs, if rightly viewed, need not conflict with science at all.

(1) How did belief grow up? I take it that Doctor Fosdick would not hesitate here to apply the results of psychology and historical research. He would not hesitate to accept the view that the report of the beginning of things in Genesis is the sort of myth that an imaginative people with no science at their command, and little history, would naturally produce when they let their fancies free. His view appears to be essentially that of Arnold in *Literature and Dogma.* Arnold contended that to those who were acquainted with the manner in which imaginative writing is produced the origin of such conceptions offered no difficulty. Nor was the manner in which

the conceptions of the New Testament were attained essentially different. The writers of the Gospel accounts were simple men who had come in contact with a personality of a marvelous quality, power, and distinction. Such a personality seemed to call for an explanation that set him apart from other men, since their hearts gave unambiguous testimony that he was like no other. What form should this explanation take? What form could it take except that of the devices and conceptions current in their time? Among these conceptions were those of the virgin birth, of a lineage from David, of a power over life and death, of a magic command of nature, and in general of a being supernatural and intermediary between man and God. These conceptions they accepted and applied almost automatically. Are we to understand that in doing so they were reporting the same kind of fact that Pliny and Galen reported as a result of their natural researches? To say so would be to misapprehend profoundly their spirit and interest. What they were essentially attempting to do was to describe the stature of their master as reported in their general sense of him, to convey to others the impress and the image that he had left upon their minds in language suitable to what they felt to be its infinite significance.

(2) If their statement of doctrine is so interpreted, a conflict with science is unnecessary. It is only scientific fact that can collide with scientific fact, but since they were not reporting such fact, how is conflict possible? Of course if they are taken as reporting facts of physiology or meteorology, conflict is both possible and inevitable. But it is a great disservice to religion to nail its flag to the mast of any scientific doctrine, for with the sinking of that doctrine, religion is too easily supposed to be scuttled also. To attempt a psychological account of the origin of belief is by no means to destroy the moral significance of our present-day faith; but to tie it up inseparably with beliefs that will inevitably pass is to confer upon religion itself the transiency of a scientific fashion.

Though very briefly and roughly stated, this, I take it, is the view Doctor Fosdick holds. Naturally enough, he talks less about belief than about life, but since this theory lurks in the background of his teaching, his remarkable energy and noble gifts of expression are bound to give it currency. Let us now turn to the other view. Among the fundamentalists there is no more able or vigorous writer than Doctor Gresham Machen, formerly of Princeton. To him a view like Doctor Fosdick's is not really a Christian view at all, for Christianity, he insists, is not to be identified with a way of life; it carries in its very essence a view of man's place in the world, of his relation to God, of the way in which God reveals his will, of the way in which man may be reconciled to him. Modernism is an elaborate and deceptive way of saying that the Christian world view is false. Doctor Machen, in company with Dean Inge, would say that "Modernism destroys the historical basis of Christianity and converts the incarnation and atonement into myths." The psychological account of Genesis is really a way of saying that the creation of the world by God is merely conjecture. The modernist account of the virgin birth is only a way of saying that certain men were deeply impressed by an unusual personality, and implies that in his origin Christ was not different from other men. So of the other modernist explanations of belief. If they are accepted, we must face the consequence that the view of the world which was clearly held by Jesus himself and by his disciples is eviscerated of truth. The end of his life, like the beginning, becomes a mere tale that is told; and if the resurrection is a myth, then so is the whole Christian hope and most of the Pauline theology. That, in so believing, we are rejecting the Master's teaching about himself can hardly be questioned, for if there is anything clear about his teaching, it is that he laid an unambiguous claim to supernatural knowledge and supernatural power. He believed that he was a second Adam come to redeem man from his sin, that no man could come to the Father but by him, that he was

destined to sit in judgment over the just and the unjust. That these claims were actually made is abundantly clear; and this fact presents the modernist some fatal dilemmas.

If he accepts them, then his statement that Christianity is a life and that its essence is living like Jesus is plainly false. For Jesus himself declared that belief on him was indispensable, that men must not merely admire him and live like him, they must worship him, if they were to be in the full sense his followers. On the other hand, if a modernist does *not* accept these statements, then in paring away from Christianity what the record clearly says is indispensable, he is saying in effect that there is no limit whatever to what one is free to reject. Christianity is a varying compound of arbitrarily selected elements, each man taking what suits him and throwing the rest away. That this is what the program comes to is plain from what we see around us. For there are numerous modernists who, having refuted the creed of Jesus, have now began to cut and trim his ethics. Liberalism thus means, not liberty, but anarchy.

The modernist is confronted with another dilemma. Jesus' statements about himself are either true or false. If they are true, then modernism, in stressing the life and not stressing the creed, is palpably wrong. But if Jesus' statements about himself are false, then modernism is equally wrong, for instead of being a leader of preeminent moral insight, Jesus was then suffering from a delusion nothing less than pathological. He was deluding others because he was profoundly deluded himself. What then is the alternative before us? We must either accept Jesus' statements about himself with all their implications, drawing no line at the virgin birth, the physical miracles, or the plan of salvation, or else we must commit ourselves to an anarchy both moral and theological, and to the view that for the truth about Christian doctrine, we must appeal, not to the New Testament but to the new anthropology.

Here is a clear-cut conflict. Which of these views is the

right one? I do not think that either as it stands can be accepted.

For any one in the writer's position the fundamentalist view is incredible. One who accepts it must hold himself ready at any time to affirm in the name of his religion what his own advancing reason denies. Let us suppose that some particular fundamentalist doctrine is taken as essential to one's faith, say the inerrancy of the Gospels or the occurrence of a certain miracle. Let us suppose that newly-acquired knowledge should reveal that this doctrine is in error. What is the position in which we are placed? It is a position in which we are compelled by our religion to be unreasonable. It may be replied that this is begging the question, since it assumes that one's own insight is more likely to be reasonable than the content of revelation itself. But the defense will not serve. We cannot, if we will, escape the appeal to our own reason. If, for example, we decide to accept the Gospels as revelation and reject other proffered revelations, we must do so either quite arbitrarily or because it seems reasonable to do so, and what seems reasonable can be determined only by ourselves. The ultimate resort to our own reason is thus inevitable; yet if this appeal is justifiable in deciding which of various possible revelations to accept, is it not also justifiable in deciding which part of a supposed revelation is the truth, and which is not? Again, if the fundamentalist position is untenable theoretically, it is also untenable practically. It imposes upon its adherents an extremely painful divided allegiance. In order to be truly religious, they must part company with the vast majority of philosophers and scientists of their time. If they venture to place themselves in such a goodly company, they must abandon their religion. They are thus torn in different directions by two of the strongest of human loyalties.

Once more, for the fundamentalist religion is a duty, and, since the acceptance of a creed is an essential part of that religion, belief also is a duty and disbelief a sin. Now, that

assent and dissent do sometimes have a moral complexion is beyond question. One may adopt a certain belief to justify wrong-doing or to call attention to one's own originality, or to avoid the painful effort of reflecting further. In such cases we rightly feel that belief wears a moral character. But only that which is voluntary can be rightly approved or condemned, and belief is not generally a matter of the will at all. When the White Queen explained to Alice her preposterous age, Alice replied that she couldn't believe it and was told to draw a deep breath and try again. The reason why every one feels this suggestion to be so fantastic is that it assumes belief to be a matter of the will. Even when the will does in fact enter in, we usually say it *should* not. We praise a scientist and a judge in the degree to which they succeed in excluding its influence and allowing their thought to follow freely the path of the evidence. It is difficult to believe that what is praiseworthy in science or history should be the opposite in theology.

Can we say then that since the attitude of the fundamentalist toward belief is unsatisfactory, that of the modernist is the right one? Unfortunately, I do not see that we can say this either. For one thing, the modernist wishes to call himself a Christian, and Doctor Machen has shown, I think, that such a claim is very misleading. For the view described as Christian was held neither by Jesus nor by his followers who founded the church. It seems too clear for reasonable denial that Jesus did entertain beliefs about himself, about his relation to God, about his coming to judge mankind, which, however difficult they may be for modernists to accept, were yet regarded by himself as essential. If they are to be regarded as unessential, it can only be by a critic who claims the right to gloss the Gospel text to an unlimited extreme. The modernist who rejects them cannot assume the name of Christian in the sense in which either Jesus or his nearest followers have used the term.

Secondly, I must believe that the modernist goes too far

in his interpretation of creeds as the symbols of moral experience. That they do rest upon and express this experience is, no doubt, true, but they aim to do very much more, and it is precisely because they do that the experience which they express can be what it is. An experience of love, admiration, or reverence, must evidently have an object, and it is because the object is conceived as possessing traits that call forth these attitudes that the attitudes come into being. If the object changes its nature, so also must my feeling about it; if the object ceases to exist, the attitude disappears. Now it is through creeds that we express our conception of the nature and attributes of him we worship. I believe, then, that the fundamentalist is right in maintaining that a creed is of the very essence of religion and that without it any properly religious attitude must disappear.

Finally, the modernist seems at present in a position very similar to that of Newman in 1842. He is trying to walk an extremely treacherous *via media,* which is so narrow as to require a more delicate balance than any clear-seeing mind can be expected to maintain. It seems virtually inevitable that he should fall off into fundamentalism on the one hand, or, on the other, into a rationalism so thoroughgoing as to sweep his present eclectic beliefs into the limbo of humanism. The fundamentalist is probably right when he says that the admission of critical reason is the admission into one's tent of the nose of the camel, which will speedily be followed by the whole beast and the disappearance of the tent itself.

But if neither fundamentalist nor modernist has a satisfactory view of belief, is there any other that is more satisfactory? With the feeling that it will probably be promptly rejected by both sides, I will go on to venture a suggestion.

We must start with this as our corner-stone: that the intellectual conscience we admire in the scientist is not to be left behind when we cross the threshold of religion. If it is right in the one field to hold judgment in suspense, to attempt

a precise equation of belief to evidence, then it cannot be wrong in the other. It will probably be objected at once that the two cases are not parallel, that in science we are dealing with nature, where suspense of judgment is practicable, but that in religion we are dealing with matters which too profoundly affect our lives to make suspense of judgment possible.

I suggest that this objection may be met by drawing a distinction, and that this distinction offers us the true way of escape. We may recognize on the one hand beliefs about value, and on the other hand beliefs about fact. Now the decisions that cannot be suspended are decisions regarding values, whereas the decisions regarding fact, at least such fact as is referred to in our creeds, may, I think, be suspended perfectly well. Suspense of judgment about the Trinity, the Virgin Birth, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Resurrection, is quite compatible with efficacy, enthusiasm, and even saintliness in the practical moral life. For the direction and the quality of that life turn upon our elections of value rather than our beliefs in any kind of fact. The perception that insight is better than ignorance, that beauty is better than ugliness, that kindness is better than hardness, happiness than unhappiness, friendliness than jealousy or hate, is the kind of insight that chiefly determines how we live. And it is a perception that need have nothing to do with any dogma of philosophy or theology. As Paulsen says in his admirable old *Introduction to Philosophy,* "moral laws are natural laws"; so far as one orders his conduct with reference to future reward or punishment, or to anything whatever except the intrinsic good or evil of one kind of life or the other, he has not yet attained moral maturity, and when he does gain this maturity, other sanctions are needless. That one should get at the start of life a rightly ordered scale of values, accepted through authentic insight, is of the very first importance. But that he should have a theology from which it is supposed to be a sin to depart and which, though no more clear to his intelli-

gence than other speculative doctrines, must be treated as an inviolable preserve—this is only too likely to produce an explosion when, in the pursuit of science or philosophy, he comes to learn what an intellectual conscience means. To take our distinction seriously and to regard quite frankly as doubtful those beliefs, however necessary they have been supposed to be, which really present themselves as doubtful to the reflective and critical mind, would unquestionably leave our judgment suspended upon practically every description of religious belief. And that would involve again considerable alterations in our religious attitudes themselves. But how are such alterations to be avoided unless we are to accept different standards of honesty in different regions of belief? Such acceptance seems to me an abandonment of mental integrity. One may hope that whatever is true elsewhere, in religious belief at least an uncompromising honesty will in the long run prove the best policy.

THE PLACE OF FEELING IN RELIGION

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"FEAR created the gods," "The gods are made by human desire," "Religion is cosmic emotion," "Religion is man's feeling of dependence and trust." Such statements as these attest the importance of feeling in the religious life. To the question, what is most fundamental in the religious law, Jesus answered in terms of love of God and love of neighbor. If you want to understand the true spirit of a religion, you must go to its common prayer-books and books of private devotion, not to its creeds. You must listen to the chants and hymns sung at its meetings for worship. You must study the kind of music it prefers from its organ or choir. You must observe the attitudes of its members, not only in the pew but in the vestibule and parish house. Why do Episcopalians put such emphasis upon ritual, upon the use of a standard book for public worship, upon the appearance of the altar, while Methodists, on the whole, put so little store by these things? Is it because of difference in belief? Hardly, because such differences are negligible. It is because of a profound difference of attitude toward God and man. In prayer the Episcopalian clergyman addresses God in a somewhat dignified and formal manner, which seems to the Methodist rather lacking in warmth and love, while the Methodist minister talks to and with God as if he were having an impromptu and informal talk with a highly respected neighbor.

The importance of feeling in religion will, then, be generally admitted. We must, however, be very careful to guard against too narrow or too broad an interpretation of the term "religious feeling." First, it is not to be taken too *narrowly*. An attitude and disposition of the will is perhaps more fundamental in what is called "Christian love" than is warm spon-

taneous feeling as such. This reference to will attitude and temper is even more striking in Confucian "sympathy" and "reverence." By "sympathy" is meant much more than occasionally aroused spontaneous feelings of compassion; it is, rather, a settled, carefully cultivated temper and habit of understanding and compliance. By "reverence" is meant much more than feelings compounded of awe and devotion; it is, rather, a deep-rooted deference toward others and especially toward one's superiors. In other words, it is not merely feeling but dependable attitude that both Christianity and Confucianism inculcate. Of course, I do not mean to deny that ofttimes religious feelings are cultivated for their own sakes. Primitive man works himself into a frenzy of excitement in the war-dance; the worshipers of Dionysus sought communion with their god in the wildest revels; the camp-meeting, with its impassioned exhortations and its convictions of sin and salvation, are too near us to be easily forgotten; and there is a good portion of the sentimentalist and the fanatic even in respectable educated people like ourselves. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be true that religious feelings are always cultivated with an eye to their effects upon the temper of mind and will. The war-dance gives a deeper sense of the group life and the danger it is facing, hence it generates courage in battles. The exhorter and the exhorted alike are convinced that conversion will produce a new heart and life. Man economizes his feelings, as he economizes his thoughts. To put it otherwise, man wants not only emotion, he wants emotion disciplined for the service of will and action. Perhaps that is why all the virtues are sometimes said to be rooted in love.

But it is equally important to guard against too *broad* an interpretation of the term "religious feeling." The fear of unknown but dreaded powers, the feeling of the mystery of things, the sense of insignificance in the presence of overwhelming power, the baffling view of infinite spaces and times —not one of these is necessarily religious. Otherwise, we

should have to say that we are religious whenever we shiver and our flesh creeps, when that eerie feeling comes over us in dark silent places, when we shrink back at the sight of yawning abysses below or lightning flashes above us. Every mathematician and astronomer would be religious when he contemplated an infinite series or swept the heavenly expanses with his telescope. There are a good many people who are satisfied that they are religious in proportion to the number of exciting, queer, or startling experiences they have had. For my part I do not see the slightest evidence that such experiences can be had by religious people any better than by lovers of the spiritualistic seance, the astrologer's hocus-pocus, or the magic crystal.

There are many romanticists, however, who would hold that, though the class of religious feelings need not include mystery, the infinite, the fearful, the eerie, and the like, it does include all experiences in which the sense of life is heightened, our love and admiration for human nature deepened, and our insights into the truth and beauty of our world extended. On this view, we are religious chiefly when our higher powers are being exercised to the fullest, when we forget ourselves in heroic action, become absorbed in significant thought, or are ravished by love and beauty. Plato speaks of the divine frenzy of the lover or the poet, and compares it with that of the seer. Philosophy has often seemed to her devotees a divine thing. And who has not, at the end of some lofty, serene passage in a symphony whispered to his neighbor, " That's as close to heaven as I ever expect to get "? Certainly one of the popular uses of the term " religion " is that which equates it with the dominant desire and passion of an individual's life, as when it is said, " Science is his religion."

This view of religious feeling is so wide-spread that it deserves fuller consideration. Many a man who has definitely departed from the faith and practise of the church takes appreciation as his god. Salvation for him is escape from the trivial

and commonplace; life is redeemed by its great moments. He regards those who live ordinary lives of respectable routine not only as Philistines but as unsaved. He need not be Epicurean in his æstheticism; he may find the greatest beauty in the rarefied atmosphere of mathematical theory or in courageous acts of self-sacrifice. But religion is for him simply the sum total of what he calls his "spiritual" experiences. Walter Pater and George Santayana have made us familiar with this religion of the rare moment and the high enjoyment.

The same general view has found its way into more technical philosophy in the doctrine that religion is the sum total of men's value experiences. God on this view is simply a symbol for the highest human values or a "construct" woven out of men's appreciations. This symbol or construct may be personified in order that it may serve as a more concrete ideal and inspiration; but it must not be taken to have reality save as an expression of men's values. Some liberal ministers come dangerously near such a view of God in their anxiety to insist upon the close connection between religious experience and life's values. And the religious humanists accept it completely, defining religion as a "shared quest for the ideal life" or "life integrated at the highest level." "Religion without revelation," Julian Huxley calls it in a recent book. It could as well be called "religion without God."

Now, I do not propose in this paper to criticise religious humanism. What I am concerned to ask is whether the term "religious feeling" denotes the whole class of feelings of appreciation, value, and the like. For my part, I am convinced that it does not, and that it is only by an abuse of language that it is made to do so. Of course, experience of great art or love or heroism bears some resemblance to religious experience, for in both we feel that we are raised to a higher level of being than we usually occupy. And there is no doubt that it is in connection with such experiences that many of us have our most genuine religious feelings aroused. Especially is this the

case with those who no longer pray at fixed times and seldom attend religious services, as well as with those whose æsthetic sense is most highly developed. Nevertheless, religious feeling differs from other value feelings in several respects. In the first place, there is a class of specifically religious feelings such as those of adoration, reconciliation, and repentance. As I am going to discuss some of these later, I will say here only that, while each of them is similar in some respects to a non-religious feeling, it is also different from it. Adoration of the divine is compared with adoration of a lady only by exaggeration and poetic conceit. In the second place, religious feeling always involves some reference to a divine being or order. Feeling is always directed toward something judged or believed to exist; that is one reason why belief is an essential even if not the most important thing in religion. I do not think that religious feeling must necessarily be directed toward a divine person; in fact, Brahmanism and Confucianism show that the object of religious feeling may be something like the moral order of the world or a cosmic consciousness, rather than a divine person. But there is always a reference to the divine conceived as a reality. In the third place, religious feeling is usually directed toward God or the divine Order as the source of all human good and value. To put it otherwise, religious feeling is not merely an outreach of the soul toward God, it is an appropriation of God as the answer to human need. It must never be forgotten that religion is primarily practical; it is an orientation of the self toward what it considers the determiner of its destinies and fortunes. In at least these three ways, then, religious feelings are to be distinguished from feelings of human love, beauty, truth, and the like.

So far I have been concerned to point out the primary importance of feeling in religion, to guard against a narrow view of religious feeling which would soften it by cutting it off from attitudes of the will, and to distinguish it from queer feelings and value feelings with which it is so often confused. Perhaps it will

be worth while to discuss some of the chief religious feelings and the attitude one should take toward them. I am well aware that this is the work of the religious psychologist primarily, but I am not so much concerned here to describe psychologically as to estimate philosophically the place of each of these feelings in the religious life. To many I may seem to be going back to bygone days when it was still thought possible to cultivate religious feelings by a uniform pattern of prayer-book and self-imposed discipline. My only answer is to point to the anarchy to which we have been led by neglecting the discipline of our feelings and emotions. It is a strange anomaly that in a day of unparalleled belief in the education of the intellect and the conditioning of the will, we should have come to believe that the emotional life can take care of itself without either personal or priestly direction. Can that be one reason why we Americans are considered by older peoples so emotionally immature, so cheap and blundering in love, so raw and crude in our humor, so sentimental in our music and our movies, so dependent upon jingly hymn tunes and ministerial "pep" talks for our religious feelings? Plato tells us that the first phase of education should aim at awakening and refining the feeling, imaginative side of our souls. For that purpose he urges a careful selection of the poems and stories that are taught about gods and men as well as an habituation of the soul to noble rhythms and harmonies, so that the soul may grow like that it feeds upon. Have we got to the point where we can dispense with all discipline of moral, æsthetic, and religious feeling? The reply may be made: "Of course, emotion must be controlled, but the way to control it is to lose oneself in action for a great cause, not by dwelling upon one's feelings. Throw yourself into achievement—social reconstruction, business, or scientific effort, and your feelings will be modified of themselves." Yes, but the type of feeling that grows up in such activities is not necessarily religious feeling at all, if my previous analysis holds good. The scientist must

learn to abstract from his feelings as he makes his experiments; but he has to cultivate love toward God and man, if he is to have it at all. The social worker may do much good with a heart that has run dry of real love for humanity. And it is at least paradoxical to say that one can best develop a love for God by forgetting God and attending to other things. What really lies back of such a view—let us say it frankly—is *either* a belief that there is no God to love *or* a profound distrust of feeling, a depreciation of its value for the good life, and a skepticism as to whether it can be taught to others or controlled in oneself. All of us find our feelings distracting and troublesome at times. They enter in when we are thinking to cloud our judgment, they keep us from action when action is called for, they tend to get out of bounds and disturb the pattern of life we are carefully weaving. Watch the war spirit sweep over whole peoples, the helplessness of the individual in love, the excesses of revival meetings. Every healthy man or woman must at times wish that he had *no* feelings to plague him as he goes about the serious business of thinking and acting! But surely the way to escape the tyranny of feeling is not to neglect it, but to refine and control it. Those who think they have left their feelings behind are always finding them rising up at the most unexpected times. Those who deny feeling most vigorously are precisely the ones who are likely to be found nursing some sentimental illusion in politics or morals or religion. It seems to me that one of the most damning charges that can be brought against modern higher education is that it develops intellect almost exclusively, leaving moral, æsthetic, and religious feelings either to wither or to frustrate themselves by unhealthy expression.

But, you will say, even if it be granted that the cultivation of religious feelings is important and should not be neglected, the practical difficulty remains, "What religious feelings ought to be cultivated?" This, of course, is the crux of the matter. A scientist friend of mine put it very well when

he said to me, " 'All things work together for good to those who love God.' What does that mean? How can any one feel that way about it? " I take it he meant that in these days of science we can't really believe that those who love a hypothetical God are going to be treated more kindly than others by an indifferent nature. In other words, part of the difficulty comes from the fact that we don't know what to believe. If we did, the right religious feelings might suggest themselves. That is the reason why it seems to me that we cannot take the attitude of suspended judgment on major beliefs. Our beliefs determine our feelings and attitudes toward life more profoundly than we know. Some recent biographical studies show all too painfully how our disillusioned feelings about life are due to our being suddenly weaned from our Christian view of the dignity of human life. Joseph Wood Krutch has shown even more devastatingly how disbelief in the worth of human life leaves the feelings with no object. It seems to me that certain religious emotions are too important as elements in the good life to wait for complete scientific or philosophical proof of the beliefs they depend upon. As James pointed out, our option in these fundamental matters, just as much as in moral decisions, is a forced one. If we suspend judgment about, say, the belief in the goodness of the world, until it is proved, we lose the values, emotional and volitional, which depend upon that belief just as definitely as if we flatly denied it. The only way the agnostic can escape this loss of values is to adopt the " as if " attitude toward belief. That is, he may say, " I suspend judgment on the truth of the belief in question, but for the sake of the practical values that accrue from it, I will act and live *as if* it is true." But that is, after all, an impossible attitude to rest in, because it implies that we can take seriously in action a belief that we do not consider justifiable. The only other way out is to say that the good life can get along without either religious belief or the feeling that depends upon it. And I agree that one can live an honest, moral life with few or per-

haps no metaphysical and religious beliefs. But I should myself maintain that such a life falls short of the highest type of the good life. And whatever one may think of the value of religious beliefs, it is hard to deny the value of certain fundamental religious feelings in deepening and ennobling the quality of a good life.

What are some of these fundamental religious feelings? What does each of them contribute to the good life? First of all, there is *aspiration.* I say "aspiration" rather than "desire" for several reasons. One of them is that I want to distinguish the specific quality of religious desire from that of other desires, such as the desire for food or for love or for fame. Of course, much of historical religion, as expressed in prayer and sacrifice, aims at securing such desires. But it seems to me that the true spirit of religion is not reached until men are able to pray, not for the satisfaction of their particular human desires, but for some over-individual end such as that expressed by Jesus, "Thy Kingdom come, thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven." To put it otherwise, it is not the fulfilment of our desire and will as such that we should pray for as religious people, it is the fulfilment of the highest desire or will we can conceive when we reflect most deeply upon life. Another reason for using the term "aspiration" is that the religious person desires not only to further an over-individual end but to feel himself part of a divine process in doing so and at times to turn directly to the author of that process as the object of his aspiration. The importance of such longing or aspiration in the economy of the good life is that it makes us discontented with ourselves as we are, makes us reach out for values to which we have hitherto been cold. It is thus a powerful stimulus to creative, adventurous living. Like the aspiration of the poet for a world of untroubled beauty above and beyond the imperfections of his every-day world, like the longing for a perfect love that shall burn, as our casual human relationships so seldom burn, with a perfect devotion,

religious aspiration yet differs from these by its greater universality and depth. Of course, it is the source of much that is unworthy and hopeless—it is only gradually that men learn what they can legitimately desire—and it can lead to frustration if there are no powerful forces in the personality to translate longing into reality. Nevertheless, it is, to my mind, the root of all religion. He who has not learned to ask for more than ordinary life will never receive it, he who has not learned to knock at a closed door will never enter into the treasure-chamber of divine riches. In this sense it is true that desire is the root of religion; it may not create the gods, as our Freudian friends believe, but it alone can open our lives to them.

The negative side of aspiration is what Christians have called *contemptus mundi,* "World-contempt." One cannot aspire to reach a better world without finding the world as it is a poor thing. Or perhaps it is because we come to be dissatisfied with the world as it is that our longing for a better world arises. That is the way the Freudians explain religious belief and desire; it is simply desire thwarted in ordinary life and turned toward a world of fancied fulfilment. I suspect that the causal relation does not run exclusively either from longing to world-contempt or from world-contempt to longing, but that they are usually bound together as positive and negative moments in the same attitude. As the artist cannot love beauty without becoming more than normally sensitive to ugliness, as the lover of humanity finds tactlessness and indifference to human need intolerable, so does the religious idealist brood with sorrow over a lost Jerusalem, or break out in denunciation of blind leaders of the blind. In our day, it has become fashionable in religious circles to minimize this negative element in religion or even to denounce it as a relic of that mediævalism which found human nature sinful and the world evil, and accordingly had to take refuge in the dream of a heavenly bliss beyond life. But there is great danger that

religion, in coming to terms too readily with this life and its values, will forfeit its distinctive message. Not life as it is, but life with the light of a transcendent vision upon it is the theme of religion. It is *quality* of life, not life merely, that is its concern. The attainment of that quality involves renunciation at every step. We may be able to dispense with a sense of sin in moral teaching, as a New York minister suggests, but we can never dispense with what that term stood for, a deep dissatisfaction and even remorse at our failures as measured by our best vision of what we might be. And, though we may gain the best practical results by concentrating most of our attention upon the positive ideal, there must come from time to time a clear and merciless self-analysis to reveal to us how far short of that ideal we fall. Even Jesus could say honestly, "There is none good save one, God."

Out of this contempt for and renunciation of the world as it is, out of this self-analysis and social criticism, springs a virtue also out of favor these days. I mean humility. True humility is not self-abasement, it is the fruit of self-appraisal before the mirror of a high ideal. We cannot dispense with it in these days of activity; nay, it is precisely at such a time as ours, when men are so close together and when their desires are so constantly leading to conflict, that humility is most needed. And, further, it is only out of world-contempt that ethical and social reformation can grow. Many a great social change has been wrought by a young person too impatient and critical of things as they are to resign himself to the complacent acceptance typical of middle age. Of course I realize how much harm can be and has been done by a world-denial that spends itself in fruitless negations and ingrown bitterness. But that is only to say that world-denial should be only one moment in a process of world-affirmation at a higher level, and therefore also that it cannot be the ultimate religious attitude.

In the third place, then, our aspiration for higher life and renunciation of the lower way must issue in a fundamental *affirmation*. This is only another way of saying that there must be a discovery of the goodness that lies at the heart of things. We are rather suspicious, in our time of post-war disillusionment, of optimism. The boundless hopes of our fathers of the Republic, the rather robust idealism of Emerson and Carlyle, and the Victorian belief in unlimited progress as expressed by Tennyson strike us as rather too high-pitched, perhaps a bit strained. It seems to me that this represents a natural and very useful reaction. Certainly the optimism of a Paul, an Augustine, or a Luther is one that is won only after prolonged effort and soul-searching. The true optimist is not the man who is most blind to the realities of things, to the evil that lies so close to the good in the world; he is, rather, the man whose faith has been able to withstand the hardest shocks life can offer. It is a striking fact that the greatest religious faith has arisen, not in times of ease and prosperity, but in times of stress and strain.

Let us not think that it is harder to attain such faith today than it was in early Christian times. It was easy for Paul, steeped in ethical Judaism, to believe in a God of law and justice, but it was not easy for him to believe in a God of forgiveness with a love that included the Gentile as well as the Jew. It was easy for Augustine to believe that there was a Creator of the world, but, in the face of paganism, barbarian invasions, and the crumbling of the old order, as well as of his own profligate youth, it was hard for him to believe in a wholly righteous God able to overcome evil. And so with Luther, whose doctrine of justification by faith in God's grace was won only after terrific and prolonged inner struggles. Indeed, the attitude of affirmation achieved by these Christian thinkers ought not, perhaps, to be called an optimistic one. The sentimental belief in the natural goodness of man is more characteristic of semi-pagans like Rousseau and Walt Whitman

than of them. For all of them alike, man left to his own devices is a sorry, sinful creature doomed to death and destruction; it is necessary that he be transformed from a fleshly creature to a spiritual one by God's grace. As we might put it, man as a biological species lately evolved is merely an animal, with an animal's appetites and urgencies; it is only as he partakes in a moral, spiritual order that he is worthy of respect and love. In other words, it is not necessary to be a blind optimist about the whole of the universe, or even the whole of human nature, in order to attain to affirmation. One can be as realistic as possible, seeing all the tragedy and defeat and waste there is to be seen, and yet hold that in some sense the evil is capable of being redeemed by the good. The struggle of Job with the problem of evil and the ultimate assurance he reached constitutes the classical instance of at least one great type of affirmation, that of one who never dreams of denying the real existence of evil. Pantheism, such as that of philosophical Hindu thinkers and of modern Idealists like Emerson, offers another type of affirmation, which I need not discuss. The important thing is that all religion must involve, not merely an aspiration after a higher life than that of ordinary human existence, but also a conviction that that higher life with its values is somehow furthered by really existing forces for good in the universe at large. From one point of view, I admit, this conviction belongs to the belief rather than to the feeling or attitude side of religion. The ultra-modernist's interpretation of it in terms of mere symbolical description of certain feelings is false. Religious convictions claim to be true statements of fact about the universe, not simply symbols of psychological experiences; or, to put it otherwise, religious beliefs claim to express, however inadequately, man's conviction that the ultimate force behind the world of real facts is one with the force that creates values and souls to value them. But if we have to do here with a belief assented to by the mind, we have to do equally with an attitude of the heart and will.

This is clear as we examine the meaning of the term "faith" in Christianity. When used as synonymous with "belief" or "system of beliefs," it is the product of the faculty of judgment and tends to get itself established as a dogma. But, more characteristically, "faith" means trust, commitment of the soul, complete devotion which makes the worshiper one with the God he worships. As such, it is, at least partially, the product of will and feeling. It is possible to believe in a God intellectually without having faith in him practically.

Now, what is the place of this third type of attitude and feeling in the good life? What is the value of what we have discussed variously as world-affirmation, optimism, and faith? My answer is, first, that it sets the whole tone of one's life, arousing joys that would otherwise inevitably be cut off at their source; and, second, that it adds great reenforcement of strength to the will in the effort to live well. On both scores, it seems to me immensely superior as a fundamental life attitude both to the futilitarianism of moderns like Mr. Krutch and to the resignation of maturity advocated by moderns like Mr. Lippman. It seems to me obvious that a life based upon the premise that values really matter in the world will be more joyful and more unflagging in realizing them than will a life based upon the premise that man's values are man's inventions in a cold and indifferent world. Of course, I realize that affirmation or trust, like the other attitudes previously discussed, can lead one to a supine, unworthy acceptance of things as they are. It is all too easy for indolent mortals to rest in the "everlasting arms." But that simply means that it cannot be taken alone, without that aspiration and that contempt for the commonplace which will not leave man content until he puts forth his every effort to realize his ideal.

If affirmation or faith in the fundamental goodness of the world possesses such importance as a source of joy and strength—and one need only read the Psalms or the life of Jesus to see that it does—it follows again that we cannot with-

out loss of value suspend our judgment on the belief upon which it depends. As I have said, I am ready to admit that one can live a "good moral life," so-called, without religious belief in a "power not ourselves that makes for righteousness." But the good life consists in more than right actions; it glows with feelings of love and joy. And it is precisely this "radiancy" which religious belief can produce, and it alone. It may be difficult to lay one's finger upon the qualities in Jesus which caused little children to love him and hardened people to regard him with awe. It may be difficult to say just why the birds and beasts were believed to respond to St. Francis' preaching. But in both cases it surely was not unconnected with their constant sense of a divine glory shining in and through all beings. I do not believe that one need wait either for scientific or for philosophic proof that the goodness that appears so imperfectly and fitfully in our human life streams as rays from a divine sun. And that, I take it, is the most basic of all religious beliefs and attitudes. Aspiration and discontent with ourselves as we are form but the prelude to a diviner music of trust. The "everlasting yes" must be heard before the religious goal is reached.

Fourth, and finally, there is a group of religious feelings and attitudes that tend to grow out of trustful affirmation. I could not mention and discuss them all, even if I knew them all. But there are three of them which can be treated together, at least briefly, to illustrate what St. Paul called the "fruits of the spirit." I mean *love, joy,* and *peace.* It is clear at once that no one of them can be understood without the others. The love that Christianity emphasizes must be a peaceful, not a feverish, love; and it must be an expression of the joy the lover takes in the loved. It is no painful outreaching for a good one has not yet attained, as Plato thought; it is rather an assimilation to, an absorption in, a good that lies open to him. It is true that when he experiences it, he is made ready to create; as Plato says, "love is generation in beauty."

And the creative power of love is as important as its own intrinsic value in estimating its contribution to the good life. What we need to emphasize, however, is that love usually grows only upon soil that trust has prepared. And, even more important, we need to see that religious love is not to be confined to our fellow men; it overflows in all directions, upon beast and bird and growing thing and warm light and running water. As Buddha says: "He [who wants to reach the highest joy] shall have measureless love for all creatures, even as a mother has for her only child, whom she protects with her own life. Up above, below, and all around him he shall extend his love, which is without bounds and obstacles, and which is free from all cruelty and antagonism. While standing, sitting, walking, lying down, till he fall asleep, he shall keep his mind active in this exercise of universal good will." "Not a sparrow falls to the ground without your Father," Jesus said; and he reminded men of the birds of the heaven that were fed and the lilies of the field that were arrayed in glory by a bountiful loving care. It is this prodigality of spirit that even those who profess themselves followers of Jesus so often lack in their love.

The trouble is that most of our love is not born of hearts at peace. It is an anxious, possessive, selfish thing. Our family love, our love of country, even our love of what we call God raises barriers rather than reaches out to include. And the reason is that it is a mere personal desire, painful and fretful like all such desires, even for things in themselves excellent. We are not content with what we are and have, so we restlessly strive for what we think we want and, thus, paradoxically enough, we cut off ourselves from what we really need. Only trust, only affirmation can give us that peace and quiet which transforms personal desires into a universal love. It is because we lack that peace, that harmony with ourselves and our world, that we wreck things by forcing them. As trust begets peace, peace begets love. And

when that love comes, we have communion with all the world and the forces behind it.

And as peace begets love, love begets joy. There is all the difference in the world between religious joy or exaltation and ordinary pleasures. There is almost as much difference between religious joy and ordinary contentment or what we call happiness. For religious joy is based, not upon bodily well being or mental good health (what some psychologists call "integration" of all the powers of body and mind), but upon a universal outgoing love. Religious joy is a joy that sings because it finds so much to love. Tagore in his "Sadhana" points out how what seems to the external view law and necessity is seen by the eye of love to be creation in and for joy. "Only he has attained the final truth," says he, "who knows that the whole world is a creation of joy . . . From joy are born all creatures, by joy they are sustained, toward joy they progress, and into joy they enter. . . It is through the heightening of our consciousness into love, and extending it all over the world that we can attain . . . communion with this infinite joy." One of the most tragic things in the history of our Christian religion is the way in which during long periods it has been made into a gloomy thing, exalting pain and suffering and sacrifice, as such, forgetting that it was life rather than death that Jesus preached. "*Blessed* are ye who suffer," he said, in that paradox summing up his whole teaching about pain. It is hard to see why pains should be necessary that joy may be born, why renunciation and sacrifice of life are the conditions of higher life. But that is what all great religions seem to teach. And the untutored common man shows a sounder instinct than most learned theologians when he finds the essence of the religious life in trust, with its fruits of peace, love, and joy. Whatever religious beliefs a man may achieve must be based upon and lead to such religious feelings and attitudes as these before they are worth the paper they are written on or the time they take to recite.

WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

Dr. Rudolf Otto, Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion at the University of Marburg, Germany, is known throughout the academic world as one of the great living mystics and theologians. He has published several volumes bearing on various phases of religion. His best-known work in America is *Das Heilige* (The Idea of the Holy), which has been translated into seven languages. This issue of The Quarterly makes available to English readers a significant study in the relation of religion to the fundamental principle of science. It affords the Editor and the Crozer faculty great pleasure to welcome Doctor Otto to its fellowship of contributors. Doctor Otto contributes an article that proposes a new supernaturalism which consists with modern science. It is a noteworthy article which should have more than a local or incidental consideration. Professor Cole was instrumental in securing the paper.

Like the Editor many of our readers will be deeply interested in the paper of James Muilenberg, and delighted to be informed about the High Church Movement in Germany and its animating spirit. Professor Muilenberg is an A. B. of Hope College, 1920, A. M. University of Nebraska, 1922, Ph. D. of Yale University, 1926. He studied at Marburg, Germany, 1929-30. He served in the U. S. Army 1917-19, was instructor in English at University of Nebraska, 1920-23, Instructor in Biblical Literature at Yale, 1924-25, and Professor of the History and Literature of Religion (Associate, 1926), 1928, which position he now fills. He is author of *Specimens of Biblical Literature* (Crowell), 1923; a monograph on *The Embassy of Dykvelt to England in 1687,* 1923,

and *The Literary Relations of the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles and the Epistle of Barnabas,* Marburg, 1929.

John Clarence Petrie is a graduate of Fordham University and the General Theological Seminary of New York City. He is at present minister of the Unitarian Congregation of Memphis, Tennessee, and a surpassing Christian gentleman, an ardent advocate of church union and a generous contributor of vigorous articles and lectures of the quality of the paper in this number. We shall hope for other papers from him. One will recognize in his paper his affinity to the elder Unitarians and that he is not far from the larger fellowship of the all-inclusive Church of Jesus Christ.

Everyone will read with special interest the article by Professor Henry Nelson Wieman, Professor of the Philosophy of Religion in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, for one sees him in a somewhat unfamiliar guise. He is known to a wide reading public as author of *Religious Experience and the Scientific Method,* 1926; *The Wrestle of Religion with Truth,* 1927; *Methods of Private Religious Living,* 1929; and *The Issues of Life,* 1930. He has also made considerable contribution to religious and professional journals. Earlier than his work at Chicago he served as Professor of Philosophy at Occidental College, 1917-27. He studied at Jena and Heidelberg, 1910-11, and was awarded Ph. D. at Harvard, 1917, D. D. by Park College, 1929, and Litt. D. by Occidental College, 1930.

Professor Jesse H. Holmes, of the Philosophy Faculty at Swarthmore College, contributes a paper embodying his views as to the place of conduct in religion. He is a B. S. of the University of Nebraska, a Ph. D. of Johns Hopkins, and a student at Harvard and Oxford, and a much traveled student in Europe, Syria, and the Orient. He is of old Quaker stock

and has been prominent in Quaker undertakings, such as Quaker Advancement Committee, being Chairman thereof, Chairman of the Peace and Service Committee, all through the war. He has been since 1899 Professor of Philosophy in Swarthmore. He has written no books, but he has been a prolific contributor to magazines, etc.

Professor Brand Blanshard, who makes a plea against the tendency to undervalue the importance of belief in religion, is an A. B. of the University of Michigan, A. M. of Columbia, B. Sc. of Oxford, Ph. D. of Harvard. His experience as a student makes him an authoritative writer, including as is the case Rhodes Scholar from Michigan; Sears Scholar, Harvard; Guggenheim Fellow, 1929-30. He was Secretary of the British Army Y. M. C. A. in Mesopotamia and India, 1915-17, A. E. F. France, 1918-19. He has served as Lecturer in Philosophy at Columbia, Assistant Professor in University of Michigan, and at present is Professor of Philosophy in Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.

Professor George F. Thomas puts us into his debt by his clear and trenchant paper on "The Place of Feeling in Religion." It is a good sign, the Editor thinks, that in this over-intellectualistic milieu one can be found to do justice to this moment in religion. Professor Thomas did his undergraduate work in the Southern Methodist University at Dallas, Texas, 1915-19, where, 1923-25, he taught New Testament and Philosophy of Religion. His graduate work was divided between Oxford, where he was Rhodes Scholar from Texas, reading for Honors in Theology, 1920-23, and Harvard where he received his Ph. D. in Philosophy, 1929. He is a Fellow of The National Council on Religion in Higher Education. He is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Swarthmore College since 1927.

EDITOR'S NOTES

SPENSER B. MEESER

THE RELIGION OF FREEDOM AND PERSONALITY

[Editorial Note. In place of the usual editorial notes, the editor offiers an abbreviated report of a paper read to a group of trained thinkers. It is here printed at the urgent request of some of them. It was offered as a supplement, not as a reply, to a paper read earlier by Professor Cole in which he raised the question whether the liberals were losing their Bible as a divine authority. No answer to this is offered. But the suggestion is made that even if "the authority" of the Bible were gone, as it is for multitudes, and the authority of the Church were rejected as by other multitudes it is, there is no need to lose religion, or that religion should languish. Is religion necessarily bound up with "authority"? This paper is our answer. The reader must not confuse himself with loose ideas of "authority." Ideals, standards, self-commendatory experiences of others may gain one's assent, but they are not of the same category with authority. We can recognize values and seek them, or ignore them. They may lure us or repel us, but psychologically the reaction is not the same as that we take to "authority." There is something also we may loosely call "the authority of the expert" as in science, but even this is not of the same category as authority in religion. We ask thoughtful consideration of the paper as a phase of the religion of the Spirit.]

The Religion of Jesus

The religion of Jesus is such. There are many forms of Christian religion, and there is the religion of Jesus: and the forms of Christian religion may, or may not bear much or any resemblance in spirit and ideal to the religion of Jesus.

I speak of "the religion of Jesus," but with no intention to suggest that Jesus had a private religion. If he had, we have no means of knowing what it is, and it would probably be inimitable. By the religion of Jesus we mean the religion he lived in the open, and which he taught by intimation, formal statement, and example.

The religion of Jesus is a religion of spirit, life, and free personality; not of authoritative forms, practises or books. It is the religion of a living personal Spirit, actually present and active in the life of men, inspiring, enlightening, and guiding them. To be a follower of Jesus involves that one,

himself, order his life after the spirit and mind by which Jesus ordered his life; and that he live in the consciousness of the presence and spirit of God as did Jesus; following Jesus, as every mariner since Columbus' day has followed that intrepid discoverer—not by sailing in his foam-marked track, long since effaced, but westward toward the continent of the soul's desire and ideal.

The chief characteristic of Jesus as a religious and moral teacher is the fact that he does not utter laws and precepts to constitute a body of formal legislation for the government of our life; but seeks to impart a new mind and spirit to his disciples, and announces principles which he leaves to them for the ennobling exercise of applying them in his spirit. He manifests no concern to fix for the future the form of his teachings, and may readily be conceived as fearing that some one might attempt to make of them a code of laws, like that of Moses. He pronounced no anathema on those who might take from or add to his words, as did the writer of the Apocalypse of John; and he constantly inveighs against attention to the letter at the expense of the spirit of his word.

If Jesus were to be a universal religious leader, offering a universal and timeless religion, his teaching would necessarily be universal and timeless in its nature. Consisting of exact precepts or laws, fitted to the life of the age in which he lived, it is apparent that it would lack applicability to the changed conditions of the life of today. In fact, all his teaching is in the nature of universal principles—a quality of eternity is in them. If conceived and applied as precepts or rules, they become impracticable and sometimes ethically absurd; but used as principles, and made the basis of a personal self-guidance, they are of supreme ethical fitness and moral worth. Jesus meant that "the truth" should make men free, that they might be members of his community of self-ruled spiritual freemen.

By "the religion of freedom and personality" then we mean a religion which is a response of the free initiative of

personality to the enlightenment and inspiration of the personal Spirit, God; which involves the completest employment of all the powers of personality in man, and is unfettered by, even when instructed by, any forms of so-called authoritative teaching. Such religion is of another genius than the religion of authoritative forms and creedal standards. *It gives precedence to the principle of personality in religion over the principle of authority.*

One must freely confess that such can scarcely be said to be the common conception of Jesus' religion. Practically all the organized forms of Christianity are based upon the preeminence of authority, and conceive religion in the terms of authority, that of church, or Bible even if embarrassed by multiple interpretations. Can we justify to reason and conscience the interpretation of Jesus' spirit and method which I have propounded?

Religion and Authority

I want now to raise these following questions: What necessary and essential place has authority in religion? May not religion arise and function in the life of men apart from any conception of authority? Is it necessary to conceive the relation of God to men in which religion arises in the category of authority? What place has the free initiative of personality in religion? Does not authority in religion tend to neutralize or destroy that element in the religion which Jesus teaches, and which men are coming increasingly to see is its indispensable characteristic, namely, its inwardness? By the inwardness of religion we mean its real connection with the central self, its rise and continuance in personal initiative? *I raise the question, beyond all previous questions as to the seat and source of authority, the medium or instrument* of authority in religion: the question whether authority has any necessary place in religion at all; whether authority is indispensably vital to religion; whether authority is the method of God; whether

some principle of inspiration, of autonomy, of personality may not be the ideal in morals and religion.

In attempting to answer these questions let us first bring to mind the fact of authority and define what we mean by it. Authority is a persistent fact of all life in all realms. It is present in most forms of religion, which thrive on the ideas of discipleship, obedience, dependence, humility, self-surrender, self-abandon, loyal acceptance of a spiritual master. We may define it as follows: "Authority is a power which constrains to belief and action, which is recognized by the individual as existing independent of his thought and will; a power, neither self-produced, self-discovered or self-evolved, which rules belief and conduct."[1] This power may be conceived as God; or as resident in God and to be mediated by prophets, book, church, ecclesiastic, or creed. Or it may be thought to be resident in these by virtue of some act of God.

Now it has been generally assumed that religion and morals involve and necessarily are based upon the clear recognition of such a power as constrains to belief and action, resident in some superior or supreme being. Mr. J. H. Leckie, in the volume *Authority in Religion,* says: "You cannot take this element of authority out of any religion without destroying it altogether"; and that: "Christianity carries the principle of authority in its peculiar genius." Religion is thus necessarily conceived as essentially obedience or submission to authority. Conceived in this manner it is not to be wondered at that so much religion readily falls into empty legalism or mere formalism, and loses the vital quality of inwardness.

Is this assumption, that religion necessarily involves the principle of authority, correct? It is an assumption widely made and has the force of an axiom with most theologians. But cannot religion be conceived or lived apart from the fact of authority and the conscious submission to authority? Is there no conceivable relation of God and man which may sub-

[1] J. H. Leckie, *Authority in Religion.*

serve the purposes and realities of religion save that of ruler and ruled? Are there no categories of some other ideal relation between God and man, in which relation there may arise such principles as spontaneity, autonomy, freedom, personal initiative or love, to conserve the essentials of religion? Religion cannot well maintain, if it can at all preserve its inwardness if it be but a submission to authority, and if faith be but a consent of the intellect to intellectual formulations of reality as it was apprehended by other men. Is law the essence of religion or is love? Is not religion at its best when conceived as love; and does not religion find its ideal in a relation in which love is the primary, supreme, and constant bond of the soul to God?

Religion Involves the Relation of Persons

In attempting to answer these further questions we may note that religion, as well as morals, *involves the relation of persons, and is so far social.* We cannot well conceive either without the existence and relation of at least two persons. For an absolutely solitary being there would be neither morals nor religion. Now *what* relation of the two is essential to the existence and worth of religion? Or, how and in what terms do we need to think of their relation in order that religion may have significance? The conceivable relations of any such two persons are many. (a) In the category of authority they may be thought to be related as king and subject, lord and vassal, master and slave. (b) In the category of the family, the relation may be thought of as that of father and son, or as brother and brother—a paternal and filial, or a fraternal relation. (c) In the social category we may think of them as fellows and friends; and (d) in the terms of redemption we may conceive the relation as that of redeemer and redeemed.

Now is it necessary to conceive the religion-relation in the first of these conceivable ways—king and subject, lord and vassal, master and slave? It must be freely admitted that

some writers have so used this relation to furnish thought forms for religion; and common religious thought has, in the main, followed this lead. But it is worthy of note that Jesus does not use this category of authority, and we have to consider whether the Biblical writers used it because they believed it expressed a necessary relation, or simply because its terms were well known and the popular or common thought forms.

Let us ask whether the thought forms of the *family relation* may not be sufficient to express the realities in the religion relation of man to God? We should notice that Jesus used these almost uniformly, exclusively to define his own relation to God, and he taught his disciples to conceive their relation to God in the same terms.

Of the *social category* also it may be said that its terms are sufficient to this end. In the volume by the late President Henry Churchill King of Oberlin, entitled *Laws of Friendship, Human and Divine,* we have a significant and almost conclusive effort to cover the whole field of morals and religion in terms of *friendship.* And the naïve convert to Christianity most readily thinks his way through his experiences in the *terms of redemption,* until formal theological instruction presses upon him the thought-forms of authority.

Fresh, Vital Religion Movements

I think we are safe in saying that all fresh, vital religion movements, all elemental religions indeed, have been grounded in and had their source in some inspiration, some spontaneities either apart from, or in opposition to, formal and authoritative cults and codes. The earlier religions certainly refer to no such authorities, and such knowledge as we have of them indicates that in them God is conceived in what we would call a familiar way, as a blood-relative, a member of the tribe, a powerful ally or friend with whom they share the wealth of their labor. The vast religious literature of the world, so often thought of

as the authoritative *cause* of religion is in reality its result and effect. *Religion is first.* Does an effect precede a cause? This is true of our Biblical literature. Christianity is not the result of the New Testament but its *raison d'être.* It gives vent to religious fact and conviction which were *experienced before they were written about. Revelation is always first an experience,* which is to say that *religion precedes and therefore may exist apart from the conception of authoritative revelation.* Revelation does not beget religion; *religion is revelation in the experience of men,* and has often been bound and hindered by the process of making the written experiences of some at some time the law of all experience with God, at all times.

Religion then not only is possible, but its ideal normal character is attainable only when the relation between God and man is conceived, not in terms of authority, but in terms of fellowship. Especially if we mean by authority "a power which constrains to belief and action," resident in anything, book, church, ecclesiastic, or state, anything outside the soul itself, then certainly authority is not essential to, and may be destructive of religion; for religion is primarily a personal matter, a concern of the individual soul with God. Anything, thrust as authority between the soul and God, is a spiritual impertinence and may, indeed we may say should be, resisted to the utmost.

Religion arises and thrives in the free communion, the action and reaction of the soul with God. The soul and God are equally accessible to each other. Authority, as an external, is an unwarranted intrusion, and can issue, as is demonstrated in the history of religion, only in the corruption of religion and its fall into the worst forms of legalism. God is able to make himself known to men, to evoke the love of each one and to establish the relation, paternal, social, or redemptive, sufficient for religion. Likewise, each individual has competency to receive from God for all and to all the issues of religion in its individual aspects. The supreme fact of religion experience,

as well as an indubitable lesson of the Holy Scriptures, is that God holds communion with men. This immediate accessibility of God and man to each other is the Magna Charta of religion, and it constitutes man self-competent in religion. In the soul's communion with him, God will make clear the possible relation of love, and what love and fellowship involve for that soul; which is *all* that that soul can primarily be concerned with.

The Principle of Personality and Religion

If then religion may arise and function in the life of man, when the relation of God and man is conceived in other than the category of authority—that for instance of the paternal and filial relation, father and son, or that of the social relation as friends and fellows, or that of redemption relation as Saviour and saved—it follows, not only that authority has not exclusive or essential place in religion, but that personality may have some essential and regulative preeminence.

What now do we mean by the principle of personality? We do not venture here to define personality. There is the fact, even though all attempts to define it make us sensible that in it is some element of an absolute sort, incapable of definition. But these facts about personality are significant:

1. Persons appear as centers of evaluation. They invest all things with value, and must therefore possess value in themselves—supreme value, since all things have value only as related to them.

2. Individual persons appear not only as centers of value, but centers of experiences. In these personal experiences only is reality related to value.

3. Persons appear as the final cause, the end and reason, the crown and climax of the process of individualization in the universe, the goal of the persistent production of more distinctly marked individualities; an order in the universe recognized and formulated by evolutionists. And when these individual persons take on moral character, they are invested with

inviolable and sacred majesty. In the scale of being, personality thus stands as goal and end of all the cosmic processes.

4. Persons appear as sentient beings, possessing volition, moral reason, the power of initiating causal series. They appear as first causes, creative, capable of determining action, controlling emotion, and sustaining abstract reasoning. As such they are capable of relative self-determination; are autonomous—ends in themselves.

If these characteristics be as represented then certain conclusions are, it seems, inevitable. We should note them:

1. The preservation, development, and perfection of personality is essential to the rational appreciation of the universe and God and is necessary to religion itself. It would be irrational and incredible to suppose that the universe and God were to exist without rational appreciation. Religion would cease to be if this appreciation failed.

2. The preservation, development, and perfection of personality is essential to unity with the world purpose, expressed in the world processes, which indicate that personality is the present goal of the universe order. Persons, therefore, must never be treated as mere means to an end; but first and always are to be regarded as ends in themselves, and all things must subserve this purpose.

3. The preservation, development, and perfection of personality is essential to the fullest exercise of the creative function in man, in which the primary element of morals and religion arises, that which constitute their reality and inwardness; that is, personal initiative. Here also, all progress in ALL realms of life finds its possibility.

4. The inhibition, the checking or hindering of personal initiative in religion, by the imposition of authoritative teaching or of traditional evaluations, means the arrest of that very capacity by which any value is perceived and real experience is possible. It arrests development, destroys value, and defeats a very evident end of creation.

5. This inhibition *is* exercised, wittingly or unwittingly, when individual persons are not permitted, or not instructed and encouraged to work according to the complete idiosyncrasy of each; or are offered a substitute in the name of authority. Authority, however exercised, excludes the exercise of certain powers, essential to the development of personality, from participation in the activity of the person so ruled; causes atrophy of those powers, annuls the functioning which is necessary to the perfection of personality. *The ideal and law of the enlarging personality is the fullest activity of the self in all his powers;* and any authority exercised in religion which suppresses or ignores the total of personal activity is fundamentally wrong. The conflict between the principle of authority and the principle of personality sometimes seems final and absolute. Authority in religion appears to defeat the end of religion, which is the perfected person. Religion, as the supreme interest of life must conserve the end and contribute to the perfection of personality, or stand in rational contradiction to the observed order of the universe.

Rational and Ethical Considerations

We must further have regard to certain elements which are involved in personality—the rational and the ethical.

1. To conserve rationality in the person involves for the individual self-guidance and self-control to the end of self-realization. Man (like God as we believe) is a self-conscious being with moral reason. As his prototype, God, is a law unto himself, that is, finds the law and end of his being in no other, so man is true to the end of his being only in rational self-guidance. Man carries the law and ideal of his life in himself, *even though he does not always obey its mandate.* It is not rational that a self-conscious, voluntary, self-determining being should find his law outside himself. We cannot rationally think that a rational being should have an end in view that does not find place in the all-inclusive purpose of self-perfection.

Dante hears a significant word from Vergil, when he completes the purgatorial trial, to which word is attributable the truth I have intimated:

> Free and upright and sound in thy free-will,
> And error were it not to do its bidding:
> *Thee o'er thyself I crown and mitre.*

2. Nor would it be *ethical* to find the principle of one's faith and conduct outside oneself. To be moral is to be true to the ideal of one's being, to one's capabilities. Mere obedience to the law of another is servile and involves the suppression of the exercise of some power in oneself. Only when one's action is a personal self-expression is there in it that inwardness and reality which are the fundaments of morals and religion and the supreme characteristic of personality—the element of personal initiative. Otherwise there is denial of the worth of oneself and one's powers.

The aim of religion (which was made for man, not man for religion) *is the moral perfection of our human selves.* To act according to the law of another in formal obedience is a step to that end of self-perfection, *only when that action expresses the free and central will of a man's self.* But when this is true, "authority" is a meaningless term. We need a new category, perhaps Paul's when he says: "We are not under law but under grace." The end, the finish of the law is love out of a pure heart. Only as action gives vent to the realities of one's own being, one's longings and purposes, only when it springs from within and is initiated by the soul in response to his own impulses is one true to himself. Loyalty to the capacities of personality is essential to morals and religion.

The Final Questions

The final question now arises: How then in morals and religion may the individual be conceived to be related to the religious and moral experience of other persons and to God?

In the religion experiences of other persons, as recorded in the Bible for instance, the individual recognizes spiritual and moral values which these persons have found and affirmed. These experiences come to constitute a body of values, such as the Holy Scriptures, which have survived because they have been found to conform more or less to universal experience. The experiences have pedagogic value; they are invitations to fellowship in first-hand experience with Reality. They constitute the rational ground for the ventures of faith, in which each seeks to know for himself the truth. In the disciplining activities of these ventures of faith, which demonstrate the values of others' experiences to the individual person, or which bring forth new values, the principle of initiative is dominant; personality is in full action, and the value has the stamp of the self. The experiences have engaged the person in all his activities, and have therefore personal worth, worth for the personality, his development and perfection. Whatever action springs therefrom has the quality of moral reality, is self-initiated and guided.

Such a worth as this may be said to be but a weakened form of authority: but it is strictly a new category: for it has none of the elements of authority, as defined. It is not a power which exists independent of the individual's thought or will, which constrains to belief and action; it *is* self-discovered and evolved from the experiences of the individual self with reality.

Concerning the relation of the individual to God, in which religion and morals arise and have reality, we have already seen that either the family relation, or the social relation, or both may be sufficient. And this fact has its apt illustration in the spirit and method of Jesus' religion, which may well be described as the religion of the divine Person come down to inspire men to a free expression of their own personality in righteousness and love; come down to fellowship them and so to save them. As noted before Christianity has been in the main conceived as based in a relation to which only the

terms of authority are appropriate; but the soul's witness to itself is that religion is at its best when the individual rises above the relation of authority and finds fellowship in the love of God; for here he finds in his experiences that he is inspired by love to forms of activity as truly moral and religious as those seemed to be which were called forth by submission to authority.

The great concern of Jesus in his religion interests is the true, free life within. To this end and in this spirit he gave his life, his truth, himself, to create among men a people, his people, free noble personalities, *impelled to the right from within.* In effect Jesus is continually saying to those near him: " I do not want to rule over you. Come to me and learn the wisdom of God. I call you no longer servants but friends. I will not lord it over you. I am among you as he that serves. Associate yourselves with me and be comrades with me in the society of God. Come with me into the blessed life of fellowship with God."

He uses the words " Kingdom of God," but he never calls God king, or represents his relation to men as such. He calls God " Father," and grounds all his teaching in the conception of God as Father. He transfigures, with spiritual significance, the idea of king and subject into that of father and children, or friend and friend. He could not well escape the expression " Kingdom of God." It was the Jewish term for the highest conceivable good; but he puts a new content into the term. He conceives a spiritual commonwealth, an association on another basis than that of ruler and ruled, an association on the basis of self-ruled free persons, a comradeship.

So the Sermon on the Mount is not properly conceived as " the law of the kingdom," but the constitution of an association, the ideal of a fellowship with God. That ideal is, in a word, that the individual be self-mastered from a pure heart within. Such is God's own free personal life; such also is the life of Jesus. He would lift men up by making them like him-

self, spiritually free, kings over themselves, and so, and only so making a kingdom—by *realizing a fellowship of kings.* God will be King only of kings and Lord only among lords—not a Lord of slaves or a King of subjects; but of them only who are crowned and mitred over themselves. *The true kingdom of God is a fellowship of kings.*

The center and core of the religion relation to God is friendship, association, fellowship. We delight in the word kingdom and its category masters our thought. Our figures suggest a lofty throne, an authoritative king, an obsequious subject, or a hero-worshiping follower. In his intimate converse Jesus invariably has a different view. It is father and child, an association with a leader and inspirer; or friendship.

And true friendship, to the self-respecting man, must always be one in which he can retain self-respect. He loves the love of lover and friend, but the patronage of one who feels himself superior, or the sycophancy of one who feels himself inferior is equally repulsive and impossible in friendship. One cannot sacrifice self-respect to friendship with the self-consciously superior, nor will he, nor can he accept that sacrifice from another. Friendship must always be on the level. Nevertheless men have almost uniformly thought God has pleasure in that which they call worship, and which often is simply an abjection of their souls in a conscious self-abasement. Jesus invites men to friendship with God and calls the apostles friends. May not our friendship with God be, in these respects, like this? Is it fawning or faith that God wants? Must we be sycophants or may we be fellows with God?

BOOK REVIEWS

Dieu, l'éternel tourment des hommes. Pasteur Marc Boegner. Editions "Je sers." Clamert. 1929. Pp. 212.

Here is a refreshing book and one which should be of interest to Americans. Discussion about God has degenerated into a somewhat depressing tilt between theists and humanists. It reminds one of an earlier theological battle which can be expressed pungently, if not elegantly in the repartee:

"There ain't no hell.
The hell there ain't!"

Personally, I am inclined to feel that very little revision of this couplet would make it extremely pat for this present stage of theological ballyhoo. One champion expresses pained astonishment and regret that his opponents can be so weak intellectually as still to talk about God, much less, believe in him. And then with apologetic tone and carefully chosen words the other champion ventures that what his dear brother has said has much truth in it, but that perhaps after all a man can believe in God, of course with reservations, and yet be one stage above the moron. To the layman this gives the impression that if this is the best that can be done God is in a bad way, and that it gives point to the recent observation of a theologian that the next book should bear the title *Poor Old God.*

From all this M. Boegner's lectures are far removed. Their content is as striking as their title: *God, The Eternal Torment of Man.* Here is a man who does not think that God need be apologized for. In a scholarly, yet captivating style, alike free from claptrap and cheap emotionalism, he sounds his thesis. In the words of a contemporary, "All questions revert to one problem, that of God, the eternal torment of men, whether they give themselves to create him or to destroy him." Men have refused to pay heed, or have set themselves definitely against him. But, as Nietzsche's fool makes pathetically clear, when they destroy him, they cannot escape him; still he remains their torment. But also for those who believe in him and accept him he is yet the torment, not only as they long for him as does the hind for the cool brooks of water, but as they see the crying injustices abroad and God seemingly permitting.

Nor is this any new experience. It is the universal history of the race. We think we find examples in some of the religions of antiquity or among primitive types where God is not found. In a most effective

survey the lecturer maintains that the verdict, although common, is mistaken. Rather there is in every supposed case evidence of a fall away from a primitive theism, and the ever-present trace of resultant wistful sadness. Sociology is a science worthy of respect, but *sociologisme* with its confident explanations of everything as a result of the actions of society entails grave errors.

The third lecture, "Fiction or Reality," will be of especial interest to technical philosophers and theologians, for it gives an able survey of recent philosophical thought concerning God, especially in France, and an appreciative but decisive criticism.

But actually God is not a problem: he is the only solution to a greater one. Without this answer man is a hopeless and sad riddle—what he is and what he wants to be. "The only solution which meets the data . . . is that at the very basis of our life stands God, not any sort of God, but a God of love and of goodness. God is the solution of the problem which is set in each of us."

So, not the God of the philosophers—and, it may be interjected, assuredly not the principle of concretion which it is fondly asserted here in our land will comfort and cause our hearts to glow with fervid warmth—but the God of the Gospels, who reveals himself to us and constrains us, even though we struggle, who will not let us go, who endures seeing his thought deformed, his character travestied, his ambition maimed, but who with irresistible patience pursues his revealing purpose—it is he who is our torment. Yes, God *is* the eternal torment of man, but—is it a paradox?—at the same time he can calm it.

One lays down the book, but he does not forget its message. It is not for nothing that M. Boegner is styled "the Harry Emerson Fosdick of France." It is a book that should bring its own reward to all who read it. With some conclusions one may perhaps not be in perfect agreement, but the genuine religious passion that lies back of the words transcends theological shibboleths. And not a word of apology throughout. He was well aware that many of his hearers would entirely disagree. But there is no attempt to sprinkle furtively a little holy water while the infant sleeps. And for this emphasis, if for nothing else, the book is an achievement. Nor is it without interest to learn that these six lectures were broadcasted over a Paris radio. And France, Paris more especially, is fondly believed by so many Americans to be chiefly devoted to atheism and the Folies Bergères. This statement carries its own moral.

Morton S. Enslin.

Studies in Matthew. BENJAMIN W. BACON, D. D., Litt. D. (Oxon.), Buckingham Professor (Emeritus) of New Testament Criticism and Exegesis in Yale University. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1930. Pp. xxvi and 533. Price, $4.00.

IN this scholarly and very full discussion Professor Bacon, the veteran New Testament critic whose ever-active pen has illumined countless obscure problems, presents his conclusions with regard to the Gospel of Matthew and of course by necessity to synoptic criticism as a whole. No brief review can do this volume justice. It is distinctly not a book to be read hastily; to appreciate it requires that one spend as long in reading it and studying it as the author did in penning it. But if this price be paid, it brings its reward.

Only a few of the most important conclusions can be summarized here. The Gospel is in no sense to be attributed to the apostle Matthew. All attempts which seek to transfer to it the halo of "Matthew's Logia" are worse than idle. The phrase "Matthew's Logia" and the attempts to call the source "Q" the "Logia" are confusing. Papias was not referring to anything except our Gospel when he wrote that Matthew composed the Logia in Aramaic and that this version had been subsequently often translated. In addition to Mark Matthew used a second source S, principally for its discourse material. Q is that portion of S which can be isolated with comparative confidence, because Luke also employed it. Other sources are represented by the intriguing symbols, N, O, P, R. The resultant Gospel is not to be dated earlier than the last years of the first century.

The essential task for the modern interpreter is to see the plan of this early author. He is an early Christian neo-legalist, a converted rabbi, as is abundantly clear from his Gospel. His purpose is to provide a second Torah, divided like its Mosaic predecessor into five books. These, Bacon feels, he can discover in the Gospel. Each of the five discourses is introduced by an appropriate "narrative section" and closes with a "transition formula": "Now when Jesus had finished these sayings," etc. To these five books are a preamble (chaps. 1 and 2) and Epilogue (chaps. 26:3—end). Matthew is vastly more than a mechanical compiler. His own purpose and point of view are everywhere revealed in his drastic rearrangement and rewriting of his sources. For example, the parable of the tares (13:24-30) is Matthew's own rewriting of Mark 4:26-29 (the seed growing secretly). Peter's walking on the water (14:28-33) is "a reflection in the mirror of early symbolism of that lost item, the most important item of all, in the resurrection story, the 'turning again' of Simon Peter" (p. 223). In brief, "Mt represents a late and degenerate

type of Synoptic tradition, remote even from the more varied developments incorporated by Lk. Its own incorporations, so far as drawn from the incomparable document S, have of course the same golden quality, though in actual extent the added material goes little beyond that included under Q. Its other incorporations are notably inferior" (p. 260). The critic's task is to realize that "Mt" knew what he was trying to do; we must strive to think his thoughts after him.

In addition to a very thorough and minute "introduction" to the Gospel—place, origin, date, author, sources—each of the "five books" and the preamble and epilogue have an elaborate chapter of introduction. Then follows a "new translation" of the Gospel equipped with marginal references to sources of each block. Following the translation is Part IV, devoted to five themes of the "books," "The New Ethic of Jesus and the Law," "The Apostolate," "The Hiding and Revelation of the Mystery," "The Problem of Church Unity," "The Messianic Judgment." The volume concludes with ten appendices which discuss in greater details problems raised in the text.

It hardly needs be said that all subsequent synoptic criticism will have to take account of this very valuable volume, nor need one be a prophet to hazard the guess that a good many lances will be broken in the joust.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

The Gospel According to Luke. JOHN MARTIN CREED, B. D., Ely Professor of Divinity, Fellow of St. John's College, formerly Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. New York and London: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. xc and 340.

THE appearance of a good commentary is always significant, for there is always room for one more. Professor Creed has produced a valuable and readable volume. In form, it is a bit different from most commentaries in that prefixed to each section of the text is a critical discussion. Many of these, as for example, The Annunciation, The Birth of Jesus, Jesus at Jerusalem, are quite full, and thus free the exegetical notes of a considerable burden. The Greek text of Westcott and Hort is printed, while the commentary discussion is set in double columns, thus making a most readable page.

Perhaps the most significant thing in the volume is the almost complete disregard—rejection is perhaps the better word, for the author does not ignore it—of the now popular hypothesis of a "third source" for Luke. Not alone the earlier view of Feine, and the somewhat similar one advocated by Streeter and developed by Vincent Taylor, but also

the hypothesis that in addition to Mark and the second source Luke employed another source, L, fails to convince him. Even Luke's Passion-narrative, the chief arsenal for L, is most naturally understood as a free rewriting of Mark, for "the additional material in general seems to be secondary," and the rearrangements, although more extensive, are "not essentially different from what is found elsewhere." Though this pet theory is thus treated with what to its champions will seem but scant ceremony, I cannot help but feel that his caution is quite justified.

There is but little new in his brief treatment of such standard queries as authorship, date, structure; but the full discussion of the "History of the Gospel and of its Interpretation" (xxv-lv) is both interesting and valuable.

The volume is a distinct contribution to sound scholarship.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

The Moffatt New Testament Commentary. Epistles to Colossians, Philemon, Ephesians. E. F. SCOTT, D. D., Union Theological Seminary, New York. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. 1930. Pp. xi and 257. Price, $3.50.

HERE is an excellent commentary for the man who desires light on the religious meaning, message, and implicates of these three Pauline letters. The volume is one of the Moffatt New Testament Commentary, and accordingly is an exposition of the translation of that justly-famed scholar. To each of the three epistles is prefixed a brief but instructive introduction intended neither as an exhibition of learning nor a challenge to other scholars, but rather as an aid to an understanding of the text.

Then follows the commentary proper. And it is refreshing to find a commentary that can be read. Usually commentaries are like the dictionary—to be consulted not read. But Doctor Scott's volume is essentially a running exposition. At the head of each section Doctor Moffatt's translation is printed in full-faced type; then follows a most ingeniously constructed interpretation.

Little need be said of the actual content of the volume. Doctor Scott's scholarship is too well known to need comment. It need only be said that the same sound learning and religious fervor that characterize all his work find ample opportunity in this appreciative interpretation of the great apostle.

To say that the volume is homiletical would be to offer it groundless insult. It is vastly more than that. It is worth a round dozen of the average inspirational helps to preachers. It does not give sermon outlines. There are no "moving incidents" nor "illustrations that will grip,"

but the man who can read this volume without experiencing a new desire to come to fresh grips with the problems of life today as did Paul the prisoner in his day and without discovering in this pioneer soul many of the aids to achievement would better think twice whether his call to preach is not of the nature described in Matthew 22 : 14.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

Jesus or Christianity. A Study in Contrasts. KIRBY PAGE. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc. 1929. Price, $1.00.

HERE is deep probing and keen analysis. The author, as every one knows, is concerned for people, he believes in them, he loves humankind and hates every thing that in any way hurts or destroys human values. He believes that there was one who once lived who so exalted human personality and labored for its well-being that a new movement began among men in the love of the Brotherhood. But somehow that movement has lost its original impetus and soul.

Jesus was the great teacher of good-will both by word and conduct. In that day of discord and enmity between Jew and Gentile and the attempt of the former to establish the Kingdom of Righteousness by military and political means, Jesus taught that it must and could be established only by good-will among men. Though constantly tempted, and urged by his friends, to use other methods whose success seemed assured he rejected all lesser measures and died to prove the supremacy of the spiritual. The way of life is the way of good-will.

Holding firm to that Way, exhibiting their firm belief in it through the hostility of determined persecution to destroy them, his disciples grew rapidly in numbers and spread his teaching widely in the world. But having triumphed and become recognized by the State, religion became identified with politics. In that triumph the soul of Christianity was destroyed. Belief, not life, became the essential. Doctrine was standardized, legalized, imperially decreed. Thus true discipleship became the recognition and service of doctrine rather than of one another. The test of Christian virtue became "orthodoxy" and the history of the Western world and of Christianity a history of the rise of materialism to the utter neglect of personal worth. The Thing has become of more worth than the Person.

Yet it is a difficult thing to practise the religion of Jesus lest goodwill become mere pious sentimentality. His way of life needs not merely the constant recognition of human worth but also a careful, intelligent, "scientific" study of the ways by which that general good of mankind can be achieved. In the patient perseverance and fellowship with those

whom the world has instinctively called great because of their high-minded devotion to the common good, the religion of Jesus may again be made real—though the cause may once again require the suffering and death of the individual.

R. E. E. HARKNESS.

Morals of Tomorrow. RALPH W. SOCKMAN, Ph. D. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1931. Price, $2.50.

DOCTOR SOCKMAN contributes to the discussion of this, perhaps over-emphasized, problem of morals and authority. A reading of the book raises the suspicion that he is seeking to improve on Walter Lippman. And at the conclusion one is left with a question in that respect.

True, the author recognizes that "Morals today are in a state of revolution. The old authorities are being challenged." Which statement has become rather familiar, to say the least, within the past few years.

The old morality, we are told, rested in divine authority, external, authoritarianism. It is all that could be expected at that stage in the developing intellectual and spiritual life of the race—especially with that part of it which resides in the Western world, which is the only part with which the author has to do.

Now the existence of the divine is being questioned and therefore among some there are no standards or sanctions. But Doctor Sockman sees a new morality being founded in a new authority—that which is personal, social, spiritual—based upon experience. That new morality is expressing itself in terms of: "playing fair"; "a good sport"; "loyalty"; "sincerity and lack of all pretense"; "partnership rather than mere service"; "integrity, despising all that is less than one's best possible."

The causes of this transition and revolution may be listed as our new scientific knowledge, intellectual development, freedom of women, industry, war, wealth, and leisure. There may indeed be a swing to the extreme in the glow of these new views but not even the sense of the divine authority was able to command complete obedience. Perhaps the new authority will avail more, just as the most commanding authority of the teacher is not the legal and official but the fact or truth demonstrated.

Forces that may be considered as aiding in the establishment of this new morality and authority are humanism and religion. Here the author betrays a strange attitude and analysis. Humanism is set over against religion. But surely, though it may not be Christianity, humanism is a religion. But little virtue is to be found in humanism since it lacks "moral initiative and creativeness." "Religion adds ethical strength to human-

ism," the point of which remark is not clear in the light of the author's confession that divine authority is gone for most Western folk today and his further statement that religion must be intelligent in its discipline, not Puritanical, i. e., austere for its own sake, since purpose and achievement are necessary in human interests.

R. E. E. HARKNESS.

A History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy and Religion. WILLIAM CECIL DAMPIER DAMPIER-WHETHAM. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. xxi and 514. Price, $4.00.

IN an age when the scientific point of view is being increasingly demanded for the study of philosophy and religion as well as the sciences themselves, the importance of the subject of this volume is obvious. We need to know through what historical processes the dominion of science has become extended to the degree now obtaining. Such a need demands a prodigious amount of painstaking labor before it can be met. For this reason the entire world of thought must be greatly indebted to our author for the book before us. It is done with exceeding care, by a man who, himself a physicist, has a wide knowledge of the whole field of the sciences, and no mean acquaintance with the development of philosophic and theological thought. Here and there, particularly in the discussions of mathematical physics, the layman finds the treatment rather too technical; but, on the whole, the story is told in language that readers without technical knowledge of the sciences can understand.

In the ancient world almost the only contributions to scientific thinking emanated from the Greeks, and these contributions are indicated. There was a good deal of magic in the world of the ancients the importance of which is in relation to the origins of the sciences, its attitude being a precursor of the scientific attitude. Astronomy was the daughter of astrology, and chemistry of alchemy. Their chief scientific interest and value is psychological. They influenced human credulity and spread the desire for immediate and irresponsible power. The spirit of the Middle Ages was inimical to scientific development for the most part, because the ecclesiastical authority gave it no encouragement. But in the end Scholasticism recognized the reason, and thus created an atmosphere where scientific thought might develop. Then came the Renaissance with its civilizing, humanistic influence. In such an atmosphere scholastic pedantry could no longer flourish. At the beginning of the period natural science was still a branch of philosophy, but by the end, thanks to such men as Erasmus, Leonardo da Vinci, and Galileo, it had won its right to freedom in method and analysis. The modern era really began with Galileo. The work of

Newton almost constituted a revolution in human thought. The old cosmology was done, and a new intellectual outlook was achieved. Curiously enough, the Christian point of approach still held the field in the thinking of the scientists, and we find Sir Isaac praying for direct divine interposition to correct any discrepancies in his mathematical physics.

With the dawn of the nineteenth century, the scientific age emerged. Scientific methods of observation and induction came to prevail everywhere. There also came into recognition the importance of scientific work for human knowledge. It is clear that the world of science is a world of appearance, disclosed and conditioned by our sensory processes. So we are compelled to face the problem of knowledge. The sciences are specialized fields of observation and discovery. They bring to us knowledge in a fragmentary way. And as our author shows, they are not the only channel through which we gain knowledge. A knowledge that things are pleasant or otherwise is not physics; nevertheless it is knowledge. The fact is that our knowledge of the physical world is an abstraction. Physics enables us to construct in our thinking a model of the external world, and then to trace the relations between its parts. In this way we infer the existence of things independently of our thoughts, and we conclude that our thought of their relations corresponds to the relations as they really exist. The philosophic problem raised by modern physics is thus a problem of relations. Our confidence in the results of our scientific endeavors increases, but, even so, our knowledge is an affair of probability, though the odds are high. This recognition of the results for knowledge of physical science is a long step in advance, *e. g.*, of the Cartesian point of view which interpreted science as a revelation of reality.

The limitations of space preclude any adequate review of the developing sciences of biology and anthropology, and the resulting new view of human nature. Suffice it to say that the scientific outlook in our day is an all but completely new one. Scientists still make use of the Newtonian concepts in physics, but relativity and the quantum theory have usurped the field. Biology has given us the concept of organism which even physicists as well as sociologists and philosophers are finding useful. What is the outcome philosophically? When the author writes of the pragmatist not recognizing the test of direct observation and experiment (p. 447), we cannot but wonder where he got his ideas about pragmatism. Certainly not from the pragmatists. His own inclination seems to be toward the new realism, because of its determination to take account of mathematics and science before building its own temple. The influence of Professor Whitehead is quite apparent; this is apparent in the discussions

of religion as well as philosophy. The author quotes with approval the former in his insistence that religion will not regain its old power until it learns to face change in the same spirit as does science. Again he approves of Eddington in his recognition that religion takes us on an adventure into a world of spirit, untrammeled by the world of physics. It is wholesome advice when he suggests the advisability of accepting the fundamentals both of science and religion and having patience until apparent discrepancies are ironed out.

Mr. Dampier-Whetham has given us a great book. One of its attractions is the glimpses given to us of some of the great figures in the history of science. We see Leonardo da Vinci in all the breadth of his intellectual power. The account of Newton is such as only a physicist could have given. Space fails us to mention Darwin, Einstein, and many others. The book is more than a history of science; it is an interpretation.

A. S. WOODBURNE.

The Coming Religion. NATHANIEL SCHMIDT. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. 262. Price, $2.25.

PROFESSOR SCHMIDT holds the chair of Semitics at Cornell University, and has been occupied all his life with the study of religion. He therefore brings to the task of forecasting the future of religion an intimate knowledge of the past history of religion. He knows full well that the only way of prognosticating the future is to acquaint oneself with the principles of development as they have operated in the past. He has therefore in the present volume used eleven chapters out of twelve dealing with historical data which would give the clues to the ways in which religion has been moving, and in the last chapter he has projected those principles into the future. The historical matter is completely mastered by the author, and he deals with it in an illuminating way. He gives his reader the feel of ongoing movements, so that we are not surprised as to his conclusions about "the coming religion."

Doctor Schmidt's definition of religion is somewhat humanistic, and reminds one of Doctor Haydon's. The latter's formulation is "the shared quest of the good life." Our author says that "Religion is devotion to the highest." Of course both of these definitions make room for such non-theistic faiths as Hinayana Buddhism and Confucianism. The authors are able to marshal a heap of evidence in support of them. The one doubt in the mind of the reviewer is as to whether they may not both be so broad that they fail to differentiate religion from such other disciplines as morality and art, both of which share with religion in the evalua-

tional attitude. Religion, as Schmidt points out, always places before its devotees a conception of something higher than has yet been attained, and makes man conscious of his failures. It is, as he says, something of a "struggle between a recalcitrant real and a beckoning ideal." That is certainly a characteristic of religion which we may continue to expect in the future, as we have observed it in the past.

When he discusses the coming religion in the last chapter it is noticeable that he says nothing much about the future of the god-idea. He does not say that the idea will disappear, nor does he say that it will be refined. He simply does not discuss it. One wonders whether his inclination is toward humanism, though he does not say so.

No one can forecast the future of religion in detail. Doctor Schmidt has done all that is really possible in dealing in generalizations. The religion of the future will not be supercilious, self-satisfied, or arrogant. It will be sympathetic and appreciative. It will increasingly emphasize the moral elements, and lay less stress on creedal formulas. The coming religion will be more esthetic, and will be receptive to all cultural influences. It will moreover express itself in new types of fellowship for the common weal. Narrow lines of demarcation will break down, but great religions will continue to function as long as they bring practical help to men.

As a contribution to the understanding and appreciation of the historical development of religion this is certainly a book of a high order. It enables the reader to see the unfolding principles that have operated in the development of religious thought and practise. Perhaps it has gone as far as a historian could go in predicting the future, with this exception that one would like to know what the author thinks about the future of belief in God.

A. S. WOODBURNE.

This Believing World. LEWIS BROWNE. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. 347. Sixteenth reprinting. Price, $1.00.

THE fact that Mr. Browne's popular book on the history of religions has in four short years reached the sixteenth reprinting is no small compliment in itself. Men like Will Durant, James Harvey Robinson, and Lewis Browne who are able to put the results of scientific knowledge in a form that will appeal to the masses are performing a signal service to the cause of culture. It is a great thing to have a knowledge of the great religions of mankind, even if such knowledge be elementary. With the increasing interfusion of culture on all hands, no man can really understand his own religion who has not some knowledge of the religious beliefs and usages of the rest of the human race.

This Believing World is intended for popular consumption, and is written in a simple, non-technical style. At the same time it is written by one who has familiarized himself with the histories and outstanding features of the great faiths, and who therefore knows whereof he writes. Mr. Browne has a charming and forceful literary style, and if his book had not been such a delight to read, not nearly so many people would have bothered about it.

The accounts that are here given are too meager for the serious student, and the book can scarcely be expected to serve for the classroom. It is meant rather for the home library. The Macmillan Company are to be congratulated in making it available at so low a price.

A. S. Woodburne.

The Problem of God. Edgar Sheffield Brightman. New York: The Abingdon Press. 1930. Pp. 209. Price, $2.00.

The doctrine of God is the focal point around which all theological discussion revolves. It is also a central problem in the philosophy of religion. Professor Brightman's new book stimulates thinking because its approach is somewhat different from others. He frankly champions the conception of a God who is limited, with a psychological rather than a metaphysical interpretation of the limitation. God's limitation is within his own nature, and is described as a "Given," being an element in the divine consciousness which sets limits on what God can do or choose to do. There is something within his own nature which was not the creation of his own will; it is eternally present, but he controls it.

One thing that we have to admire about modern men like Brightman and Horton, grappling with this greatest eternal problem is the straightforward way in which they try to clarify the issues. Horton (in *Theism and the Modern Mood*) from the theologian's standpoint and Brightman from the philosopher's angle are both facing the question fearlessly, and saying what they must say without equivocation. We know what they are talking about. Brightman tells us what he means by God. He is "the universal being, the source and purpose of all that is"; "not a separate fact independent of other facts" (p. 62). He is "a Person supremely conscious, supremely valuable, and supremely creative, yet limited by the free choices of other persons and by restrictions within his own nature" (p. 113). On the question of evidence for the existence of God the author holds that every item of experience, rightly understood, is evidence, so that we are confronted with a superabundance rather than a paucity of evidence. But he finds the chief evidence in six directions: the evidence of the

rationality of the universe, of the emergence of novelties, of the nature of personality, of values, of religious experience, and of systematic coherence.

The core of Brightman's discussion really is personality. Personal idealism, which is the position the author holds, interprets reality through the experience of personality. Any attempt to explain personality by something not personal, he believes to be fallacious. Moreover, unless one is to be forced into dualism, it is reasonable to suppose that the universe is of such a character as we find in our experience of consciousness. Now a personalistic view of the world involves an acknowledgment of the reality of personality in ourselves as well as in God. This is the ground on which Brightman reaches his view of a finite God. Any person, human or divine, is limited by the nature of his personality. In our own case we cannot do or think or will anything contrary to our own temperaments or personalities. Neither can God. God could not will to make a round triangle or a two which when multiplied by two will yield six. His eternal nature includes reason, and he cannot do what is irrational. Neither can God choose to do what is manifestly evil.

It is the old problem of trying to explain the nature of God in consonance with the belief in human freedom. If we deny freedom to man, i. e., real freedom, then what becomes of morality? It is clearly illusory. If we grant man to have real moral freedom, Brightman holds that it implies an actual limitation upon the foreknowledge of God. Then too, our author finds some relief from the dilemma created by the presence in the world of suffering and moral evil by the doctrine of a finite God. He does not mean that God is ignorant of evil, but rather that suffering and evil are the outcome of God's eternal given nature out of which he is always bringing some higher good. God confronts genuine difficulties. He has work to do and does not repose in an eternal bliss of perfection. Brightman thus holds that the limitation is within the nature of God and not just something self-imposed. It is in the nature of consciousness, a datum somewhat analogous to human sense experience, yet not produced by any stimulus or cause external to God.

There are two problems which present themselves to our minds from a perusal of Brightman's book. One is: Can we worship a finite God? That is probably as good a test as we can put to a proposed view of God. Does it present to us One who can be the object of our worship? Brightman's own position is that the worshipful attitude is not in any respect contingent on the hypothesis of infinity. We are inclined to forget that the concept of infinity is mathematical and metaphysical. Theology needs to face squarely the question of whether it is a *sine qua non* of a Christian view of God. When the modern astronomer tells us that the

universe is finite and measurable, and then begins to talk in terms of hundreds of thousands of light years, the distinction between infinity and finitude fades from us. What we have to decide is whether the concept of infinity is really one of religious value which we cannot abandon, and more ultimately whether there is evidence for an infinite Being behind this finite universe.

The other problem is this: Does a finite God presuppose a pluralistic world-view? William James and James Ward held that the two positions stood together. Brightman does not throw any light on his own view of that matter. Logically the two views seem to interlock, a pluralistic view of the universe and the doctrine of a finite God. We should like to know whether our author believes it to be possible to hold to the latter without the former. If not, is he prepared to accept the consequences of his position? For the majority it looks like a difficult task to try to reconcile pluralism with the Christian view of God.

A. S. Woodburne.

The Mysterious Universe. Sir James Jeans. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. ix and 163. Price, $2.25.

What sort of universe is this in which we live and strive? And what relation do we bear to it? These questions that have disturbed the human mind ever since Thales are faced anew in Sir James Jeans' arresting book from the point of view of mathematical physics. Man's increasing knowledge of the nature of the physical universe, due to the researches of physical scientists, has resulted in quite a new formulation of the problem of the philosopher.

The nineteenth century in the main yielded scientific results that led to mechanistic interpretation. The so-called laws of the conservation of matter, mass, and energy tended toward a deterministic and static view of the universe. But toward the end of that century discoveries were made which quite negatived the mechanistic hypothesis. Certain phenomena, gravitation and radiation in particular, defied all efforts at a mechanistic interpretation. The conclusion that Sir James reaches is that all the pictures which the scientists can draw of the universe which seem capable of according with observed facts are mathematical pictures. We are truly in a mysterious universe, that the author depicts in the old analogy which Plato used of men seated in a cave the mouth of which is so opened toward the light that they see their own shadows like marionettes playing on the opposite wall of the cave. The fact that we cannot find any but mathematical symbols that stand true to the observed facts of the universe leads this scientist to the conclusion, which he deems the outstanding achievement

of twentieth-century physics, that "we are not yet in contact with ultimate reality." This discovery he ranks higher than relativity, the quantum theory, or the dissection of the atom.

What are the philosophical conclusions of such a discovery, or of such a series of discoveries? Sir James finds the universe to be so thoroughly and accurately conversant with the rules of pure mathematics, as human minds have formulated them, that he thinks it shows evidence of having been designed by a pure mathematician. "The universe can best be pictured," he says, "although still very imperfectly and inadequately, as pure thought, the thought of what, for want of a wider word, we must describe as a mathematical thinker." Thus the Great Architect of the Universe turns out to be a mathematician.

At first blush this looks like a straightforward defense of idealism in metaphysics. But Sir James will not have it that way. In fact he exhibits real philosophical insight when he indicates that such conclusions as those of modern science tend toward the breakdown of the old lines of demarcation as between realism and idealism. The ultimate reality of things is really beyond the present state of our knowledge.

In the first chapter our author gives it as his opinion that life started on this earth as an accident. Man has stumbled, almost by mistake, into a universe which was not primarily designed for life, and which apparently is indifferent, if not actually hostile to it. Moreover the universe is gradually but surely cooling, and will eventually become too cold for life to persist, so that the end in view for the human race is to be frozen off. This point of view seems difficult to reconcile with that put forward in the last chapter which is teleological with mathematical accuracy. It seems to impinge on the picture of a mathematically accurate design and the conception of the universe as pure thought.

Let it be remarked that this newly evolving scientific view of the universe is throwing down a challenge to the philosopher of religion to rethink his problems. Every thoughtful Christian man ought to realize the nature of the problems set by the new science, and Sir James Jeans is a master guide into that mysterious realm.

A. S. WOODBURNE.

An Anthology of Modern Philosophy. DANIEL SOMMER ROBINSON. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1931. Pp. xiii and 836. Price, $4.50.

PROFESSOR ROBINSON has placed us under a debt of gratitude for this excellent source-book for the study of the philosophy of modern times. We have here selections from the works of thirty-two thinkers from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries. The work of selection is excellently

well done, and has the merit of including material which is nowhere else available in the English language. The selections from the works of Bruno, Campanella, Kierkegaard, and Herbart were especially translated for inclusion in this volume.

It is important for the student of philosophy that he come as early and often as is possible in contact with the actual sources. It is not enough to get his material at second-hand from historians. Such source-books as this and Doctor Robinson's *Anthology of Recent Philosophy* are invaluable both to the instructor and to the student. They enable one to get the gist of the thinking of these outstanding men without laborious searching through ponderous volumes. At the beginning of each selection the editor has placed a useful introduction and analysis. The man who procures for himself this anthology will find that he is in possession of a veritable library of modern philosophy and that within the compass of a single volume.

A. S. Woodburne.

The Issues of Life. Henry Nelson Wieman. New York: The Abingdon Press. 1930. Pp. 273. Price, $2.00.

The first and foremost issue of life is to grow up, and that is a spiritual just as truly as a physiological process. Professor Wieman suggests three stages through which we ought to pass: from the urge of life to the art of life, from the fulfilment of present desire to the transformation of desire to that which will yield the most abundant fulfilment, and from living for the lure of established ideals to living for the lure of unexplored possibilities. The great issue of life is bringing the spirit of our faith into all the affairs of life, living life on that high level where every-day problems will be approached in the spirit of reverence. This attitude Wieman calls worshipful problem-solving. The solution of a particular problem is religious when we take it so seriously that it involves our beliefs regarding the ultimate factors in human destiny. That is what moved the ditch-digger to say:

> I'll dig a ditch so straight and true
> Almighty God can look it through.

This attitude toward life's paramount issues involves a conception of religion that is challenging. For Wieman religion is conceived somewhat as John Dewey does: "A sense of the possibilities of existence and devotion to the cause of these possibilities." At the same time Wieman finds this definition rather meager and would fill it out so that it would include an evangel. He would delineate religion as " dedicating life in supreme devo-

tion to the order of existence and possibility which provides the highest values which ever can be actualized." The matter he stresses is that religion must include both existential and potential elements. And the same with God. God is not merely an ideal. He includes both orders, the existential and the possible by virtue of which the greatest conceivable good is truly a possibility. We must not leave out either element in defining God, either existence or possibility.

This definition of God leads Wieman to deny personality to God. But he denies it from an angle quite antithetical to most of those who take a similar position: not because God is less than personality, but for the opposite reason. The order of existence and possibility which is God is greater than personality, though it may be considered personal in the sense that personalities are involved and may be achieved in it. We are reminded of the Hindu position that the concept of personality is to be rejected as placing a limitation on God that is unwarranted.

Professor Wieman has given us a thought-provoking book. He is one of the men who are trying to think through the vital problems of a philosophy of religion in the modern world where science exerts so much influence. While he welcomes cordially all that the sciences can do for the enrichment of life, he is trying to show us that there is a realm in which religion has a distinctive service. The religious man, he reminds us, has access to phases of life which otherwise would be unknown. Love is a way to knowledge as truly as the laboratory is, and it is the way to the knowledge of the supreme good—to God.

A. S. Woodburne.

Adventures in Philosophy and Religion. James Bissett Pratt. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1931. Pp. xi and 263. Price, $2.00.

Professor Pratt has given us in this volume five studies which he has put in the form of the Platonic dialogue. This is somewhat uncommon in modern philosophical works, but rather refreshing. It makes the discussions seem rather more involved with the very stuff of life than some of the abstract treatises. It also enables the author to present the different positions in regard to a subject under debate with close relevancy to one another. Doctor Pratt has a fine sense of good humor which he uses with subtle effect, giving a rare charm to his writing. But, what is more important, he is one of those philosophers who are willing to look at facts squarely, and who do not believe in mincing matters for theoretical ends.

In the first study the author has examined some of the more important attempts of contemporary philosophy to overcome dualism. The dialogue form enables him to subject each of these positions to cross-

examination. Thus we see the pragmatic, the neo-realistic, the behavioristic, the objective idealistic, the humanistic philosophies as well as Bertrand Russell put on the witness-stand and made to face the attorney, Pratt. The name "Mr. Try-Everything-Once" is very apt for Mr. Bertrand Russell. The conclusion of this first dialogue is that no one has yet been able to offer a satisfactory substitute for spiritual dualism.

The second dialogue is a discussion of religion. Here we see orthodoxy, liberalism, humanism, and scientific method all contending for their views on the great matters concerning the nature of religion, its place in the modern world, and faith in God. It is well done, and yet it is not very satisfactory. The trouble comes in trying to put the positions of a group into the mouth of a single character. Doctor Humanist, for example, is a synthesis of several brands of humanism and therefore he is not quite like any of them. Pratt admits this difficulty, and, all in all, he has done well to overcome it as far as possible. Presumably Mr. Layman in this dialogue is presenting the author's views, and we see his dualism coming out here again. It may be that there are elements of experience that seem to demand a dualistic treatment, as Pratt suggests. The facts of life seem to be even more diverse, and if experience be the sole basis, perhaps pluralism would be still truer. On the other hand, is not the goal of philosophy monism, the effort to find a coherent view of the whole?

The last two dialogues are put in the form of Buddhistic discussions. Professor Pratt has been a life-long and careful student of Buddhism, as we know from his *Pilgrimage of Buddhism*. His own view is that the spiritual heritage of the religious liberal of our day is made up of elements from Christianity, Buddhism, and Greek philosophy. He believes in the essential spiritual unity of Buddhism and Christianity. Perhaps he is right, but that seems to some of us like a unity between an optimistic and a pessimistic view of life. Is that why the modern man prefers to be called a "meliorist"?

A. S. Woodburne.

God in Christian Experience. W. R. Matthews, D. D. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1930. Pp. xix and 283. Price, $3.00.

This study from the pen of the Dean of King's College, London, is a fresh and stimulating examination of the Christian faith in God, considered from the continuity of Christian experience in history. The basis is sound. We can never hope to understand the significance of any belief apart from the religious experience of mankind in general and of Christian people in particular. There are two movements of the human spirit which are involved in the experience of religion. One is the search for

coherence or unity in this world of mystery and diversity. The other is the effort to substantiate value. Theology and the philosophy of religion must reckon with these two elements of life. It is the author's conviction that the only doctrine of God that can satisfy this double demand is one which includes both immanence and transcendence. But never yet has there been achieved a doctrine that meets these two needs satisfactorily. There has always been a gap between the god worshiped by the devout and the God whom the theologians have described theoretically.

It is the consciousness of this gap that leads the author to endeavor to build a theology on the basis of Christian experience. In the history of the Christian experience of God the most significant factor is Jesus. At once we are confronted with a difficulty. An analysis of the experience of Jesus is beyond us because "on any view that cares to keep in touch with the main stream of Christian belief, we should have to admit that the mind of Jesus is beyond our comprehension, and that we cannot hope to penetrate its secret places, because the analogous experience is lacking in ourselves" (p. 48). Yet we are convinced that God must be like Jesus, and because of what we know of Jesus we are convinced that the divine Being must be love. The New Testament gives us a portrait of one who ventured to the utmost in faith in God and God's kingdom.

The discussion of the problem as to whether or not God is a person is exceedingly thorough and careful. Doctor Matthews has familiarized himself with philosophical and psychological discussions as well as religious considerations of personality. The Christian doctrine of God is a commitment to the position that God is at least a person, though there may be reasons for considering this view as inadequate. He would describe God as the most real Being. But all of our concepts of reality are in the last analysis derived from the experience of the self. On this ground, he thinks that the personality of God is the most acceptable hypothesis that has been suggested. Doctor Matthews realizes the dangers of limitations, and defines his main thesis as the contention that the divine being is not wrongly thought of in terms of personal life. Perhaps "supra-personal" would be a better description.

A philosophical scrutiny of Christian experience and indeed of all experience leads the author to conclude that about the most satisfactory philosophy of the universe is the monadology of Leibniz. It provides an explanation for the many of experience, as well as for the One who unifies and gives meaning. Doctor Matthews' views always command respect, even if one does not accept them *in toto*, for he is one of the most vigorous thinkers in the theological world today.

A. S. WOODBURNE.

Christian Ethics and Modern Problems. W. R. Inge, Dean of St. Paul's. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1930. Pp. ix and 427. Price, $5.00.

According to his own confession, this is to be the author's last major literary work. If one may judge from the scholars and historical movements that are constantly referred to, then the reading of a lifetime has contributed to this significant study. He was forced to take up the study of Christian ethics in order to meet the critical conflict between Christianity and secularity in contemporary life. "That our religion no longer attracts those who are shaping the thought of our time is notorious . . . the revolt is partly ethical." By deifying the natural man and neglecting entirely the stark reality of human sin and the welcome revelation of a redeeming God, the secularist has made his ideals quite incompatible with those of the Christian. Religion is not, for that reason, to become either eschatalogical, ascetic, or Roman Catholic; rather, it must set itself to "spiritualize" the sense world. In assuming this responsibility, the churchman should recognize that there are some favorable elements in the mundane sphere. For instance, we must remember that "the special revelation which has been made to our age comes through natural science."

Although Dean Inge grants this concession to secularism, he does not appear to leave any room for its claims when he defines the field of Christian ethics. Christian ethics are theocentric; they focus in the Gospels wherein the mind and heart of Christ are revealed. A twofold task faces the writer: to disentangle the principles of Christ's teachings from the overgrown interpretations and interpolations of New Testament scribes, and to apply these standards of excellency in a fearless manner to the problems of our Western world. The contents of the book are divided somewhat evenly between the treatment of these questions.

The Dean disclaims any insuperable difficulty in isolating what are the principles that actuated the Christos. On the one hand, these are segregated by a painstaking study of the Hebrew, Stoic, and mystery cults of the first century to determine in what particulars the Lord contributed unique factors to normative living; and, on the other hand, they are understood to have sanction for modern men as the same divine Spirit that dwelt in him also works through them. The writer has no hesitancy about using such phrases as "the true interpretation," "the essence of Christian ethics," "in substance," "it would seem," and so on, to lend authority and finality to his scriptural exegesis. Thus, "Christianity lifts psychology out of mere subjectivism, and morality out of mere relativism."

The following modern problems receive the author's attention in the second half of the book: scientific claims for the world, industrial issues,

capital punishment, the status of women, eugenics, divorce, sex, war, and patriotism. The approach to them is marked by two features. In every instance, he traces, beginning with antiquity, the historic attitudes of successive civilizations and classical scholars toward these subjects. As a matter of fact, so much space is allotted to genetic studies that the text might well have been called "A History of Christian Ethics." This does not infer that the author's own comments on current maladjustments in society are inconsequential. On the contrary, his keen, fresh and fearless analysis of our social ills is most timely. It is striking to observe how far a State-Churchman can depart from generally accepted policies in his church and his nation. Magnanimity of spirit is illustrated in the remark, " there are no truer Christians than the Society of Friends." He stands opposed to the lodgment of great wealth in private hands. With General Sherman, he agrees that " war is hell," and that Christianity and State must part ways if governments insist on settling disputes by resort to bloodshed. Yet, corporal punishment has its legitimate function in the courts of justice. Women have more freedom than is good for them, especially the well-to-do have. The church should sponsor the teaching of the principles of birth control, rather than encourage by indifference illegal and injurious contraceptive measures. Divorce is approved " in a few other cases besides adultery."

The other feature that characterizes his approach to modern problems is the almost total neglect of the Christian principles which he articulates in the first part of the book. The absolute norms of right living which the Dean labored over with rare historical and critical insight are left high and dry; he adopts a strictly empirical view-point in grappling with issues incident to our industrial and democratic age. A more striking shift in methodologies could hardly be illustrated within the covers of a single text. The reader who is interested in making an intimate acquaintance with New Testament, historical, and current Christian ethics can scarcely find a more challenging treatment.

STEWART G. COLE.

Religious Education of Adults. W. EDWARD RAFFETY. New York: Fleming H. Revell. 1930. Pp. 214.

THE tenets of evangelism and popular education are mingled in conventional arrangement. Much of the vernacular is that of the lay " go-getter." Such a book may help stimulate activity in the adult department of the Sunday school, but such activity tends to be subject-matter centered and consequently without purposeful social direction.

STEWART G. COLE.

Constructive Citizenship. L. P. Jacks, D. D., Litt. D. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. 1930. Pp. 300. Price, $1.00.

One of the striking traits of religious leaders in Great Britain is their intelligent interest in workaday affairs. Whether it is the by-product of State-Church traditions or not, evangelicals, as well as ecclesiastical conformists, do participate in the responsibilities of civic leadership. Doctor Jacks illustrates this when he writes as intimately and feelingly about social pathology, the League of Nations, industrial conditions, civic reform, as he might about the Nicene formula, faith and works, or church union. He proceeds to discuss these mundane issues as one who is obliged in the name of humanity to have some constructive policies to offer with a view to healing the ills of his fellow men. The author is concerned particularly with "the industrial interpretation of the rights and duties of citizenship." To act on his suggestions would be to work out a high-minded type of lay-religion. Christianity would find one of its chief accomplishments in the production of a rugged social culture.

Constructive Citizenship was one of the earliest Religious Book Club selections, and is published now in the dollar "anvil" series of books.

Stewart G. Cole.

Personality in Its Teens. W. Ryland Boorman. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1931. Pp. xv and 268. Price, $2.50.

The personality of a teen-age boy represents individuality in degree as it does of a mature man or woman. The traits that differentiate him from them are distinctive and require special study for their definition. Mr. Boorman writes with authority on his theme, for he has spent years in successful boy leadership and training. This is his second book bearing on his professional interest. In *Developing Personality in Boys* he set forth the principles in social psychology that he has found useful in understanding adolescents. In the present volume he illustrates these principles freely with descriptive records from boys' correspondence; also he uncovers many of the behavior patterns that are characteristic of high-school boys.

The reviewer was forced time and again during his reading of the book to wish that parents and religious leaders, whose work calls them to minister to teen-age youth, would avail themselves of the learning that lies in these materials. The author struck upon a method of inquiry that drew from scores of boys, scattered across the continent and from every type of social class, frank confessions of problems and of ambitions entertained, that reveal the heart of this generation of high-school boys. He shares the confidences of twenty boys in particular, as they bear upon such subjects as family life, girl friends, club activities, athletics, vocational

selection, morals and religion. If one is interested in a cross-section of boy attitudes toward any ordinary life interest of adolescents, he will find it treated in this book. If he is concerned to trace the ups and downs, the victories and defeats, the realism and idealism, as they mingle in particular American boys, he will discover that also. The writer has purposefully couched his materials in untechnical language in order to make the book a welcome instrument in the hands of lay people.

STEWART G. COLE.

Seekers of Light. CLARENCE W. CRANFORD. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1930. Pp. 113. Price, $1.25.

INTEREST centers in book and author alike. Mr. Cranford is a graduate of Bucknell University, 1929, and is now at Crozer as a member of the Middle Class. His extra-mural work is that of Director of Young People's Activities at Grace Temple, Philadelphia, better known as Dr. Russell Conwell's church. Mr. Cranford has had unusual experience as a leader of young people in summer camp and assembly, and it is out of this experience that he writes *Seekers of Light.*

The volume before us is composed of ten chapters, which are as many devotional messages many times delivered to groups of young folk who seek light on some religious problem. I. "Seekers of Light," urges and encourages youth to go fearlessly in quest of truth, a process commended as most apt in curing doubts, because thereby one works his way through and out of them. Direction in such a quest is indicated by the youth motto, "Christ first—Others second—Self third." II. "The Greatness of God" sets forth a picture of the vast and ordered universe as given us by modern science, then proceeds to challenge the devout youth to think a God great enough to hold such in the hollow of his hand and good enough to nurture therein spiritual verities for men. III. "The Hand of God," casts up the question as to whether or not the hand of God is active in one's life and if so, how it operates. The Father does not predetermine, rather he sets us free and places in us a boundless confidence which makes us workers together with him in growing the Christ kind of life. IV. "The Closed Door," introduces us to Holman Hunt's beautiful picture, "The Light of the World," with its closed door. The fact that many young people are as doors closed against Christ is noted and the reasons sought. Among those discovered are, first a failure to grasp the fact that "Jesus shows us what God is, and what man may become," and second, a false approach to his divinity; rightly conceived, "His divinity was not the result—it was the cause." "Looking to Jesus," "How Beautiful My Brother Is," "Who Is My Brother?" "What of Self?" "The Pure in Heart," and "The Voice of Jesus," head chapters which complete an

interesting section of the trail blazed by one youth who joyously and freely is seeking light, the Light that lighteth every man.

Youth here speaks to youth in the language and passion of youth; it would be well if other multitudes of our young should join, by means of this volume, those free and fearless seekers after light.

WILLIAM R. MCNUTT.

The Young People's Department of the Sunday School. WILLIAM P. PHILLIPS and W. A. HARRELL. Nashville: The Sunday School Board. 1930. Pp. 240. Price, 60 cents.

IT is trite to say that modern industry creates under the sun a new thing, namely an industrial civilization. Whether or not it creates a new heaven may be debatable, but not so the fact that it creates a new earth. Our beautiful Southland does not know this yet, but in the next fifty years it will be wiser and sadder at this point. It will be learned that such a civilization haughtily commands, Take up the slack, get down to brass tacks! That some already have premonitions of this stern demand is revealed nowhere better than in a volume like the one under review. It is a handbook, of the proverbial "brass-tack" variety, for the teachers and officers of the young people's department of the church school. Here are chapter and verse for every act—"take up the slack!" Here is the kind of book that is necessary for too many schools both North and South. Let devout men pray for creative leaders in our church schools, who need not be told when to turn up their thumbs and when to turn them down.

WILLIAM R. MCNUTT.

The Lord's Prayer. FRIEDRICH RITTELMEYER. Translated from the German by S. M. K. Gandell. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1931. Pp. 192. Price, $1.75.

THIS volume of sermons, like the author's previous book *Behold the Man,* is much older than its translation. There is abundant evidence and even direct statement that the studies were first presented during the years of the World War.

Though critical scholarship has contributed to the author's use and understanding of the Lord's Prayer, it has failed to destroy his sense of its reverent beauty. He has passed beyond learned doubts. The Prayer is for him neither a rubric nor a rosary; it is a poem of the mystical appreciation of God.

The delicate touch of these sermons is that of the following picture:

"A church prayer is like a torch borne along at which any one may light his individual candle in his own way and go to his Father in secret" (p. 15).

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Preacher and His Missionary Message. STEPHEN J. COREY. Nashville, Tenn.: Cokesbury Press. Price, $1.50.

Protestant Cooperation in American Cities. H. PAUL DOUGLAS.

Digging Up Biblical History. Recent Archæology in Palestine and Its Bearing on the Old Testament. Vol. I. The Croall Lectures for 1928-29 Amplified by J. GARROW DUNCAN, B. D. New York: The Macmillan Company. Pp. 265. Price, $3.50.

Cadet Stephen. ALICE PICKFORD EVANS. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. Price, $1.25.

The Christian Ideal for Human Society. ALFRED E. GARVIE. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. Price, $4.00.

The Jesus of the Poets. An Anthology. Edited by LEONARD R. GRIBBLE. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc.

Psychology and Religious Experience. W. FEARON HALLIDAY, M. A. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. Price, $3.00.

Jesus—Lord or Leader. FRANK LENWOOD. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc.

Preaching Values. HALFORD E. LUCCOCK. New York: The Abingdon Press. Price, $2.00.

The Conflicts of the Early Church. W. D. NIVEN, M. A., D. D., Professor of Church History in Trinity College, Glasgow. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. Pp. 174. Price, $2.00.

The Reform Movement in Judaism. RABBI DAVID PHILIPSON. New York: The Macmillan Company. Price, $4.50.

Word Pictures in the New Testament. ARCHIBALD THOMAS ROBERTSON. Vol. III. "The Acts of the Apostles." New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. Price, $3.50.

THIS series was reviewed in a former number of THE QUARTERLY.

Religion in a Changing World. RABBI ABBA HILLEL SILVER. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. Price, $2.00.

Essentials. P. CARNEGIE SIMPSON, D. D. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. Price, $1.50.

The Religion of Man. The Hibbert Lectures for 1930. RABINDRANATH TAGORE. New York: The Macmillan Company. Pp. 241. Price, $2.50.

REVIEWED IN THIS NUMBER

Studies in Matthew. Benjamin W. Bacon, D. D., Litt. D. (Oxon.), Buckingham Professor (Emeritus) of New Testament Criticism and Exegesis in Yale University. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1930. Pp. xxvi and 533. Price, $4.00.

Dieu, l'éternel tourment des hommes. Pasteur Marc Boegner. Editions "Je sers." Clamert. 1929. Pp. 212.

Personality in Its Teens. W. Ryland Boorman. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1931. Pp. xv and 268. Price, $2.50.

The Problem of God. Edgar Sheffield Brightman. New York: The Abingdon Press. 1930. Pp. 209. Price, $2.00.

This Believing World. Lewis Browne. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. 347. Sixteenth reprinting. Price, $1.00.

Seekers of Light. Clarence W. Cranford. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1930. Pp. 113. Price, $1.25.

The Gospel According to Luke. John Martin Creed, B. D., Ely Professor of Divinity, Fellow of St. John's College, formerly Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. New York and London: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. xc and 340.

A History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy and Religion. William Cecil Dampier Dampier-Whetham. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. xxi and 514. Price, $4.00.

Christian Ethics and Modern Problems. W. R. Inge, Dean of St. Paul's. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1930. Pp. ix and 427. Price, $5.00.

Constructive Citizenship. L. P. Jacks, D. D., Litt. D. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. 1930. Pp. 300. Price, $1.00.

The Mysterious Universe. Sir James Jeans. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. ix and 163. Price, $2.25.

God in Christian Experience. W. R. Matthews, Dean of King's College, London. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1930. Pp. xix and 283. Price, $3.00.

Jesus or Christianity. Kirby Page. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc. 1929. Pp. 332. Price, $1.00.

The Young People's Department of the Sunday School. William P. Phillips and W. A. Harrell. Nashville: The Sunday School Board. 1930. Pp. 240. Price, 60 cents.

Adventures in Philosophy and Religion. James Bissett Pratt. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1931. Pp. xi and 263. Price, $2.00.

Religious Education of Adults. W. Edward Raffety. New York: Fleming H. Revell. 1930. Pp. 214.

The Lord's Prayer. Friedrich Rittelmeyer. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1931. Pp. 192. Price, $1.75.

An Anthology of Modern Philosophy. Daniel Sommer Robinson. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1931. Pp. xiii and 836. Price, $4.50.

The Coming Religion. Nathaniel Schmidt. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. 262. Price, $2.25.

The Moffatt New Testament Commentary. Epistles to Colossians, Philemon, Ephesians. E. F. Scott, D. D., Union Theological Seminary. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. 1930. Pp. xi and 257. Price, $3.50.

Morals of Tomorrow. Ralph W. Sockman, Ph. D. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1931. Price, $2.50.

The Issues of Life. Henry Nelson Wieman. New York: The Abingdon Press. 1930. Pp. 273. Price, $2.00.